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Abstract 
 
 
Simone Weil had a short but distinguished career as a French intellectual. Writing 
mainly between the two European wars of the twentieth century, Weil is more widely 
accredited for her later spiritual work. This thesis seeks instead to discuss the political 
aspect of Weil’s writing so that her early themes of labour and science can be charted 
as they develop through the later themes of oppression, liberty, power and force. I will 
show how her understanding of labour, liberty and science provide the foundation for 
her understanding of oppression and force. In charting her formal education, her 
Leftist syndicalist-revolutionary period and her critique of Marxism, I argue that her 
prolonged adherence to a pacifist position delays her comprehensive understanding of 
force, particularly during WWII. Importantly, it discusses the key stages 
chronologically, spanning the period 1925 – 1940, and relates them to the historical 
context of the period. This timeframe encompasses her earliest Lycée Henri- IV essays, 
a large proportion of her trade union journal articles, Réflexions sur les causes de la 
liberté et de l’oppression sociale and L’Iliade ou le poème de la force. I contend when 
she rejects these beliefs through a combination of maturing analysis and reflective 
experience that it became evident that oppression, power, and particualrly force are 
not only undeniable and ineradicable but at times necessary. 
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Introduction 
 
In Discussions of Simone Weil1 Rush Rhees expresses a sentiment that reverberates 
when approaching Simone Weil’s thought and writing. In attempting to understand 
how she described material things through Greek science and Descartes’s geometry to 
achieve a religious view of the world, Rhees suggests that perceptions like these 
invite academic criticism and seem wide open to it. But when I do try to criticise them in this 
way, I always expect that I am being stupid, that I am failing (unable) to read what she has 
written in the way that it should be read, that I simply misunderstood something to which my 
eyes have not be opened. And then I conclude that I must leave it there.2 
Acknowledging the depth and breadth of Weil’s body of work, this research 
concentrates on Weil’s political thought from her earliest Lycée Henri-IV essays to her 
writing around WWII. The purpose of this explicit concentration is to engage with her 
writing as it develops though revolutionary syndicalism, Marxism and pacifism and is 
achieved by investigating the philosophical and thematic nature of these transitions in 
parallel to the evolving European and Russian political turmoil of the interwar period 
of the twentieth century. I argue that Weil’s slow rejection of syndicalist-revolution in 
response to the rise of National Socialism, her refutation of Marxism through analysis 
of oppression in production-labour and the recognition of the limitations of pacifism 
following a complex investigation of force over the course of WWII define and hinder 
her philosophical development. 
 
 
1 Rush Rhees, Discussion of Simone Weil, ed. D.Z. Philips, ass. Mario von der Ruhr (Albany: State 
University of New York, 1999). 
2 Rhees, p. 64. 
2 
 
Aside from enhancing the undeveloped field of Weil’s political writing, I argue 
that research of this kind must engage with her earliest philosophical-political writing 
to reveal the foundation of her political thought.3 As a methodology this thesis will 
employ a chronological approach that identifies Weil’s themes with their development 
alongside evolving politics. This approach is necessary because Weil’s thought 
develops both in relation to intellectual ideas and the historical events to which they 
correspond. Problematically, much of the secondary critique engages with the later 
‘spiritual’ phase, or post-war phase, of her life, and because only a minority of the 
secondary research engages with Weil’s political writings, this thesis contributes to 
that limited field by concentrating on the development of her political thought in 
relation to the evolving political crisis surrounding the two World Wars. 
I contend that the distinction between the spiritual and political Weil has been 
affected by the way her early work appeared in obscure French trade union journals. 
However, the collection and serial publication by the French publishing house 
Gallimard is an excellent resource, especially concerning her unpublished work of the 
interwar period. If some secondary research relates to Weil’s political writings, a 
minute amount engages with Weil’s earliest writing. No research has shown how the 
themes of her political work are directly informed by her earliest writing. This is not 
to suggest that Weil’s early preoccupation with science, labour and force do not extend 
into the later work after WWII. I do not contend that Weil’s views on these themes do 
not change. Whilst the main source for this research is the Gallimard4 series on Weil, 
 
3 There is, possibly, also merited significance to be drawn from an investigative person charting the 
relation between her early writing and later work. However, it is not possible within the remit of this 
research. 
4 Simone Weil, Écrits de Londres et dernières lettres (Paris: Gallimard, 1957): Écrits historiques et 
politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988): 
Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: 
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I also research a series of texts by Dorothy Tuck McFarland and Wilhelmina van Ness, 
entitled, Simone Weil: Formative Writings 1929—19415 that gave access, not only to 
Weil’s thesis on Descartes, her reports on Germany’s convulsions just before Hitler 
became Chancellor, the journal d’usine6 and select essays on the political crises of the 
1930s, but to a number of unpublished fragments from the late 1930s. Thomas R. 
Nevin’s Simone Weil: Portrait of a Self-Exiled Jew7 not only addresses Weil’s 
thoughts and her prejudices but examines her reasons for entertaining them and gives 
them a historical focus. He claims that to Weil’s generation the Spanish Civil War, the 
Popular Front, the ascendance of Hitlerism, and the Vichy years were not mere 
backdrops but defining events. Lawrence A. Blum and Victor J. Seidler’s A Truer 
Liberty: Simone Weil and Marxism8 had a great influence on this research, showing 
how Weil’s philosophy sought to place political action on a firmly moral basis. The 
activity, freedom and dignity of the manual worker became the standard for political 
institutions and movements.  
Weil criticises Marxism for its confidence in progress and revolution and its 
attendant illusory belief that history is on the side of the proletariat. As a noted scholar 
of Marxism, David McLellan, in Utopian Pessimist: The Life and Thought of Simone 
Weil9 and Karl Marx: Selected Writings10 lends a judicious sympathy indispensable to 
 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991): Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, 
Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989). 
5 Simone Weil, Formative Writings 1929-1941, trans. & ed. by Dorothy Tuck McFarland and 
Wilhelmina van Ness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987). 
6 Simone Weil, Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la 
révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), pp. 153-282. 
7 Thomas R. Nevin, Simone Weil: Portrait of a Self-Exiled Jew (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1991). 
8 Lawrence A. Blum and Victor J. Seidler, A Truer Liberty: Simone Weil and Marxism (Oxon: 
Routledge, 1989). 
9 David McLellan, Utopian Pessimist: The Life and thought of Simone Weil (New York: Poseidon 
Press, 1990). 
10 Karl Marx, Karl Marx: Selected Writings, ed. David McLellan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000). 
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a study of Weil. Mary Dietz’s Between the Human and the Divine: The Political 
Thought of Simone Weil11 is partly related to this thesis. Drawing on Weil’s writings 
from 1934-1943, Dietz examines Weil from the psychoanalytical perspectives of 
rational dependence, impersonality and belonging and rootedness. Athanasios 
Moulakis in Simone Weil and the Politics of Self-Denial12 situates Weil’s political 
thought within the context of the intellectual climate of her time, where he connects 
her epistemology, her cosmology, and her personal experience. Moulakis is attentive 
to the ideological climate of the time in which doctrine is inseparable from the last 
days of the Third French Republic, the Spanish Civil War, and the rise and clash of 
totalitarianism. Peter Winch’s Simone Weil: The Just Balance13 shows that Weil needs 
to be taken seriously not only as a religious and political thinker but also as a 
philosopher. Winch brings the later Wittgenstein to bear on his analysis of Weil and 
traces her gradual move away from Cartesian dualism and rationalism.  
Rush Rhees’s Discussions of Simone Weil14 provides the most sustained 
critique to date of Weil’s views on science and religion. Rhees’s observations on the 
major themes in Weil’s philosophy of work and society, science, ethics and religion 
show how he wrestles with the difficulties he found in the work of Weil. It is, however, 
another example of where Weilian scholarship lacks political analysis as his starting 
point is Réflexions sure les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale. Assisting in 
the production of Rhees’s Discussions of Simone Weil, Mario von der Ruhr’s Simone 
 
11 Mary G. Dietz, Between the Human and the Divine: The Political Thought of Simone Weil (New 
Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield,1988). 
12 Athanasios Moulakis, Simone Weil and the Politics of Self-Denial, trans. by Ruth Hein (Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 1998). 
13 Peter Winch, Simone Weil: The Just Balance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
14 Rush Rhees, Discussion of Simone Weil, ed. D.Z. Philips, ass. Mario von der Ruhr (Albany: State 
University of New York, 1999). 
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Weil: An Apprenticeship in Attention15 is concerned largely with Weil’s middle to later 
period. Written from the perspective of Weil as a religious mystic, his work is a 
meditation on the essence of Christianity in relation to Weil. The early parts of E. Jane 
Doering’s Simone Weil and the Specter of Self-Perpetuating Force16 informs this 
research as it examines the material in Weil’s notebooks and lesser-known essays to 
illuminate her evolving thought on power, force, violence, war, and injustice. 
However, as the bulk of the book addresses Weil’s engagement with mysticism and 
the Bhagavad Gita during her final years, it seeks to encompass the entirety of Weil’s 
activist and intellectual search for moral value in a violent world. Accordingly, except 
for Blum and Seidler, McLellan’s Utopian Pessimist and Nevin, many of the 
secondary sources above limit their engagement with Weil’s earliest writings. 
Consequently, after noting that Doering’s Specter of the Self-Perpetuating Force 
begins with the rejection of pacifism, I sought to understand why, and so my research 
intends to reveal the foundation of Weil’s position. This method of developing from 
the textual foundation reflects the historical process as it relates to the development of 
ideas in the twentieth century. Above all, this chronological approach reveals insights 
into the development of Weil’s thought. A criticism of this method is the concern that 
I reproach Weil’s thought for developing, that somehow, I believe that her thought 
should remain fixed. I cannot conclude that what Weil initially believes or eventually 
concludes is correct. My only concern is that it did and I suggest that it did so in 
relation to political events. My critique is that it developed too gradually. 
 
 
15 Mario von der Ruhr, Simone Weil: An Apprenticeship in Attention (London: Contunuum, 2006). 
16 E. Jane Doering, Simone Weil and the Spectre of Self-Perpetuating Force (Indiana: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2010). 
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This thesis is divided into four chapters, namely, ‘Science and Labour in 
Philosophical Education’, ‘Syndicalisme’, ‘Oppression and Liberty’ and ‘Justification 
of Force’. It is structured chronologically to allow for a delineation of Weil’s writing 
in relation to social and political events. The chapters are correlated so that the 
development of the themes of science and labour, which are found in her earliest 
student essay and publications, can be connected and developed chronologically 
through to her syndicalist ideals and then to her engagement with Marxism before we 
can understand the relation of force. This chronological method exposes the layers that 
reveal Weil’s hesitant recognition of the limited acceptance of a justification of force. 
Chapter One, entitled, ‘Science and Labour in Philosophical Education’, 
discusses her writing that the Lycée Henri-IV and École Normale Supérieure period 
produced. The first and second sections details Weil’s philosophical topics in relation 
to Émile-Auguste Chartier, who gave Weil her most important lesson: that knowledge 
must be wedded to experience. Outlining Weil’s theory of labour, it will detail how it 
informed her dissertation on Descartes. It concludes that the themes of science and 
labour are central tenets to Weil’s earliest writing, which were to later underpin her 
thinking on syndicalisme and Marxism. 
Chapter Two, entitled, ‘The Socialist Left and Weil’s Syndicaliste revolution 
retreat’, outlines how Weil’s active engagement and participation with syndicalism 
began in Le Puy in 1931. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section 
describes the Socialist and syndicalist landscape. The second section situates Weil 
within that landscape. The third section shows the relationship of the first and second 
sections to her decision to withdraw from political life after she witnesses Germany’s 
syndicalist and political movements rendered ineffective in halting the rise of National 
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Socialism. It concludes that Weil dismisses syndicalism as a method of heralding her 
version of revolution. It is also of note that is developing a more refined philosophical 
outlook. Finding more philosophical nuance in her syndicalist experiences, Weil’s 
own writing reveals the need for a greater theoretical understanding. 
Chapter Three, entitled, ‘Oppression and Liberty in Réflexions sur les causes 
de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’,17 investigates Weil’s most developed writing 
on Marxism. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section discusses in 
order, ‘Concepts of Oppression and Liberty’, her ‘Factory Labour’ and the correlation 
between ‘Weil and Marxism’. The second section engages with the initial two chapters 
of Réflexions; ‘Critique du marxisme’18 and ‘Analyse de l’oppression’.19 The third 
section reflects on the two concluding chapters of Réflexions; ‘Tableau théorique 
d’une société libre’20 and ‘Esquisse de la vie sociale contemporaine’.21 This chapter 
concludes that Weil rejects Marxism because of Marx’s partial apprehension of the 
complexity of oppression, as she understands it, the consequence of which diverts him 
to an incomplete conclusion. 
 
 
17 Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques 
et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1991). 
18 Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques 
et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1991), pp. 31-47. 
19 Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques 
et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1991), pp. 47-71. 
20 Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques 
et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1991), pp. 71-93. 
21 Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques 
et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1991), pp. 93-106. 
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Chapter Four, entitled, ‘From Pacifism to Justification of Force’, provides the 
evidence for Weil’s evolution from ardent pacifism to a recognition of pacificism’s 
limitations in counteracting an opposing, physical force deployed by humans. Despite 
the subject of force holding a central place in Weil’s later political thought, I wait until 
the final chapter to elucidate the subject so that the reader can have a greater 
understanding of how her thought, which evolves through Cartesian activity, labour, 
science, oppression and power, comes to recognise the limitation of pacifism. This 
chapter is divided into six sections. The first section, entitled, ‘Power and Force’, 
presents Weil’s understanding of force and power in Réflexions sur les causes de la 
liberté et de l’oppression sociale. The second section of this chapter, ‘Reflections on 
War’, briefly discusses Weil’s reflections on war. The third section of this chapter, ‘A 
Response to Alain’s Challenge’, deals with Weil’s response to one of Alain’s 
questions on war. The fourth section of this chapter, ‘The Spanish Civil War’, reflects 
on Weil’s participation in the Spanish Civil War. The fifth section of this chapter, ‘The 
Power of Words’, assesses how Weil attempts to expose the power of words. The sixth 
section of this chapter, ‘The Tipping Point of Pacifism’, details an understanding of 
Weil’s “tipping point” of pacifism. This chapter concludes that Weil, while still 
retaining the principle of pacifism, recognises its limitations in physical confrontation. 
Consequently, as syndicalism and Marxism’s ineffectiveness are recognised 
and pacifism’s limitation is reached, As a method, the chronological nature of these 
chapters relate how the corresponding political timeline affects Weil’s thought in 
Réflexions and L’Iliade ou le poème de la force.22 I conclude that if pacifism is limited 
in its response to force, then force, in not only existing, is sometimes necessary. Force 
 
22 Simone Weil, ‘L’Iliade ou le poème de la force’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la 
guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989). 
9 
 
is not only a phenomenological characteristic of the world, but one which is required 
for our survival. In accepting that force exists in nature, irrespective of man, Weil 
argues that in society force continues to exist in the same natural guises but also 
produces new and concurring features where man evolves in society. A product of 
man’s interrelationship as he attempts to mitigate force manifests as power and the 
race for power. It is fair to suggest that Weil does not completely reject the aspirational 
merits of pacifism but recognises pacificism’s limits in counteracting an opposing, 
physical force deployed by humans. I contend though, in failing to employ a rigorous 
measure of doubt whilst advocating for syndicalism, Marxism and pacifism, it is 
evident that Weil’s beliefs stifle her development. In finally accepting that force is 
pervasive and weighs upon everyone, she then implores that it should be employed in 
the full knowledge of its consequences. 
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Chapter One 
 
Science and Labour in Philosophical Education 
 
Introduction 
 
To understand the themes that Weil will articulate in the years after she graduated 
from the École Normale Supérieure, this chapter outlines her philosophical education 
as it relates to the influences and themes found in her texts. This summary is necessary 
to underpin the first stage of this thesis that charts the development of Weil’s thought 
from pacifism to a justification of force. This chapter will show how Weil’s theories 
on science and labour derive from her earliest writing. The timeline of this material is 
from her attendance at the Lycée Henri-IV in Émile-Auguste Chartier’s class, hereafter 
known as Alain, in 1925 until her posting as a teacher in Le Puy in 1931 after 
graduating from the École Normale Supérieure. 
Structurally, this chapter is subdivided into four sections. The first section, 
entitled, ‘Philosophical influences’, outlines the educational relationship between 
Weil and Alain and poses the question as to whether this relationship is as important 
as the influences of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza and Kant, or indeed, the 
climate of politics and social revolution in France, Europe and Russia during her 
childhood and upbringing. The second section, entitled, ‘Themes and Philosophers’, 
correlates Weil’s earliest writing with the primary philosophers that are explicit in her 
texts through the application of several secondary sources.23 This section specifically 
 
23 Athanasios Moulakis in Simone Weil and the Politics of Self-Denial, David McLellan in Utopian 
Pessimist: The Life and Thought of Simone Weil, Mario von der Ruhr in Simone Weil: An 
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discusses her essays: Le Conte des cygnes dans Grimm,24 Le beau et le bien25and  
L’existence et l’objet26 before introducing a critique of the first of Weil’s published 
articles, De la perception ou l’aventure de Protée.27 It is through this first publicised 
article that we encounter a burgeoning engagement with the theme of labour. The third 
section, entitled, ‘Theory of Labour’, assesses Du temps28 in relation to the Kantian 
view of time as an a priori form of thought. Extending the implications of her 
reflections on labour into more concrete areas, we observe in her later article, Le 
travail comme médiation29 that Weil considers us separated from ourselves by work. 
The fourth section, entitled, ‘Dissertation on Labour’, shows how her theory of labour 
culminated in a dissertation, Science et perception dans Descartes.30 In this major 
work we find a critique of science and the shaping of her theory on labour, which I 
discuss in the following chapter. Nevertheless, because of Weil’s youth and 
developing education, this chapter is not overly critical of this early period. Instead, it 
seeks to unravel an under-researched period to provide the methodical foundation for 
a critique of science and labour so further chapters can consider their relation to 
pacifism, syndicalism and Marxism. 
  
 
Apprenticeship in Attention, Miklos Vetö’s in The Religious Metaphysics of Simone Weil and Thomas 
R. Nevin in his Simone Weil: Portrait of a Self-Exiled Jew. 
24 Also translated by McLellan as Grimm’s Fairy Tale of the Six Swans. 
25 The Beautiful and the Good. 
26 Existence and Object. 
27 Concerning Perception or the Adventures of Proteus. 
28 Concerning Time. 
29 Work as Meditation. 
30 Science and Perception in Descartes. 
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1.1 Philosophical Influences 
 
Despite attending lectures given by René Le Senne and Leon Brunschvicg in the Lycée 
Henri-IV and the École Normale Supérieure, Moulakis argues in Simone Weil and the 
Politics of Self-Denial that ‘[Weil] acquired the most important part of her schooling 
in philosophy from Alain’.31 There is little argument that Alain influenced Weil. But 
we cannot truly know nor dismiss Alain’s influence on Weil’s thinking. Her education 
would have also been heavily influenced by the French tradition of Descartes. 
Moulakis states that ‘French philosophy was shaped by Descartes [and that] [f]or three 
centuries Descartes remained the patron saint of French thought’.32 One of the 
endearing qualities of Descartes was that ‘[h]is style not only satisfied literary taste; it 
shaped it to a considerable extent [and] […] his work could be influential in a way that 
could not be achieved by, say, Auguste Comte with his convoluted French’.33 David 
McLellan is more definitive in Utopian Pessimist: The Life and Thought of Simone 
Weil when he states that Alain ‘had more influence on the development of her thought 
than any other of her contemporaries’.34 However, Thomas R. Nevin states in his 
Simone Weil: Portrait of Self-Exiled Jew that Alain’s ‘influence on her can be read 
throughout her mature writings’,35 which implies that Alain was not as influential on 
Weil’s early writing as McLellan states. The problem that McLellan states is that, 
while ‘Alain presented his pupils with a view of the world, 36 which left a profound 
 
31 Moulakis, Simone Weil and the Politics of Self-Denial, trans. by Ruth Hein (Columbia: University 
of Missouri Press, 1998), p. 80. 
32 Moulakis, Simone Weil and the Politics of Self-Denial, p. 82. 
33 Ibid. 
34 David McLellan, Utopian Pessimist: The Life and thought of Simone Weil (New York: Poseidon 
Press, 1990), p. 12. 
35 Thomas R. Nevin, Simone Weil: Portrait of a Self-Exiled Jew (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1991), p. 39.  
36 ‘Alain rejected any idea of system and his favoured vehicle was the short essay or Propos, dealing 
with a single highly specific question or event, of which he published thousands during his lifetime. 
Alain himself concentrated on style and approach more than originality of doctrine. A radical in politics, 
13 
 
impression on them, [it was] difficult to summarise’.37 When Weil presented her thesis 
titled, Science et perception dans Descartes38 to her École Normale Supérieure 
dissertation supervisor, Leon Brunschvicg, Moulakis states that ‘the work is 
influenced by Alain, who was a Cartesian in the sense that he not only accepted 
Descartes’s dualism as the truth but went further to raise it to the absolute criterion of 
those philosophies that can be trusted’.39 
If one agrees, as Moulakis states, ‘[i]n Alain’s work, as in Weil’s, [that 
Cartesian] dualism was the indication of critical philosophy, as opposed to ontology 
and ideology, [and thus, a] protection against creating a closed system, Alain’s refusal 
to present his work in systematic form, his use of the format of the propos, is part of 
this attitude’,40 then one finds Weil’s early precepts. This is evidenced by Winch who 
states that ‘she is concerned, roughly, with the nature of human beings, material beings 
in a material world, who think; and with the relation between the human thinking and 
the materiality of the human world.’41 As evidence, one finds echoes of Moulakis, 
McLellan, Winch and Nevin’s line of thinking in Miklos Vetö’s passage in The 
Religious Metaphysics of Simone Weil. 42 The statements are intended to show that 
 
he had been an active defender of Dreyfus and, although an ardent pacifist, had enlisted in the war as a 
simple foot-soldier as an act of solidarity - an example that Weil was to follow later in Spain. An 
essayist, therefore, as much as a philosopher, he was also a great classicist, and denied that there was 
any progress in philosophy, and had no time for historical detail. His aim was to re-think the great 
tradition of Plato and Descartes in the light of Kant, whose ideas had been transmitted to him by his 
own philosophy teacher, Jules Lagneau, for whom Alain conserved an unbounded admiration.’ 
McLellan, Utopian Pessimist, p. 12. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Science and Perception in Descartes. 
39 Moulakis, Simone Weil and the Politics of Self-Denial, p. 83. Quoted from André Bridoux, ‘Extraits’ 
in Alain. Sa vie, son œuvre avec un exposé de sa philosophie (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
1964), p. 99. See also Simone Pétrement, Simone Weil: A Life, trans. Raymond Rosenthal (New York: 
Schocken Books,1976), p. 38. 
40 Moulakis, Simone Weil and the Politics of Self-Denial, p. 83. 
41 Peter Winch, Simone Weil: The Just Balance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.2. 
42 ‘[Weil’s] thought, which betrays a certain heteronomy of philosophical, religious, and, occasionally, 
openly scientific ideas, hardly corresponds to the traditional conception of metaphysics. Descartes was 
the thinker who influenced her the most, after Plato and Kant; but toward the end of her life, she would 
not hesitate to affirm that, to her mind, the founder of Cartesianism was not a philosopher in the 
authentically Platonic and Pythagorean sense of the word, and to conclude that ‘ever since the 
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Weil was traditionally orientated in her educational atmosphere. From Alain, Plato, 
Aristotle, Spinoza and Descartes we find a large proportion of Weil’s philosophy, or 
at least its influence. There can be disagreement or discussion to the extent of their 
influence, or whether she is concerned more with Spinoza than Descartes, or Plato 
rather than Aristotle. The most notable point to observe is that Weil was eminently 
educated in the pillars of philosophy. Mario von der Ruhr writes in Simone Weil: An 
Apprenticeship in Attention that Alain and Weil 
realised that there was a strong temptation to model non-scientific modes of discourse on the 
structural and stylistic templates dictated by the natural sciences, and that the failure to resist 
that temptation invariably generated conceptual confusion and, by implication, a certain kind 
of superficiality in thought and feeling.43 
It can be inferred from von der Ruhr’s passage that Weil has not yet begun to form the 
themes that mark her political thought. I argue, however, that the essential hallmark 
of Alain’s influence on Weil is not overtly philosophical, in terms of the people or 
subjects he taught, though that is undeniable as evidenced above. One can propose that 
the more prevailing influence may not have been a Cartesian or philosophical 
direction, but, as McLellan states, that Weil’s ‘indignant opposition to the prevailing 
social order and her enthusiasm for the cause of the underdog found a ready echo in 
Alain’s teaching’.44 Siân Miles in Simone Weil: An Anthology states that Weil 
‘believed, like Alain, that philosophy is the explanation of the obvious through the 
obscure.’45 The most important method in revealing the obscure is Weil’s engagement 
in active philosophy. It was Alain’s friendship with Lucien Cancouët, a railway worker 
and active member in the Communist-affiliated union, C.G.T.U (Confédération 
 
disappearance of Greece, there has been no philosopher’.’ Miklos Vetö, The Religious Metaphysics of 
Simone Weil, trans. Joan Dorgan (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), pp. 2-3. 
43 Mario von der Ruhr, Simone Weil: An Apprenticeship in Attention (London: Contunuum, 2006), p. 
51. 
44 McLellan, Utopian Pessimist, p. 14. 
45 Simone Weil: An Anthology, ed. by Sian Miles (London: Penguin Classics, 2005), p. 10. 
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générale du travail unitaire), that began Weil’s participation in teaching trade-
unionists. Aside from preparing her for a professional career teaching philosophy, 
Alain’s influence stirred an ‘interest in labour relations and in the nature of labour 
itself […] long before Simone Weil became an undergraduate.’46 Miles states that 
[t]he connection between her experiences at the working men’s school in the rue Falguière and 
her studies at the Ecole Normale Supérieure was crucially important. It provided the link 
between her most deeply held beliefs and the means of their implementation.47   
This is Alain’s most important legacy passed to Weil. As Winch states, the main issue 
which Weil attempts to confront is that ‘human beings are essentially active beings, 
[that] [t]heir greatest good lies in the exercise of their activity.’48 The nature of this 
activity quickly evolves to become one of Weil’s lifelong themes: labour. Weil 
expressed this continuing commitment to workers’ education in a letter to a former 
student in 1934, stating, ‘[t]he most important [positive work for the foundation of a 
new and more humane order than the present one] is the popularisation of knowledge, 
and especially scientific knowledge. Culture is a privilege which, in these days, gives 
power to the class which possesses it.’49 When Lawrence A. Blum and Victor J. Seidler 
state in A Truer Liberty: Simone Weil and Marxism that ‘Alain was suspicious of 
organised political parties, [that] he emphasised the importance of freedom of 
individual thought, was sceptical of political ideologies, and criticised socialism for 
insufficiently protecting the individual against abuses of power’50 one can almost find 
Weil’s entire canon and life unfolding in a few short lines. Her ideas and her life, 
though bound tightly, are not as closely linked with Alain as some sources suggest. 
Providing a pedagogical framework instead of strict systematic adherences, he 
 
46 Simone Weil: An Anthology, ed. by Sian Miles (London: Penguin Classics, 2005), p. 9. 
47 Miles, p. 10. 
48 Winch, p. 6. 
49 Simone Weil, Seventy Letters, ed. and arr. by Richard Rhees (London: Oxford University Press, 
1965), p. 2. 
50 Lawrence A. Blum and Victor J. Seidler, A Truer Liberty: Simone Weil and Marxism (Oxon: 
Routledge, 1989), p. 1. 
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instilled his students with a social concern, as citizens, and taught philosophy as an 
active subject, one practised and experienced. One can argue that Alain nurtured 
intellectual, cultural, historical, political and literary curiosity in the French and 
European traditions. This abound foundation, when combined with a broad 
philosophical skillset, encouraged students to question, why this world, and what I 
ought to do?  These are aspects to consider when we engage in the next section with 
some of Weil’s earliest writings during Alain’s class (Oct. 1925 – Jul. 1928). 
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1.2 Themes and Philosophers 
 
During her first year at Henri-IV, Weil’s main interests were around human action and 
morality, as evidenced by two essays that she wrote. In an (Nov. 1925) essay, entitled, 
Le Conte des cygnes dans Grimm,51 Weil recounted the story of a young woman whose 
six brothers have been changed into swans.52 The lessons that Weil draws from this 
story is that ‘pure abstention is active […]; the only force in this world is purity; 
everything that is without admixture is a piece of the truth […] [and that] the only 
force and the only virtue is to abstain from action’.53 At the time of writing this essay 
Weil had yet to become involved in the active philosophy outlined earlier. Abstention 
as activity changes completely to engagement. Her references to force as purity and 
virtue will undergo radical alteration. This essay does highlight Weil’s engagement 
with Aristotle and Plato, though it is Plato who Weil cites on four occasions, where 
 
51 Simone Weil, ‘Le conte des six cygnes dans Grimm’, in Premiers écrits philosophie, Tome I: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), pp. 57-59. 
52 To have them changed back into their true selves, she must sew six shirts from white anemones while 
keeping silent. This takes her six years, during which she marries a king and is accused by her mother-
in-law of murdering her children. Not being able to reply, she is condemned to death and is on the point 
of being executed when the six swans arrive. Throwing the shirts on them, they are transformed. 
53 ‘Ici, l’abstention pure agit. L’amour du roi, les accusations de sa mère rendent l’épreuve plus difficile; 
mais sa vraie vertu n’est pas là. Il faut qu’elle soit difficile: l’on ne fait rien sans effort; mais sa vertu 
est en elle-même. La tâche de coudre six chemises ne fait que fixer son effort et l’empêcher d’agir: car 
tous les actes lui sont impossibles si elle doit la mener à bout, excepté parler et rire. Le néant d’action 
possède donc une vertu. Cette idée rejoint le plus profond de la pensée orientale. Agir n’est jamais 
difficile: nous agissons toujours trop et nous répandons sans cesse en actes désordonnés. Faire six 
chemises avec des anémones, et se taire: c’est là notre seul moyen d’acquérir de la puissance. Les 
anémones ici ne représentent pas, comme on pourrait croire, l’innocence en face de la soie des chemises 
enchantées; quoique sans doute celui qui s’occupe six ans de coudre des anémones blanches n’est 
distrait par rien; ce sont des fleurs parfaitement pures; mais surtout les anémones sont presque 
impossibles à coudre en chemise, et cette difficulté empêche aucune autre action d’altérer la pureté de 
ce silence de six ans. La seule force en ce monde est la pureté; tout ce qui est sans mélange est un 
morceau de vérité. Jamais des étoffes chatoyantes n’ont valu un beau diamant. Les fortes architectures 
sont de belle pierre pure, de beau bois pur, sans artifice. Quand l’on ne ferait, comme méditation, que 
suivre pendant une minute l’aiguille des secondes sur le cadran d’une montre, ayant pour objet l’aiguille 
et rien d’autre, on n’aurait pas perdu son temps. La seule force et la seule vertu est de se retenir d’agir’. 
Simone Weil, ‘Le conte des six cygnes dans Grimm’, in Premiers écrits philosophie, Tome I: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), pp. 58-59. 
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she iterates, that ‘[t]his is not a tale but a discourse, Plato would say’.54 We must, 
however, be careful about drawing too many inferences from this essay as she is still 
learning and developing her philosophical studies. 
 In the second (Feb. 1926), more extensively developed, essay, entitled, Le beau 
et le bien,55 Weil identifies the good with an act of free will by which the individual 
conformed to the moral law. Nevin states that ‘she showed the influence of Alain’s 
Protagorean devotions’56 by equating God with humanity and the human spirit, ‘[a] 
position quite foreign to her later thinking’.57 The example of such a beautiful act is 
Alexander’s refusal of the helmet full of water that one of his soldiers brings him when 
the army is marching through a desert. When Alexander poured the water on the 
ground, his action might be apparently useless and wasteful. For Weil, however, this 
ceremonious renunciation of water creates a solidarity with his soldiers, whose thirst 
is quenched by their leader’s act. The moral is that to 
save the world it is enough to be just and pure; which is expressed by the myth of the Man—
God who redeems the sins of humanity by justice alone without any political action. We must 
therefore save in ourselves the spirit of which external humanity is the myth. Sacrifice is the 
acceptance of suffering, the refusal to obey the animal in ourselves, and the will to redeem 
suffering humanity by voluntary suffering. Every saint has poured the water away; every saint 
has refused all happiness which means being separated from the sufferings of humanity.58 
 
 
54 ‘Ce n’est pas là un conte, mais un discours, dirait Platon’. Simone Weil, ‘Le conte des six cygnes 
dans Grimm’, in Premiers écrits philosophie, Tome I: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 
58. 
55 Simone Weil, ‘Le beau et le bien’, in Premiers écrits philosophie, Tome I: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1988), pp. 60-73. 
56 Nevin, Simone Weil: Portrait of a Self-Exiled Jew, p. 48. 
57 Nevin, Simone Weil: Portrait of a Self-Exiled Jew, p. 49. 
58 ‘Il suffirait donc d’être juste et pur pour sauver le monde; ce qu’exprime le mythe de l’Homme-Dieu, 
qui rachète les péchés des hommes par la seule justice et sans aucune action politique. Il faut donc se 
sauver soi-même; sauver en soi l’Esprit, dont l’humanité extérieure est le mythe. Le sacrifice est 
l’acceptation de la douleur, le refus d’obéir à l’animal en soi, et la volonté de racheter les hommes 
souffrants par la souffrance volontaire. Chaque saint a répandu l’eau; chaque saint a refusé tout bonheur 
qui le séparerait des souffrances des hommes’. Simone Weil, ‘Le beau et le bien’, in Premiers écrits 
philosophie, Tome I: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 71. 
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Duty to oneself, therefore, coincided with duty towards humanity and consisted in a 
self-mastery, which enabled one freely to choose to share the common position. Mario 
von der Ruhr states that Weil ‘is concerned with the kinds of considerations that would 
prompt us to say of an action that it is beautiful, and how, indeed, the notions of beauty 
and goodness are related to each other’.59 
These moral considerations are complemented by more strictly philosophical 
concern, as Weil saw an intimate link between will and thought in that perfect freedom 
coincided with perfect knowledge. We can also read the influence of Aristotle and 
Spinoza on Weil, in that they both regard that man’s greatest attribute – the attribute 
of reason – must be demonstrated practically as well as theoretically. Fulfilling our 
nature depends upon establishing order over the emotions. Relating this connection, 
Weil writes: 
Let us consider then a beautiful action. There is none more universally admired than that of 
Alexander who, suffering from thirst along with his whole army which he was leading across 
a desert, poured out on the ground a little water that a soldier had brought to him in a helmet. 
What are we thinking when we say that this action is beautiful?60 
Von der Ruhr offers the critique that Weil is aware of the difference in approach to 
this seemingly wasteful use of water. He states that ‘Weil knows that there will be 
readers who [would not] think that Alexander’s action was beautiful at all — that 
pouring the water away was useless, for example, as Alexander was leading an army, 
and a thirsty leader is less likely to be efficient than one whose thirst has been 
quenched’.61 However, Weil argues that a defender of Alexander will reply that the 
action of shedding water is more useful to the army than water could have been, 
 
59 von der Ruhr, Simone Weil: An Apprenticeship in Attention, p. 57. 
60 ‘Considérons donc une belle action. Il n’en est pas de plus universellement admirée que celle 
d’Alexandre qui, souffrant de la soif, avec toute son armée qu’il faisait passer par un désert, versa sur 
le sol un peu d’eau qu’un soldat lui avait apportée dans un casque. Que pensons-nous quand nous disons 
que cette action est belle?’. Simone Weil, ‘Le beau et le bien’, in Premiers écrits philosophie, Tome I: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 67. 
61 von der Ruhr, Simone Weil: An Apprenticeship in Attention, p. 58. 
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because it is calculated to give courage.62 This is a point of interpretation because 
drinking the water is as useful as pouring it away. Nevin, however, outlines that this 
passage exemplifies an element of rigidity in Weil’s early thinking on morality, 
stating: 
[Weil] takes up both the beautiful and the good without seeking their identification and 
concludes by affirming it. Weil presumes that because a human being has ideas of the good, 
the beautiful, and the true, they have a kind of unity in the human, but she recognises that a 
work of art might not be conformed to the good. Further, good conceived merely as morality 
is rigid and severe, yet the Jansenists’ disapproval of art suggests to her that there might be a 
chasm between beauty and the good.63 
We must assume that Weil is not stating that the pouring of water sated the thirst of 
the soldiers, while the point of courage is also moot. Rejecting both these ideas, Weil 
argues that ‘the utility of his action is in effect beside the point’.64 If we want to get to 
the heart of the matter, we must pay attention to other aspects of Alexander’s action: 
Alexander, after a first movement that is purely mechanical, stands motionless while the 
soldier draws near. The army does not spring toward the water either, and it does not even look 
on it with greed; it directs its gaze to human signs, that is to say, it looks at its leader. 
Alexander, all the while the soldier was coming toward him, made no movement toward the 
water; when the soldier is close by, he finally takes the helmet, and stands motionless a 
moment. The army stands motionless too, its eyes fixed on him; and the universe is filled with 
the silence and the tension of expectation of these men. Suddenly, at the necessary instant, 
neither too soon nor too late, Alexander pours out the water; and the tension toward it is as it 
were released. No one, Alexander less than anyone, would have dared to foresee this 
astonishing action; but once the action is accomplished, there is no one who does not feel that 
it had to be like this.65 
 
62 ‘Un défenseur d’Alexandre répondra que l’action de répandre l’eau était plus utile à l’armée que l’eau 
n’aurait pu l’être, parce qu’elle était propre à donner du courage’. Simone Weil, ‘Le beau et le bien’, in 
Premiers écrits philosophie, Tome I: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 67. 
63 Nevin, Simone Weil: Portrait of a Self-Exiled Jew, pp. 148-149. 
64 ‘Bon, dira l’autre, Alexandre était un habile général; cela n’est pas encore beau. Et l’utilité de l’action 
d’Alexandre est en effet en dehors de la question’. Simone Weil, ‘Le beau et le bien’, in Premiers écrits 
philosophie, Tome I: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 67. 
65 ‘Alexandre, après un premier mouvement purement mécanique, reste immobile tandis que le soldat 
s’approche. L’armée non plus ne bondit pas vers l’eau, et ne la regarde même pas avec convoitise; elle 
dirige ses regards sur les signes humains, c’est-à-dire qu’elle observe le chef. Alexandre, tout le temps 
que le soldat venait vers lui, n’a pas fait un geste vers l’eau; quand le soldat est tout près il prend enfin 
le casque, et reste un moment immobile. L’armée reste immobile aussi, les yeux fixés sur Alexandre; 
et l’univers est rempli du silence et de l’attente de tous ces hommes. Soudain, à l’instant qu’il faut, ni 
trop tôt ni trop tard, Alexandre répand l’eau; et l’attente en est comme délivrée. Personne, Alexandre 
moins que tout autre, n’aurait osé prévoir cette action étonnante ; mais une fois l’action accomplie, il 
n’est personne qui n’ait le sentiment que cela devait être ainsi’. Simone Weil, ‘Le beau et le bien’, in 
Premiers écrits philosophie, Tome I: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 68. 
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The beauty of Alexander’s action is ‘therefore the same as that of a ceremony; and it 
may be said that the action of Alexander is ceremony’,66 meaning, as von der Ruhr 
states, ‘he remained still at the crucial moment, and that his subsequent pouring out of 
the water is part of a geometry of renunciation in which his own motives and those of 
his soldiers are perfectly aligned’.67  
Concentrating on the utility of Alexander pouring or drinking the water misses 
the point. In rejecting water that they could not also drink, Alexander shares and binds 
the suffering of his men. In rejecting the solution to their thirst, Alexander rejects a 
desire and his position as leader. The beautiful act is stripping Alexander and his men 
of their differences and binding their faith together, for Weil states: 
And in effect the soldier who brings the water, and the army that looks at it, renounce the water 
too; they renounce it for Alexander; he renounces it for them; each man is, like the stones of a 
temple, at once end and means.68 
We again observe that Weil is stipulating that the goodness of an action is derived 
from a non-action, which is also found in Le Conte des six cygnes dans Grimm. Nevin 
argues that ‘[Weil] never quite relinquished Plato’s prejudice that the love of beauty 
is the one immediate avenue to the good vouchsafed to this life—a reflection of the 
Greeks’ inclination to blur differences between the aesthetic and the moral’.69 If an 
ethical decision is to be considered and there is no obvious solution to sharing a minute 
amount of water with an army, then adhering to an act that is empathetic to the plight 
of his soldiers allows Weil to cast Alexander in the light of Aristotelian goodness, 
 
66 ‘La beauté de l’action d’Alexandre est donc la même que celle d’une cérémonie; et l’on peut dire que 
l’action d’Alexandre est cérémonie’. Simone Weil, ‘Le beau et le bien’, in Premiers écrits philosophie, 
Tome I: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 69. 
67 von der Ruhr, Simone Weil: An Apprenticeship in Attention, p. 58. 
68 ‘Et en effet, le soldat qui apporte l’eau, et l’armée qui regardent, renoncent aussi à cette eau; ils y 
renoncent pour Alexandre; Alexandre y renonce pour eux; chaque homme est, comme les pierres du 
temple, à la fois fin et moyen’. Simone Weil, ‘Le beau et le bien’, in Premiers écrits philosophie, Tome 
I: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 69. 
69 Nevin, Simone Weil: Portrait of a Self-Exiled Jew, p. 148. 
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where truth is emphasised alongside virtue and beauty. At this early point, that Weil 
is aware and is basing these ethical considerations on Greek philosophy is prescient as 
her writing attunes to unfolding political events. 
Weil rearticulates the virtues of the decision by presenting an image of 
Alexander alone in desert. Again, finding water, the consideration to drink is 
undeniable. Yet, Weil’s response is clear. Were Alexander to drink the water, the 
beauty of the action disintegrates. 
The sacrifice consists in the acceptance of pain, in the refusal to obey the animal in oneself, 
and in the will to redeem suffering men by voluntary suffering. Every saint has poured out the 
water; every saint has refused all well-being that would separate him from the sufferings of 
men.70 
Von der Ruhr is satisfied that ‘[t]here is something saintly in this renewed 
renunciation’.71 In heightening the moral implications of acting dutifully, even when 
nobody is watching, Weil wants to underscore that proximity is not the basis for action. 
It is more important for Weil that we are cognisant of others’ suffering even when we 
cannot witness it. Nevin surmises that Weil insists that ‘[Alexander’s] action was good 
[…] because he delivered himself from the thirsty animal within him, he gave up the 
water on behalf of his men as they did for him. His action was beautiful because he 
and his men, serve in this story as means and end’.72 Weil identifies the good with an 
act of free will by which Alexander conforms to the moral law. I believe that empathy 
is this moral law and that beauty is in the acceptance of a shared sacrifice. The 
Aristotelian or philosophical ideas have merit, yet the essay is essentially a student 
exercise in philosophy. The main point to draw from the essay is the idea of shared 
 
70 ‘Le sacrifice est l’acceptation de la douleur, le refus d’obéir à l’animal en soi, et la volonté de racheter 
les hommes souffrants par la souffrance volontaire. Chaque saint a répandu l’eau; chaque saint a refusé 
tout bonheur qui le séparerait des souffrances des hommes’. Simone Weil, ‘Le beau et le bien’, in 
Premiers écrits philosophie, Tome I: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 71. 
71 von der Ruhr, Simone Weil: An Apprenticeship in Attention, p. 59. 
72 Nevin, Simone Weil: Portrait of a Self-Exiled Jew, p. 150. 
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sacrifice. It is this concept that endures in Weil’s work longer than any impressions of 
goodness and beauty. 
 In 1929, the journal Libres Propos published the first of two articles where 
Weil now concentrated on the idea of work. In the first published article, entitled, De 
la perception ou l’aventure de Protée,73 Weil recounted the Homeric myth of Proteus, 
a sea-god of ancient Greece, who had the gift of assuming any shape he wished. 
Proteus is analogous for the age-old problem of correct perception: ‘We all learn to 
perceive between the ages of one and four and all our life, through science, culture, art 
and work, we merely commemorate this first revolution’.74 For Weil, the Protean 
impressions that the external world made upon the mind were not to be brought to heel 
by reflection alone, whether it was that of the geometrician or the physicist. 
Essentially, the concept of space is essential to perception and it is labour that provides 
an understanding of space.  
Thus, for a man who takes refuge in a cave and wishes to block the entrance with a large rock, 
necessity dictates first that the movements that permit him to do this have no relation to the 
spontaneous movements that, for example, cause him to fear ferocious beasts, and are even 
their direct opposite.75 
 
 
73 Simone Weil, ‘De la perception ou l’aventure de protée’, in Premiers écrits philosophie, Tome I: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), pp. 121-139. 
74 ‘Nous apprenons tous à percevoir entre un an et quatre ans, et toute notre vie, par les sciences, la 
culture, les arts, le travail, nous ne faisons que commémorer cette révolution première’. Simone Weil, 
‘De la perception ou l’aventure de protée’, in Premiers écrits philosophie, Tome I: Œuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1988), pp. 134-135. 
75 ‘Le travail, par opposition à la réflexion, à la persuasion, à la magie, c’est une suite d’actions qui 
n’ont aucun rapport direct, ni avec l’émotion première, ni avec le but poursuivi, ni les unes avec les 
autres; ainsi pour un homme qui, par exemple, abrité dans une caverne, veut en boucher l’entrée par 
une grosse pierre, la loi est d’abord que les mouvements qui lui permettront de le faire n’ont aucun 
rapport avec les mouvements spontanés que causait en lui, par exemple, la peur des bêtes féroces, et 
leur sont même directement contraires. Simone Weil, ‘De la perception ou l’aventure de protée’, in 
Premiers écrits philosophie, Tome I:  Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 125.  
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Conjuring the Plato of L’existence et l’objet76 and again the geometrical or algebraic 
movement found in Le Beau et le bien, Weil insists that ‘a workman who ceaselessly 
experiences the law of work can know much more both about himself and the world 
than the mathematician who studies geometry’. 77 McLellan argues that the ‘rather 
forced and awkward argument of this article reflected Weil’s desire to integrate 
manual labour into her previously more abstract philosophical considerations’.78 In Le 
Conte des cygnes dans Grimm, Le beau et le bien and De la perception ou l’aventure 
de Protée we find Weil grappling with abstention as an activity in Le Conte, which the 
transmutes to a working engagement in Protée. Her references to force as purity and 
virtue will undergo radical alteration, while Le beau et le bien constitutes Weil’s 
foundation in a shared suffering. Whether this suffering is beautiful is somewhat 
beside the point. The important aspect is that she believes that only sharing the 
experience of other people’s suffering constitutes a virtue worth pursuing. Alain’s 
legacy to Weil is a philosophy of participation; Weil’s participation is empathy 
through activity. 
  
 
76 Simone Weil, ‘L’existence et l’objet’, in Premiers écrits philosophie, Tome I:  Œuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1988), pp. 80-88. 
77 ‘Bien mieux, un ouvrier qui éprouve sans cesse la loi du travail peut connaître bien plus et sur lui-
même et sur le monde que le mathématicien qui étudie la géométrie sans savoir qu’elle est une physique, 
que le physicien qui ne donne pas leur pleine valeur aux hypothèses géométriques. L’ouvrier peut être 
sorti de la caverne, les membres de l’Académie des sciences peuvent se mouvoir parmi les ombres’. 
Simone Weil, ‘De la perception ou l’aventure de protée’, in Premiers écrits philosophie, Tome I: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), pp. 136-137. 
78 McLellan, Utopian Pessimist, p. 22. 
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1.3 Theory of Labour 
 
These reflections on labour were continued in the second article that Weil published 
in Libres Propos. Du temps79 and consists of an analysis on Kant’s view of time as an 
a priori form of thought. For Weil, time was ‘this separation between what I am and 
what I want to be, such that the only path from myself to myself is work, a relationship 
between myself and myself that is forever being undone and that only work can tie 
together again’.80 The law of time, therefore, is the law according to which ‘effort, an 
action of the mind is the only means of passing from project to work; from the project, 
going to work, I exercise my power’.81 Since the world was composed of objects that 
were simply juxtaposed without any necessary connection 
it is only by the trial of work that space and time are presented to me, always together, time as 
the condition, and space as the object, of any action; the law of work prescribes, with regard 
to my action, that it has duration, with regard to the world, that it is extended.82  
Weil concludes that we must ‘awaken again to the world, that is, to work and 
perception, while still having the courage to observe this rule  […] to lower our body 
to the rank of a tool, our emotions to the rank of signs’.83 Weil is concerned with 
 
79 Simone Weil, ‘Du temps (1928-1929)’, in Premiers écrits philosophie, Tome I: Œuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1988), pp. 141-158. 
80 ‘Le temps est cette séparation entre ce que je suis et ce que je veux être, telle que le seul chemin de 
moi à moi soit le travail, ce rapport toujours défait entre moi et moi que le travail seul renoue; désirer 
être à demain c’est désirer avoir rendu la planche lisse sans avoir poussé le rabot, le plancher net sans 
avoir manié le balai’. Simone Weil, ‘Du temps (1928-1929)’, in Premiers écrits philosophie, Tome I: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 143. 
81 ‘C’est par un effort, une action de l’esprit que je passe du projet à l’œuvre; à partir du projet, allant à 
l’œuvre, j’exerce ma puissance’. Simone Weil, ‘Du temps (1928-1929)’, in Premiers écrits philosophie, 
Tome I: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 151. 
82 ‘Ainsi c’est seulement par l’épreuve du travail que me sont donnés, et toujours ensemble, temps et 
étendue, le temps comme la condition, l’étendue comme l’objet de mon action; la loi du travail enferme, 
quant à mon action, qu’elle dure, quant au monde, qu’il s’étende’. Simone Weil, ‘Du temps (1928-
1929)’, in Premiers écrits philosophie, Tome I: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 145. 
83 ‘La seule manière dont j’aie à penser ces idées, c’est de m’armer d’elles pour conquérir le monde. 
Éveillons-nous donc de nouveau au monde, c’est-à-dire revenons au travail et à la perception, sans 
manquer de courage pour observer cette règle, par laquelle seulement ce que nous faisons peut-être 
travail, ce que nous sentons, perception: rabaisser notre propre corps au rang d’outil, nos émotions au 
rang de signes. Simone Weil, ‘Du temps (1928-1929)’, in Premiers écrits philosophie, Tome I: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 147. 
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extending the implications of these reflections on labour into more concrete areas, as 
we observe in Le travail comme médiation.84 Weil begins by stating that the problem 
is ‘we are separated from ourselves by work’.85 This form of labour denies the worker 
influence over the nature of the labour, namely meditative involvement in the process. 
Labour which requires diminished input requires limited mastery over the ordering of 
one’s thoughts and emotions. She concludes that ‘for as long as the movements of the 
living body, which, by the inexplicable union of the soul and the body accompany 
each of my desires, are sufficient to accomplish these same desires, the mind, attentive 
to its own thoughts, never turns towards work’.86 Whilst it is undeniable that a theory 
of work is central to Weil’s thought, why is it understood in purely philosophical 
considerations and not, for example, in economic terms? Moulakis states that her 
theory of work 
allows her to combine the glorification of labour with Kantian causality, and it permits her to 
establish an epistemology that is also a doctrine of self-mastery, an ethic. Weil polemicizes 
against Max Planck and Albert Einstein to preserve the concept of work contained in classical 
physics.87 
An understanding of her theory is necessary to underpin such statements like the 
concluding sentence in Protée where Weil states that ‘geometry, perhaps like all 
thought, is the child of workers’ courage’.88 If we look ahead to her later writing, work 
and world, according to Weil in the closing paragraphs of L’Enracinement,89 are so 
defined ‘that all other human activities, command over men, technical planning, art, 
 
84 Simone Weil, ‘Le travail comme médiation, in Premiers écrits philosophie, Tome I: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), pp. 243-247. 
85 ‘Nous sommes, par le travail, séparés de nous-mêmes’. Simone Weil, ‘Le travail comme médiation, 
in Premiers écrits philosophie, Tome I: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 243. 
86 ‘Car tant que les mouvements du corps vivant qui, par l’union inexplicable de l’âme et du corps, 
accompagnent chacun de mes désirs, se trouvent suffire à accomplir ces mêmes désirs, l’esprit, attentif 
à ses seules pensées, ne se tourne jamais vers le travail’. Simone Weil, ‘Le travail comme médiation’, 
in Premiers écrits philosophie, Tome I: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), pp. 246-247. 
87 Moulakis, Simone Weil and the Politics of Self-Denial, p. 94. 
88 ‘La géométrie, comme toute pensée peut-être, est fille du courage ouvrier’. Simone Weil, ‘De la 
perception ou l’aventure de protée’, in Premiers écrits philosophie, Tome I:  Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1988), p. 126. 
89 The Need for Roots. 
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science, philosophy and so on, are all inferior to physical labour in spiritual 
significance […] [and] in a well-ordered social life, it should be its spiritual core.’90 
Though a view which Weil refined, physical labour connected the human to himself 
with nature. It gives him a physical standing in the world, where he can perceive 
himself and the world their relation to one another. The worker is the tool; he, if she 
is allowed, is the solution to his problems. Activity as labour and freedom to think are 
two inseparable concepts that Weil bring with her from these early essay and articles. 
We can read in her article Du temps that this version of work is a form of creation of 
the human. 
The only law that obtains in such a world is juxtaposition. Only in the test represented by work 
I am given, and always together, time and extension, time as the condition, extension as the 
object of my action. The law of labour encloses, as to my action, that it lasts, as to the world, 
that it extends.91 
If we consider ‘time as the condition’, and as Moulakis states that ‘[w]ork means an 
adjustment to something that escapes our direct grasp, and as a formalising detour it 
is distinct from arbitrary and “imaginary” actions’,92 we have a version of work that 
deviates from a valuation that consists of time and labour multiplied by the cost of 
producing goods and services. We must understand that Weil is imagining a theory of 
work that will counteract scientific elitism and mechanised production which alienates 
the worker from work. Consequently, we begin to read the influence of Marx’s 
alienation of labour in her writing. Already typifying the distinction between Weil and 
 
90 ‘Dès lors les autres activités humaines, commandement des hommes, élaboration de plans techniques, 
art, science, philosophie, et ainsi de suite, sont toutes inférieures au travail physique en signification 
spirituelle. Il est facile de définir la place que doit occuper le travail physique dans une vie sociale bien 
ordonnée. Il doit en être le centre spirituel’. Simone Weil, L’Enracinement: prélude à une déclaration 
des devoirs envers l’être humain (Paris: Gallimard, 1952), p. 216. Simone Weil, The Need for Roots, 
trans, Arthur Mills (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 298. 
91 ‘La seule loi d’un tel monde c’est la juxtaposition. Ainsi c’est seulement par l’épreuve du travail que 
me sont donnés, et toujours ensemble, temps et étendue, le temps comme la condition, l’étendue comme 
l’objet de mon action; la loi du travail enferme, quant à mon action, qu’elle dure, quant au monde, qu’il 
s’étende’. Simone Weil, ‘Du temps (1928-1929)’, in Premiers écrits philosophie, Tome I: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 145. 
92 Moulakis, Simone Weil and the Politics of Self-Denial, pp. 94-95. 
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Marx, her theory of labour extends further than Marx’s critique of production surplus. 
Weil will assert in the subchapter, ‘Tableau théorique d’une société libre’,93 in 
Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale that it is work which 
controls the passions and prevents madness:  
We have only to bear in mind the weakness of human nature to understand that an existence 
from which the very notion of work had disappeared would be delivered over to the play of 
the passions and perhaps to madness.94 
Correlating control of madness and prevention of madness, Weil further extends her 
definition to outline what work is not. ‘Idle people might may well have fun giving 
themselves obstacles to overcome’,95 which do not relate to the external obstacles that 
need to be overcome. Observing obstacles such as ‘science, sports, art’96 as the results 
of ‘pure whim’,97 which ‘do not form for a man a means of controlling his own 
whims’,98 Weil asserts that ‘[i]t is the [external] obstacles that we encounter that have 
to be overcome which give us the opportunity for [internal] self-conquest’.99 This is a 
particularly robust and encompassing duty of work, which aims to fulfil a function in 
the worker. The activities that could represent the greatest degree of freedom, like the 
 
93 Theoretical table of a free society. 
94 ‘Il suffit de tenir compte de la faiblesse humaine pour comprendre qu’une vie d’où la notion même 
du travail aurait à peu près disparu serait livrée aux passions et peut-être à la folie; il n’y a pas de 
maîtrise de soi sans discipline, et il n’y a pas d’autre source de discipline pour l’homme que l’effort 
demandé par les obstacles extérieurs’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de 
l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la 
révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 72. 
95 ‘Un peuple d’oisifs pourrait bien s’amuser à se donner des obstacles, s’exercer aux sciences, aux arts, 
aux jeux; mais les efforts qui procèdent de la seule fantaisie ne constituent pas pour l’homme un moyen 
de dominer ses propres fantaisies’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de 
l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la 
révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 72. 
96 ‘Un peuple d’oisifs pourrait bien s’amuser à se donner des obstacles, s’exercer aux sciences, aux arts, 
aux jeux; mais les efforts qui procèdent de la seule fantaisie ne constituent pas pour l’homme un moyen 
de dominer ses propres fantaisies’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de 
l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la 
révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 72. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 
99 ‘Ce sont les obstacles auxquels on se heurte et qu’il faut surmonter qui fournissent l’occasion de se 
vaincre soi-même’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in 
Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 72. 
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pursuit of science, sport and art ‘are valuable only to the degree that they imitate or 
even exaggerate the strict rigor and accuracy of work’.100 Moulakis observes that 
Weil’s ‘philosophy of work is Stoic in the sense that the revolt against necessity is 
made to appear foolish rather than heroic. Work is not a mode of Promethean rebellion. 
The free man determines his own fate’.101 Weil’s understanding of an absolutely free 
mode of labouring, unconstrained by the modern micro or macroeconomic 
considerations that define politics, would be that ‘in which methodical thought was in 
operation throughout the course of the work’.102 Highlighting the inarticulate nature 
of her theory at this time Weil agrees that ‘the difficulties to be overcome would have 
to be so varied that it would never be possible to apply ready-made rules’.103 Weil will 
later argue in Oppression and Liberty regarding the nature of liberty, which 
encompasses work, that an ideal, while seemingly unattainable, is good to have as a 
measurement. An ideal is a yardstick by which one can measure how far we are away 
and whether our actions diminish or enhance the likelihood of attaining the goal. From 
this point forward in her career, Weil’s theory of labour is the central pivot which all 
her work revolves.  
 
100 ‘Même les activités en apparence les plus libres, science, art, sport, n’ont de valeur qu’autant qu’elles 
imitent l’exactitude, la rigueur, le scrupule propres aux travaux, et même les exagèrent’. Simone Weil, 
‘Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, 
Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1991), p. 72. 
101 Moulakis, Simone Weil and the Politics of Self-Denial, p. 96. 
102 ‘Par opposition, le seul mode de production pleinement libre serait celui où la pensée méthodique se 
trouverait à l’œuvre tout au cours du travail’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et 
de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à 
la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 81. 
103 ‘Les difficultés à vaincre devraient être si variées que jamais il ne fût possible d’appliquer des règles 
toutes faites; non certes que le rôle des connaissances acquises doive être nul; mais il faut que le 
travailleur soit obligé de toujours garder présente à l’esprit la conception directrice du travail qu’il 
exécute, de manière à pouvoir l’appliquer intelligemment à des cas particuliers toujours nouveaux’. 
Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques 
et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1991), pp. 81-82. 
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1.4 Dissertation on Science and Labour 
 
Weil’s reflections on power, work, and equality accompanied a continuing political 
and educational commitment at the turn of the 1930’s. Certainly not the encompassing 
manifestation of her thought at this time, but one of Weil’s earliest full bodies of 
writing was her dissertation for Diplôme d’Études Supérieures,104 entitled, Science et 
perception dans Descartes. Weil’s thesis concerned the history of humanity’s search 
for knowledge and the problem with sense perception. Beginning with the 
revolutionary discovery of geometry by Thales of Miletus, the long history of modern 
science had begun, and so the question that Weil asked was what status to give to the 
successors of Thales: 
Must we submit blindly to these thinkers who see for us, as we used to submit blindly to priests 
who were themselves blind, if lack of talent or leisure prevents us from entering their ranks? 
Or, on the contrary, did this revolution replace inequality with equality by teaching us that the 
realm of pure thought is the sensible world itself, that this quasi-divine knowledge that 
religions sensed is only a chimera, or rather, that it is nothing but ordinary thought? Nothing 
is harder to know, and at the same time nothing is more important for every man to know. For 
it is a matter of nothing less than knowing whether I ought to make the conduct of my life 
subject to the authority of scientific thinkers, or solely to the light of my own reason; or rather, 
since I alone can decide that, it is a matter of knowing whether science will bring me liberty 
or legitimate chains.105 
The ‘question was […] the same that she had asked herself when fourteen years old: 
whether only people of genius had access to the realm of truth’106 and it is notable how 
Weil takes the Cartesian cogito and reformulates it to assert a possessive power that 
 
104 Diploma in Higher Studies. 
105 ‘Devons-nous nous soumettre aveuglément à ces savants qui voient pour nous, comme nous nous 
soumettions aveuglément à des prêtres eux-mêmes aveugles, si le manque de talent ou de loisir nous 
empêche d’entrer dans leurs rangs? Ou cette révolution a-t-elle au contraire remplacé l’inégalité par 
l’égalité, en nous apprenant que le royaume de la pensée pure est le monde sensible lui-même, que cette 
connaissance quasi divine qu’ont pressentie les religions n’est qu’une chimère, ou plutôt qu’elle n’est 
autre que la pensée commune? Rien n’est plus difficile, et en même temps rien n’est plus important à 
savoir pour tout homme. Car il ne s’agit de rien de moins que de savoir si je dois soumettre la conduite 
de ma vie à l’autorité des savants, ou aux seules lumières de ma propre raison; ou plutôt, car cette 
question-là, ce n’est qu’à moi qu’il appartient de la décider, si la science m’apportera la liberté, ou des 
chaînes légitimes’. Simone Weil, ‘Science et perception dans Descartes’, in Premiers écrits 
philosophie, Tome I:  Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 162. 
106 McLellan, Utopian Pessimist, p. 26. 
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can function actively. Descartes attempts to underpin his existence, whilst Weil moves 
beyond her existence to her ability to control her activity (power). She begins in the 
introduction by heralding the intellect of Greek science and the part that mathematics 
occupied in it. Nevin argues that 
[h]er pleas for the intuitive grasp of science have a populist ring: she demands that science 
remain accessible to ordinary people’s perceptions, that it first answers the external world 
before losing itself in theories. The thesis marks an attempt to go back to Descartes for a 
reorientation of scientific endeavour.107 
Weil claims that Descartes is the first among moderns to understand that ‘science takes 
as its sole legitimate aim the measure of quantities and their interrelations determining 
such a measure’.108 Wrestling our knowledge of nature away from the domain of the 
senses to that of reason, ‘he purified our thinking of imagination and modern scientists, 
who have applied analysis directly to all objects susceptible to this study, are his true 
successors’.109 To determine whether scientists were divided on the question of 
whether their theories, which were becoming increasingly abstract and algebraic, were 
linked in any way to the world of everyday perception and experiment, Weil proposed 
revisiting the foundations of modern scientific method in the work of Descartes.110 
The first part of Weil’s dissertation is a textual analysis of Descartes’s works 
in an orthodox style replete with quotations from the Latin originals. She begins by 
assembling passages from several of Descartes’s central works to show that he is 
indeed rightly seen as the founder of modern science, in that, ‘refusing to trust the 
senses, Descartes puts his trust in reason alone, and we know that his system of the 
 
107 Nevin, Simone Weil: Portrait of a Self-Exiled Jew, p.54. 
108 Ibid. 
109 ‘Il a donc purifié notre pensée d’imagination, et les savants modernes, qui ont appliqué l’analyse 
directement à tous les objets susceptibles d’être ainsi étudiés sont ses vrais successeurs’. Simone Wei, 
‘Science et perception dans Descartes’, in Premiers écrits philosophie, Tome I: Œuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 172. 
110 Simone Weil, ‘Science et perception dans Descartes’, in Premiers écrits philosophie, Tome I:  
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 165. 
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world is the triumph of what is called the a priori method’.111 By putting ratios, which 
involve mathematics and algebra, at the heart of the old physics and geometry, 
Descartes gives modern science an abstract analytic basis. The orthodox interpretation 
of Descartes is that modern science had always essentially been what it was in the 
twentieth century and it had to be accepted as such or abandoned altogether. Weil 
claims there are passages in Descartes that present a very different picture. Showing 
the realistic side to his thought, it expresses an interest in the applications of science 
and considers perception to be the beginning of science. Real science is simply the 
correct use of reason, and open to all. The conclusion of the first part of the dissertation 
is that Descartes appears to contradict himself, and the solution is not found in 
examining his texts but ‘become, at least for a time, a Cartesian’,112 which meant being 
open ‘to doubt everything, and then to examine everything in order, without believing 
in anything except one’s own thought in so far as it is clear and distinct, and without 
trusting the authority of anyone, even Descartes, in the least’.113 For this tall order, 
Weil imagines what such a fictitious Cartesian might say. 
 The second part of her dissertation aims at a re-thinking Descartes’s Discours 
de la méthode114 in the more personal style of his Méditations.115 Like Descartes, Weil 
begins with a systematic doubt: sensations, feelings of pleasure and pain, even abstract 
 
111 Refusant donc de croire aux sens, c’est à la seule raison que Descartes se fie, et l’on sait que son 
système du monde est le triomphe de ce qu’on nomme la méthode a priori; et cette méthode, il l’a 
appliquée avec une audace qui n’a eu, selon une parole connue, ni exemple ni imitateur; car il va jusqu’à 
déduire l’existence du ciel, de la terre et des éléments’. Simone Wei, ‘Science et perception dans 
Descartes’, in Premiers écrits philosophie, Tome I: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 167. 
112 ‘La pensée cartésienne n’est pas telle qu’on puisse la commenter du dehors; tout commentateur doit 
se faire au moins pour un moment cartésien. Mais comment être cartésien? Être cartésien, c’est douter 
de tout, puis tout examiner par ordre, sans croire à rien qu’en sa propre pensée, dans la mesure où elle 
est claire et distincte, et sans accorder le plus petit crédit à l’autorité de qui que ce soit, et non pas même 
de Descartes’. Simone Wei, ‘Science et perception dans Descartes’, in Premiers écrits philosophie, 
Tome I: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 183. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Discourse on the Method. 
115 Meditations. 
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mathematical ideas. All these appear at first to be arbitrary and possibly the product 
of illusion. What is not the product of illusion is the power that consciousness must 
doubt these appearances. Through this power Weil knows that she thinks. ‘Might what 
I take for my thought not be the thought of an Evil Genius? That could be so in regard 
to the things that I think, but not for the fact that I think then. And through this power 
of thinking — which so far is revealed to me only by the power of doubting – I know 
that I am’.116 Thus, instead of Descartes’s ‘I think, therefore I am’,117 Weil substitutes 
the more active, ‘l have power, therefore I am.’118 But her power over her own 
thoughts is extremely limited, so there must be something external to cause this 
limiting. Having established the bare existence of her mind and an external world, 
Weil turns to the nature of the link between them: 
Although I cannot create a single one of my thoughts, all of them from dreams, desires, and 
passions to reasoned arguments— are, to the extent that they are subject to me, signs of myself; 
to the extent that they are not subject to me, signs of the other existence. To know is to read 
this double meaning in any thought; it is to make the obstacle appear in a thought, while 
recognising in that thought my own power.119 
 
116 ‘La puissance que j’exerce sur ma propre croyance n’est pas une illusion; c’est par cette puissance 
que je sais que je pense. Ce que je prends pour ma pensée, ne serait-ce pas la pensée d’un Malin Génie? 
Cela peut être quant aux choses que je pense, mais non pas pour ceci, que je les pense. Et par cette 
puissance de pensée, qui ne se révèle encore à moi que par la puissance de douter, je sais que je suis. Je 
puis, donc je suis’. Simone Weil, ‘Science et perception dans Descartes’, in Premiers écrits philosophie, 
Tome I: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 189. 
117 Simone Weil, ‘Science et perception dans Descartes’, in Premiers écrits philosophie, Tome I: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 189. 
118 Ibid. 
119 ‘Aussi ces pensées dont je ne puis créer une seule sont-elles toutes, depuis les rêves, les désirs, les 
passions jusqu’aux raisonnements, autant qu’elles dépendent de moi, signes de moi, autant qu’elles 
n’en dépendent pas, signes de l’autre existence. Connaître, c’est lire en une pensée quelconque cette 
double signification, c’est faire apparaître en une pensée l’obstacle, en reconnaissant dans cette pensée 
ma propre puissance; non pas un fantôme de puissance comme ce pouvoir surnaturel que je crois parfois 
posséder dans mes rêves, mais cette même puissance qui me fait être, que je connais mienne depuis que 
je sais que, du moment que je pense, je suis’. Simone Weil, ‘Science et perception dans Descartes’, in 
Premiers écrits philosophie, Tome I: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), pp. 193-194. 
34 
 
This ‘knot of action and reaction that attaches me to the world’120 Weil calls 
‘imagination’,121 a faculty that opens a passageway into the world for the mind. For, 
in addition to feelings and sensations, imagination presents her with the idea of 
number, order and the principles of geometry. How could perception unite these two 
sides of the imagination? In the key passage, Weil writes: 
I am always a dual being, on the one hand a passive being who is subject to the world, and on 
the other an active being who has a grasp on it; geometry and physics help me to conceive how 
these two beings can be united, but they do not unite them. Can I not attain perfect wisdom, 
wisdom in action, that would re-unite the two parts of myself? I certainly cannot unite them 
directly, since the presence of the world in my thoughts is precisely what this powerlessness 
consists of. But I can unite them indirectly, since this and nothing else is what action consists 
of. Not the appearance of action through which the uncontrolled imagination makes me blindly 
turn the world upside down by means of my anarchic desires, but real action, indirect action, 
action conforming to geometry, or, to give it its true name, work.122 
Her conclusion is the same as her previous essays on perception: ‘Now I recognise 
that the two kinds of imagination, which are found separately in the emotions and in 
geometry, are united in the things I perceive. Perception is geometry taking as it were 
possession of the passions themselves, by means of work’.123 Perception united to 
work is like a blind person’s stick. It is the essential link between the mind and the 
external world, and body and tools were geometrical concepts rendered material. The 
question that she poses at the beginning of her dissertation on the relation of science 
 
120 ‘À présent je n’ai plus à suspendre l’imagination, mais à lui laisser cours pour m’instruire auprès 
d’elle. C’est en ce nœud d’action et de réaction qui me retient au monde que je dois trouver ma part et 
connaître ce qui me résiste’. Simone Weil, ‘Science et perception dans Descartes’, in Premiers écrits 
philosophie, Tome I: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), pp. 201-202. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Je suis toujours deux, d’un côté l’être passif qui subit le monde, de l’autre l’être actif qui a prise sur 
lui; la géométrie, la physique me font concevoir comment ces deux êtres peuvent se rejoindre, mais ne 
les rejoignent pas. Ne puis-je atteindre la sagesse parfaite, la sagesse en acte, qui rejoindrait les deux 
tronçons de moi-même? Certes je ne puis les unir directement, puisque c’est en cette impuissance que 
consiste la présence du monde en mes pensées; mais je peux les rejoindre indirectement, puisque ce 
n’est pas en autre chose que consiste l’action. Non pas cette apparence d’action par laquelle 
l’imagination folle me fait bouleverser aveuglément le monde au moyen de mes désirs déréglés, mais 
l’action véritable, l’action indirecte, l’action conforme à la géométrie, ou, pour la nommer de son vrai 
nom, le travail’. Simone Weil, ‘Science et perception dans Descartes’, in Premiers écrits philosophie, 
Tome I: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 209. 
123 ‘Je reconnais à présent en ces choses perçues l’union de ces deux espèces d’imagination, qui se 
trouvent, séparées, l’une dans les émotions, l’autre dans la géométrie. La perception, c’est la géométrie 
prenant possession en quelque sorte des passions mêmes, par le moyen du travail’. Simone Weil, 
‘Science et perception dans Descartes’, in Premiers écrits philosophie, Tome I: Œuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 210. 
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to equality is answered: science, properly conceived, is merely correct perception and 
is thus, in principle, open to all through the practice of work: 
Science so conceived, by reducing the heavens, the earth, all things, and even the imagination 
under the name human body to a system of machines, will add only one thing to the knowledge 
that is implicit in self-conscious work, namely, it will add the knowledge that that knowledge 
contains all there is to know, and that there is nothing else.124 
Hence, it follows that Weil’s theory of work manifests the mind’s genuine freedom. 
In it, the mind, using the body itself as pincers with which to grasp matter, realises its 
own freedom and, simultaneously, the inadequacy of its ideas. As the geometrical 
application of clear and distinct ideas, work is the outward sign that perception can 
actively accommodate the world. 
  
 
124 ‘La science ainsi conçue, en réduisant à un système de machines le ciel, la terre, toutes choses, et 
l’imagination même sous le nom de corps humain, ajoutera pour chacun une connaissance, une seule, 
à celle que renferme le travail percevant, à savoir que celle-ci contient tout et qu’il n’y a rien d’autre’. 
Simone Weil, ‘Science et perception dans Descartes’, in Premiers écrits philosophie, Tome I: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 218. 
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Conclusion 
 
In borrowing Descartes’s image of the blind man’s cane, Weil symbolises the sensory 
realm that thought uses as its intermediary for grasping the object of its work, the 
world as obstacle. Work does not detract from the exercise of doubt that forms the 
core of Cartesian method. Rather, it elevates doubt in affording perception something 
to be explored, namely, matter. Science’s role is to enable anyone to become, as it 
were, a tool of perception, but Weil states that the benefit of that process is strictly 
internal. Science serves only to make the mind master its imagination in response to 
the world. Here, Weil lodges a caveat against notions of scientific progress. 
Technology initially gives us the illusion of power over matter, but the world no more 
belongs to us than to the ancients. Thus, while already entrenched in her earlier 
writings, Science et perception dans Descartes provides an indispensable foundation 
to Weil’s subsequent writings on the integrity of work and work’s function as a 
sacrament of life and subsequently provided the philosophical basis for her 
commitment to radical politics. Accordingly, the problem that Weil investigated in La 
division du travail et l’égalité des salaires125 is an extension of this dissertation, as 
McLellan reformulates: 
As long as human beings simply moved matter about, there was no problem; but the expanded 
division of labour meant that some people moved other people about. And with the rise of 
education, perhaps the greatest power in the present age, the situation was radically altered; 
for it produced an elite who claimed privilege in the name of science.126 
 
 
 
 
125 The division of labour and equality of wages. 
126 McLellan, Utopian Pessimist, p.23. 
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According to Weil, science is a word which, when 
pronounced in the right place, places the individual who uses it among the small number of 
those who have the right to decide, while the ignorant crowd, the mass, in other words the 
people, find themselves pushed aside. If the people recognise that the elite have every right to 
push them aside, all that remains is to believe in the elite, to obey it, and hope for its 
benevolence.127 
Weil’s critique of science, and as such, labour, is important as it relates to analysis of 
syndicalism and Marxism. Believing that science is almost inconceivable by a single 
person, Weil laments that it functions a parallel role to that of the knowledge withheld 
by the priests. This understanding of science advancing the means of production 
destroys parity of social esteem for the labouring classes left behind. For Weil, man 
as an individual has two kinds of activity. ‘He can form ideas, which is thought, and 
he can directly transform his impressions’.128 It is also on this basis that Weil believes 
that people should be salaried and any other method, regardless of ability, ‘would be 
unfair’.129 Weil saw little solution except in acquainting the workers with the 
principles of science so that they could confront and understand the ever-evolving new 
technologies. The France in which Weil emerged from her student years was one of 
tranquil confidence. The time she spent at Henri-IV and the École Normale coincided 
with the height of France’s prosperity. However, with America about to be shattered 
by economic crisis, with Stalin about to unleash collectivisation in the Soviet Union, 
 
127 ‘En ce que ce mot de science, prononcé à propos, place celui qui s’en sert dans le petit nombre de 
ceux qui ont le droit de décider, tandis que se trouve récusée la foule des ignorants, la masse, autrement 
dit le peuple. Si le peuple reconnaît que l’élite le récuse à bon droit, il ne lui reste plus qu’à croire en 
elle, à lui obéir, à espérer en sa bienveillance’. Simone Weil, ‘La division du travail et l’égalité des 
salaires’, in Premiers écrits philosophie, Tome I: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 254. 
128 ‘Si l’on considère l’homme pris comme individu, l’on voit en lui deux espèces d’activité, et deux 
seulement. Il peut former des idées, ce qui est pensée; il peut transformer indirectement ses impressions, 
autrement dit changer volontairement la matière, ce qui est travail. Travailler, c’est changer 
volontairement la matière par les mouvements du corps; le travail d’ouvrier est le travail’. Simone Weil, 
‘La division du travail et l’égalité des salaires’, in Premiers écrits philosophie, Tome I: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 249. 
129 ‘Si deux faucheurs, d’ailleurs également forts et habiles, manient, l’un une faux très bonne, l’autre 
une faux très mauvaise, certes, en un jour de travail, le premier aura abattu plus de blé que le second, 
chacun reconnaîtra cependant qu’il serait injuste de lui payer un salaire plus élevé’. Simone Weil, ‘La 
division du travail et l’égalité des salaires’, in Premiers écrits philosophie, Tome I: Œuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 249. 
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with Germany on the brink of civil war and Italy overtaken by Mussolini’s Fascists, 
France was still a haven of political order and economic well-being, this prosperous 
tranquillity was soon interrupted by the accelerated crisis that began to appear at the 
end of 1930, a year mid-way between the end of the First World War and the beginning 
of the second and which marked a crucial turning-point in French society. In the 
following decade the basis of economic organisation, political institutions and 
intellectual life were fundamentally shaken. As the world literally transformed with 
the onslaught of new technology driving social conditions domestically, Weil looked 
to syndicalist revolution for a response. 
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Chapter Two 
 
The Socialist Left and Weil’s Syndicaliste revolution retreat 
 
Introduction 
 
Weil’s active involvement with French syndicalisme130 begins when with her teaching 
appointed in Le Puy. This chapter establishes her intellectual progression between 
1931 and 1934 in relation to the syndicalist movements that she became involved with 
in this industrialised area in the wake of the 1929 Great Depression and the evolving 
European political crisis thereafter. The aim of this chapter is to utilise the themes of 
science and labour from the first chapter and question whether Weil’s theory of labour 
and syndicalism is predicated on Marxist and Socialist theory. This investigation is 
necessary because it provides the basis for a Marxist critique in the following chapter. 
Methodologically, this chapter initially details the Socialist and syndicalist traditions 
in France. With this foundation in place, Weil’s engagement with syndicalism and her 
ideological relation to trade unions will then be outlined so that an investigation of the 
German and workers’ revolution can be understood. This method will show that 
Weil’s disengagement from syndicalist and Marxist ideals relates to the simultaneous 
rise of National Socialism. 
This chapter is subdivided into three sections. The first section, entitled, 
‘Socialist and Syndicalisme Tradition’, outlines the French syndicalist movement and 
in brief Weil’s ideological relation to its aims and ideals. I will show that the two main 
 
130 Labour unionism. 
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syndicalist bodies, the C.G.T. (Confédération Générale du Travail) and the C.G.T.U. 
(Confédération générale du travail unitaire), split the workers, dividing the syndicalist 
movements between Marxist, French socialist and anarchic-revolutionaries. The 
second section, entitled, ‘Weil and Syndicalisme’, concentrates on Weil’s engagement 
in syndicalist activities in the Loire and Haute-Loire regions, where she worked to 
unite inter-union groups and working to educate and inform union workers. The third 
section, entitled, ‘Germany and Workers’ Revolution’, discusses Weil’s travels to 
Germany, where she investigates the German proletariat’s willingness and ability to 
engage in a workers’ revolution as it had occurred in Russia. Retaining the deep 
conviction that only the workers could improve their own situation, I show that she 
transitions away from that idea. Disillusioned by the German unions and political 
parties’ apathy in withstanding the rise of German fascism, I explore why Weil alters 
her political outlook. Consequently, the conclusion of this chapter argues that Weil’s 
visits to Germany and her experience of the political and syndicalist inabilities to 
challenge the rise of the National Socialist Party creates a philosophical partition 
between the syndicalist movement and the means of heralding a social revolution. 
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2.1 Socialist and Syndicalisme Tradition 
 
In 1909, the C.G.T. union came under the reformist leadership of Léon Jouhaux and 
tilted toward closer association with the socialist Section Française de l’Internationale 
Ouvrière (S.F.I.O.), which had grown into a democratic reform group. But in doing 
so, C.G.T. compromises the syndicalist principle of independent trade union action. 
Under these conditions, the Comités Syndicalistes Révolutionnaires (C.S.R.) 
contributed considerably to the split at the Congress of Tours and the establishment of 
the French Communist Party, as well as the Communist federation of trade unions, the 
C.G.T.U., which, initially comprised of anarcho-syndicalists, soon became aligned 
with the French Communist Party. In 1925, this group, rooted in the La Vie Ouvriére 
periodical, founded a revue syndicaliste-communiste, titled, Révolution Prolétarienne, 
to serve as an organ of the opposition. The greater part of Weil’s writings published 
under her name during her lifetime appeared in La Révolution Prolétarienne. 
In En marge du comité d’Études131 Weil calls on the workers to take up the 
entire inheritance of past generations. Taking possession of culture is especially 
important: ‘Indeed, this act of taking possession is the revolution’.132 The ability to 
use language comprises the realisation of a liberating capacity. In the same spirit, she 
adopts Marx’s position about overcoming the debasing separation of intellectual and 
manual labour. Partly out of principle, partly because of local conditions wherever she 
taught, Weil joins the teachers’ unions and fights for the unification of the labour 
movement, believing that a strengthening unification leads to the power for change.  
 
131 In the margins of the study committee. 
132 ‘Cette prise de possession, c’est la Révolution elle-même’. Simone Weil, ‘En marge du comité 
d’études’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 69. 
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However, Weil is a good example of the contradictions within the entire syndicalist 
movement. She believes in the uncompromising class-war attitude of the C.G.T.U., 
while also condemning its ties with the Communist Party. Conversely, she is 
comfortable in the tradition of independent union action, which was still alive in the 
C.G.T., while also disliking the reformist moderation of this organisation. 
Exasperating the fragmented nature of the labour movement, the debates within each 
union and among the various trade unions were increasingly affected by events abroad, 
including the rise of fascism in Europe and the growth of the Communist 
Internationale. Weil’s last significant act in relation to syndicalism is her participation 
in the C.G.T.U. congress that took place in September 1933. The congress was firmly 
controlled by spokesmen for party orthodoxy, skilled at silencing any voices raised in 
opposition, where they vilified and intimidated the dissident delegates, Weil among 
them. She is prevented from reporting on events in Germany because her publications 
made it clear that she refuses to reinterpret the mistakes and defeat of the German 
labour movement along party lines to make them appear as carefully considered 
actions and victories. A month after the congress, Weil publishes an unsigned report. 
In it she wrote: 
The true character of the congress was fully revealed when, after the session ended, Charbit 
and Simone Weil were brutally prevented from distributing appeals in the street for solidarity 
with German comrades, victims of Fascist terror, who did not belong to either of the two main 
Internationals. Such things would be impossible in a real trade union organisation. But the 
C.G.T.U. is an outright appendage of the Russian state apparatus.133 
 
133 ‘Le véritable caractère du congrès apparut pleinement quand l’on empêcha brutalement Charbit et 
Simone Weil de distribuer dans la rue, à la sortie d’une séance, des appels à la solidarité en faveur des 
camarades allemands victimes de la terreur fasciste qui n’appartiennent à aucune des deux 
Internationales. De tels faits seraient impossibles dans une véritable organisation syndicale. Mais la 
C.G.T.U., depuis longtemps dégénérée, n’a plus rien de commun avec une organisation syndicale. Elle 
est un simple appendice de l’appareil d’État russe’. Simone Weil, ‘Le congrès de la C.G.T.U.’, in Écrits 
historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1988), p. 287. 
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The Bolshevik turn of the C.G.T.U. is not the only thing that discourages Weil. After 
experiencing the revolutionary syndicalism of her friends in Saint-Etienne, it seemed 
inadequate and dogmatic. In February 1933, she wrote to her friend Urbain Thévenon: 
This is the moment above all—above all for the young—to start seriously reviewing all ideas, 
instead of adopting 100 percent any prewar platforms (prewar C. G. T. or Bolshevik party), 
just at the time when all workers’ organisations have completely failed.134 
Weil believes that workers’ organisations failed because they are not the vehicle of 
change that she feels they should be; they are overly political and run by what she 
believes is an executive elite who stifle debate. In a broader sense, while dissatisfied 
by the German movement’s inability to counteract National Socialism, she believes 
the French syndicalism system is ineffective in achieving the aims that she believes 
might help the worker, like cultural and scientific education. This would allow workers 
to reclaim language and cultural insight and gain a knowledge to alleviate the 
alienating processes. 
In the last vestiges of a dying belief, she casts her lot one last time with a 
syndicalist organisation, when during the Spanish Civil War, she enrols in the militia 
of the Catalan C.N.T. (Confederación Nacional del Trabajo). This is a significant 
development in Weil’s outlook. Despite believing in the ineffectiveness of the German 
workers’ organisations and the French syndicalist movement, she turns towards a 
theatre of war for hope in reviving her revolutionary dreams. Disillusioned, she writes 
to Bernanos in 1938: 
From my childhood onwards, I sympathised with those organisations which spring from the 
lowest and least regarded social strata, until the time when I realised that such organisations 
are of a kind to discourage all sympathy.135 
 
134 Simone Pétrement, Simone Weil: A Life, trans. Raymond Rosenthal (New York: Schocken Books, 
1976), pp. 148-149. 
135 Seventy Letters, translated and arranged by Richard Rees (Oxford University Press: London, 1965), 
p. 105. 
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Weil hopes that the trade unions might serve as agents for a revolution that could not 
only seize the bureaucratic and military machines - but smash them as well. 
Attempting to rise above this rudimentary Marxist aim, assigning this function to the 
trade unions intends that the unity of their members might be brought about ‘not 
through the imaginary ties created by the community of opinion but through the real 
ties created by the community of their productive function’.136 Weil acts on her 
perception of the movement’s structure and course of action on the one hand, and her 
analysis of the contemporary crisis on the other. Abandoning, if not her revolutionary 
hope, at least her conviction that the trade unions could be the embodiment of this 
hope, her lament is a resignation as much as it unwittingly points to a problem of 
power that would become an issue in her later work: 
The problem is: to find some way of forming an organisation that does not engender a 
bureaucracy. For bureaucracy always betrays. And an unorganised action remains pure, but 
fails. The ‘revolutionary syndicalists’ are against bureaucracy, I know. But syndicalism is itself 
bureaucratic! And even the revolutionary syndicalists, discouraged, have wound up by coming 
to terms with the bureaucracy.137 
Weil’s problem with bureaucracy (and trade unions and political parties) is that they 
inevitably amount to dictatorship by the elite. A point which will become more 
obvious to Weil in Oppression and Liberty is that somebody (or an organisation) 
always has power and – more importantly – somebody or an organisation needs to 
have power. How it is wielded is the real problem. Given these circumstances and her 
beliefs, Weil is compelled to reject any responsibility in organised revolutionary acts, 
although she did not resign her principled solidarity with the workers’ movement, 
 
136 ‘Pour que le pouvoir puisse passer effectivement aux travailleurs, ceux-ci doivent s’unir, non pas du 
lien imaginaire que crée la communauté des opinions, mais du lien réel que crée la communauté de la 
fonction productrice’. Simone Weil, ‘Aprés la mort du Comité 22’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, 
Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 74. 
137 Pétrement, Simone Weil: A Life, pp. 150-151 
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whenever it became manifest as the spontaneous protest of the masses. In March 1934, 
Weil wrote to Simone Pétrement: 
I have decided to withdraw entirely from any kind of political activity, except for theoretical 
work. That does not absolutely exclude possible participation in a great spontaneous 
movement of the masses (in the ranks, as a soldier), but I don’t want any responsibility, no 
matter how slight, or even indirect, because I am certain that all the blood that will be shed 
will be shed in vain, and that we are beaten in advance.138 
From that time on, Weil retreats from all organised political activity and concentrates 
on theoretical research. On October 1st, 1934, she takes an unpaid leave of absence to 
start working in December of the same year at an unskilled factory job. 
  
 
138 Pétrement, Simone Weil: A Life, p. 198. 
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2.2 Weil and Syndicalisme 
 
The Depression of the early 1930s, although it came to France later than to the more 
developed industrial and financial nations, collapsed the tenuous promises of a revived 
French syndicalist political base. Pressure for unification of the C.G.T. and C.G.T.U. 
came from the indisputable fact that syndicalism had been robbed of its illusions on 
both ends: neither revolution nor respectability was within its grasp. Whilst the 
C.G.T.U. relished the opportunity to exploit class antagonisms aggravated by the 
crisis, the C.G.T. turned to America’s New Deal and Belgium’s Plan du travail for 
models of structural reform that could unite the syndical interests with those of the 
middle class. However, the common denominator of their concern was negative: the 
ascent of crypto-fascist leagues in France and the growing threat of National Socialism 
in Germany. These issues, the reunification of syndicalisme, its policies toward the 
government, the patronat, and the fascist threat, were only gradually coming into focus 
under the impact of the Depression when Weil entered the syndicaliste movement in 
1931. 
 During this period Weil’s hope for social change still centres on the unions 
rather than political parties, despite her growing apathy. She still believes that only a 
revolution prepared and carried out by the trade union organisations could be a genuine 
revolution. In an article written three months later titled, Aprés la mort du Comité 
22,139 Weil proposes that the groups based on occupations are the only ones that could 
really change society. Reinterpreting a definite Marx position, she suggests: 
 
 
 
139 After the death of the Committee of the 22. 
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Experience has shown that a revolutionary party can effectively, according to Marx’s formula, 
take possession of the bureaucratic and military machinery, but not to smash it. For power to 
really pass into the hands of the workers they would have to unite, not through the imaginary 
ties created by the community of opinion but through the real ties created by the community 
of their productive function.140  
The Marxist line of thinking, from which Weil oscillates, is tenuous at times because 
Weil focuses on the positive aspect for a societal structure after the revolution. She 
needed to invigorate the revolutionary trade unionists, who she felt needed to wage 
the revolutionary struggle inside the factories and on the corporate level, while also 
attempting to retain a critical viewpoint that is not based on strict orthodox Marxist 
ideology. But Weil is arguing for a hierarchal Marxist society, asserting that those who 
produce things, i.e. manual workers, should be at the top of the hierarchy. One of the 
problems with Marxism is that Marx does not recognise that ‘smashing the 
bureaucracy’ is only half the battle when people need hospitals, schools and services 
the day after the revolution. Weil does not make specific reference to these services 
because she recognises these citizens’ needs distinguishes her from Marx. What both 
Weil and Marx fail to recognise is that hierarchies are necessary structures to organise 
societies (clubs, schools, councils, governments) and that the hierarchal nature of these 
structures should not diminish the participation and rights of people below (or above).  
Communism is an example of an anarchic structure that devolved almost immediately 
into a hierarchal structure, ruled by the party elite. Weil does recognise this feature, 
yet later insists that an anarchic decentralised system should form the basis of a 
revolution. Maybe not specifically stemming from this above communist example, but 
 
140 ‘Néanmoins, l’expérience a montré qu’un parti révolutionnaire peut bien, selon la formule de Marx, 
s’emparer, de la machine bureaucratique et militaire, mais non pas briser. Pour que le pouvoir puisse 
passer effectivement aux travailleurs, ceux-ci doivent s’unir, non pas du lien imaginaire que crée la 
communauté des opinions, mais du lien réel que crée la communauté de la fonction productrice’. 
Simone Weil, ‘Aprés la mort du Comité 22’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement 
syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 74. 
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transformation of anarchic structures to hierarchal is the reason she condemns the 
bureaucratic, trade unionist and political party structures to failure.    
From the start of her trade union engagement, Weil was committed to unity 
and attempted to organise meetings at Le Puy between militants of the C.G.T. and the 
C.G.T.U. to band together trade unionists of all the different tendencies. Her activities 
on behalf of the unemployed at Le Puy drew a great deal of criticism, especially from 
her school administration. Early in her Le Puy period, she considers joining a political 
party in addition to the membership she already held in the C.G.T. union. However, 
by December 1931 it could be argued that Weil had only contempt for political, 
organised parties. A visit to a mine marked a new interest in, and emphasis on, 
technology. A revolutionary approach to technology and the conditions it engendered, 
like uncritical thinking in a production line, is necessary to re-establish the workers’ 
control over work because where ‘[m]an is forced to intervene in this struggle of 
gigantic forces he is crushed’.141 For workers to re-establish control over their working 
conditions, Weil believes that they have to gain control of their minds while working. 
That means understanding the processes, being involved in the decision-making and 
be given opportunities to engage in problem solving. For Weil, political change only 
replaces one repressive regime by another, and because technology functioned as 
another layer of oppressive capitalism, it therefore required theoretical attention. Weil 
is concerned with the oppressive nature of technology because it removes man from 
the central role of production. Despite machines doing the work, man is now a slave 
to the machine in terms of maintenance or loading and unloading; the machine can 
work without man, but man cannot work without the machine in the modern capitalist 
 
141 ‘L’homme, contraint d’intervenir dans cette lutte de forces gigantesques, y est écrasé’. Simone Weil, 
‘Après la visite d’une mine’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, 
Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 96. 
49 
 
system. Most concerning for Weil is that the automated machine denies man the 
important ability to think while working. A man who cannot think at work, while 
labouring long hours in service of a machine, is unable to think outside of work. Weil’s 
activities and belief in the trade unions system would always struggle to counteract 
such machinations. 
 Although generally in agreement with the Twenty-Two group, Weil 
understood the objections that certain trade unionists, whether in the C.G.T. or the 
C.G.T.U., brought against them. Between the C.G.T. and the C.G.T.U. there existed 
not only a factual division but also a divergence of principles, in that the C.G.T. 
defended trade union independence from the political parties while the C.G.T.U. was 
in favour of a close connection between trade unionism and political parties. Although 
its activity was closely tied to the programme of the Communist party, the C.G.T.U. 
waged the class struggle more energetically than the C.G.T., which was progressively 
reformist. The disintegration of Weil’s hope that syndicalism could herald the tangible 
social change is borne out in her thinking at the time. Supporting trade union 
independence (C.G.T.) and the class struggle (C.G.T.U.), she envisages that a merger 
between the two unions is not actually a capitulation of doctrines or an absorption of 
the central movements by the other. In Paris, the movement for unity was having its 
difficulties. In November 1931 the national congress of the C.G.T.U. was held in the 
Magic-City Hall. If the congress of the C.G.T. had already largely rejected the 
proposals of the Twenty-Two, the C.G.T.U.’s congress was even harsher towards 
them. Weil thus set about attempting to organise an inter-trade union group at Le Puy. 
The meeting decided to form an inter-union group and established certain rules, whose 
observation could in the future favour unity. They promised above all to fight any 
attempt to form a new trade union where there already was a union, whatever its 
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tendency: Confederated, United, or Independent, and where there was none, they 
advocated the formation of a single union that would freely decide upon its orientation. 
Weil wrote a full account of this meeting, published in November in 1931 in 
L’Effort, titled, La marche vers l’unité syndicale une réunion intersyndicale au Puy.142 
In this article, when describing how the initiative for this meeting had been taken by 
militants from three different trade union groups, Weil does not mention her own role. 
The end of this article makes it evident that she is aware of the difficulties that the 
amalgamated union group would have to overcome. She foresaw them even more 
clearly since she already knew when she wrote the article of the decisions at Magic-
City. It is evident that she is determined to continue the fight for unity, despite the 
opposition of the trade union bureaucrats. ‘Unity at the top having proved unrealisable, 
[so] the members of the rank and file are now compelled to take the job into their own 
hands’.143 Of course she does not want to weaken the existing organisations, as she 
states: 
one must respect the existing trade union organisations, which are the most precious conquest 
of the working-class movement; and one must realise unity without the support of these 
organisations or even, in many instances, despite them. This seemingly insoluble problem must 
be solved by the working class, or else it will be condemned to disappear as a revolutionary 
force.144  
In considering the conditions for a real revolution, Weil regards the workers’ ability 
to attain knowledge and an understanding of culture as vitally important. What Weil 
means when she argues for a cultural education or a scientific education, or other form 
 
142 The march towards union unity an inter-union meeting in Puy. 
143 ‘L’unité par le sommet étant apparue comme irréalisable, les syndiqués de la base vont se trouver 
contraints de pendre la tâche en main eux-mêmes’. Simone Weil, ‘La marche vers l’unité syndicale une 
réunion intersyndicale au Puy’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, 
Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 63. 
144 ‘Il faut respecter les organisations syndicales existantes, qui sont la plus précieuse conquête du 
mouvement ouvrier; et il faut réaliser l’unité sans l’appui de ces organisations, ou même, en bien de 
cas, malgré elles’. Simone Weil, ‘La marche vers l’unité syndicale une réunion intersyndicale au Puy’, 
in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 63.   
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of education, is the attainment of knowledge that workers can use to understands and 
challenge the power that management and capitalism monopolise. She presents her 
ideas on this subject in an article published by L’Effort in December 1931 entitled, La 
vie syndicale: en marge du Comité d’Études.145 Recalling the failure of the peoples’ 
universities before the First World War, she asked, ‘is this a reason to condemn all 
work of this kind? On the contrary, the important thing is to distinguish, among the 
attempts at working-class culture, those that are conducted in such a way as to 
strengthen the ascendancy of the intellectuals over the workers, and those conducted 
in such a way as to free the workers from this domination’.146 In this article Weil 
articulates the priests role in the origins of human culture. Weil, I believe, is not 
lamenting religion’s role, nor the ecclesiastical education that priests received, but that 
the disparity between what uneducated workers might know in relation to a learned, 
educated priest leads to a distinction between people: a superiority of knowledge. 
At all times, the ability to handle words has seemed to men something miraculous. […] These 
privileged beings are priests; and the fact that their formulas are bereft of effectiveness does 
not prevent them from being regarded as possessing an essence superior to those who know 
how to act. This domination of those who know how to handle words over those who know 
how to handle things is rediscovered at every stage of human history. […] These assemblers 
of words whether priests or intellectuals have always been on the side of the ruling class, on 
the side of the exploiters against the producers.147  
 
 
145 Union life: on the sidelines of the Committee of Studies. 
146 ‘Est-ce une raison pour condamner tout travail de cet ordre? Il importe plutôt de distinguer, parmi 
les tentatives de culture ouvrière, celles qui sont conduites de manière à dégager les ouvriers de cette 
emprise’. Simone Weil, ‘La vie syndicale: en marge du Comité d’études’, in Écrits historiques et 
politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 
68. 
147 ‘De tout temps la faculté de manier les mots a semblé aux hommes quelque chose de miraculeux. 
[…] Ces êtres privilégiés, ce sont les pétrés; et le fait que leurs formules sont absolument dépourvues 
d’efficacité ne les empêche pas d’être considérés comme étant d’une essence supérieure à ceux qui 
savent agir. Cette domination de ceux qui savent manier les mots sur ceux qui savent manier les choses 
se retrouve à chaque étape de l’histoire humaine. […] Ces assembleurs de mots pétrés ou intellectuels 
ont toujours été du côté de la classe dominant, du côté des exploiteurs contre les producteurs’. Simone 
Weil, ‘La vie syndicale: en marge du Comité d’études’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: 
L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 69.        
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The problem is not that a priest or intellectual might know more than a worker, but 
that a broader utility of language signifies greater respect; while maybe knowing little, 
the sophist still appears knowledgeable. Where she will later amend this line of 
argument regarding language and the knowledge of language in Ne recommençons pas 
la guerre de Troie,148 we should observe that she believes that the proletariat should 
not have contempt for those who can wield language. Rather, they should appropriate 
its use as a revolutionary weapon. For her, this approach is the true revolution. 
This respect accorded language and the men who are best able to use it has been indispensable 
to human progress. Without it, men would have remained blind and routine when doing the 
necessary work of life; it is out of religion that all human thought has developed, including the 
most positive form of science. So, it is not by inspiring them with contempt for culture, 
described here as bourgeois, that the workers can be freed from the intellectuals’ domination. 
Certainly, this superiority accorded up until now to intellectuals over producers, through a 
convention that has been indispensable to human development, must now be absolutely 
rejected by the workers. Yet this does not mean that the workers must reject the heritage of 
human culture; it means that they must prepare to take possession of it, as they must prepare 
themselves to take possession of the entire heritage from previous generations. Indeed, this act 
of taking possession is the revolution.149  
Weil agrees with Marx on the empowerment of workers through education and 
language acquisition, though Marx’s position is not as evolved as Weil’s. However, 
Marx and Weil differ on their understandings of intellectual and manual labour. He 
argues that the division of intellectual and manual labour distinguishes people 
unequally, and that the material position should erased, while Weil advocates for a 
unification. If Weil could enact her theory of labour, intellectual thinking would 
inform manual labour. Both, however, are concerned with the monopolisation of 
 
148 Let us not start the Trojan War again. 
149 ‘Ce respect accordé au langage et aux hommes qui sont le mieux capables de s’en server a été 
indispensable au progrès humain. Sans ce respect, les hommes en seraient restés à la pratique aveugle 
et routinière des travaux indispensables à la vie. C’est à partir de la religion que s’est développée toute 
la pensée humaine, y compris la science la plus positive. Aussi n’est-ce pas en leur inspirant le mépris 
de la culture, qualifiée à cet effet de bourgeoise, qu’il faut libérer les travailleurs de la domination des 
intellectuels. Certes, cette supériorité accordée jusqu’ici aux intellectuels sur les producteurs par une 
convention qui a été indispensable au développement humain doit leur être à présent absolument 
refusée. Mais cela ne signifie pas que les travailleurs doivent se préparer à en prendre possession, 
comme ils doivent se préparer à en prendre possession de tout l’héritage de générations antérieures. 
Cette prise de possession, c’est la Révolution elle-même’. Simone Weil, ‘La vie syndicale: en marge 
du Comité d’études’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 69. 
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power and information that they believe arises from intellectual activities from the 
same article, Weil surmises that: 
In Marx’s eyes, perhaps the most important conquest of the proletarian revolution should be 
the abolition of what he calls ‘the degrading division of work into intellectual and manual 
work’. The abolition of this degrading division can and must be achieved, and we must prepare 
for it now. To this end we must, first, give the workers the ability to handle language and 
especially the written language.150  
Not only is Weil teaching her courses at the lycée, doing the preparatory work for 
miners’ courses at the Saint-Etienne Labour Exchange, carrying on her trade union 
activities at Le Puy, taking her trips to Saint-Etienne and sending in articles to L’Effort, 
she also finds the time to write an article for the November bulletin of the National 
Union of Public-School Teachers in France and the Colonies section at Haute-Loire. 
In an article entitled, Réflexions concernant la crise économique,151 Weil maintains 
that ‘the crisis has destroyed those advantages which the workers believed they had 
acquired’,152 but that the proletariat should continue the class struggle by instituting a 
policy of collaboration as ‘the idea of possible collaboration between classes is not 
ruined by the crisis’.153 However, far removed from a conciliatory stance on class 
struggle, the Twenty-Two were racked by dissension after the Japy Congress. Their 
differences had always been a threat, owing to the different loyalties within the group 
 
150 ‘Aux yeux de Marx, la conquête la plus importance peut-être de la Révolution prolétarienne devait 
être l’abolition de ce qu’il nommait la division dégradante du travail en travail intellectuel et travail 
manuel. L’abolition de cette division dégradante, l’on peur et l’on doit la préparer dès maintenant. Il 
faut, à cet effet, tout d’abord donner aux ouvriers le pouvoir de manier le langage, et en particulier le 
langage écrit. Simone Weil, ‘La vie syndicale: en marge du Comité d’études’, in Écrits historiques et 
politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 
69. 
151 Reflections concerning the economic crisis. 
152 ‘Du jour au lendemain, la crise a réduit à néant ces avantages que les travailleurs croyaient acquis; 
il apparaît clairement à présent que ces améliorations éphémères dans la vie du travailleur ne 
constituaient pas un progrès accompli par les ouvriers, mais simplement un aspect provisoire d’une 
certaine politique patronale’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions concernant la crise économique’, in Écrits 
historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1988), pp. 65-66. 
153 ‘Cependant l’idée d’une collaboration possible entre les classes ne se trouve pas ruinée du fait de la 
crise; elle trouve dans la crise de nouveaux arguments’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions concernant la crise 
économique’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 66. 
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and it became clear that the Committee of Twenty-Two was doomed to disappear. The 
Committee did soon break up. At a meeting held in late November 1931, the C.G.T. 
and C.G.T.U. members both refused to support the original position taken by the 
Twenty-Two and each resumed its freedom of action. The dilution of the Twenty-Two 
did not mean the end of Weil’s struggle for trade union unification. She thought that 
the efforts to realise unity among the rank and file should now be intensified. However, 
despite working to prepare for the second inter-union meeting, which took place in Le 
Puy in late December, an opportunity presented itself: the events at Le Puy. 
Advocating for assistance for the unemployed in Le Puy, Weil wrote Une 
nouvelle étape dans le mouvement des chômeurs154 communique, which sought ‘a 
soup kitchen to be created and municipal works to be opened’,155 the ‘engagement of 
foreign unemployed at the municipal works’156 and that the unemployed ‘must force 
the municipality to take measures on behalf of women, old people and children’.157 
Despite singing the Internationale as they paraded through the street, Weil dismissed 
any political overtures on the part of the unemployed, stating, ‘the Internationale is not 
a political song; it is the song of those workers who refuse to be slaves of the 
profiteers’.158 To a conservative French society this was unabashed communism. The 
 
154 A new stage in the movement of the unemployed. 
155 ‘Un bouillon populaire est créé; un chantier municipal est ouvert’. Simone Weil, ‘Une nouvelle étape 
dans le mouvement des chômeurs’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, 
Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 76. 
156 ‘Une autre concession arrachée par la magnifique solidarité des chômeurs, c’est la promesse formelle 
d’embaucher, dans les chantiers municipaux, les chômeurs étrangers’. Simone Weil, ‘Une nouvelle 
étape dans le mouvement des chômeurs’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement 
syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 77. 
157 ‘Ils doivent contraindre la municipalité à prendre des mesures en faveur des femmes, des vieillards, 
des enfants, et des mesures qui ne se réduisent pas à de simples annonces’. Simone Weil, ‘Une nouvelle 
étape dans le mouvement des chômeurs’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement 
syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 77. 
158 ‘Mais l’Internationale n’est pas un chant politique; c’est le chant des travailleurs qui refusent d’être 
esclaves des profiteurs’. Simone Weil, ‘Une nouvelle étape dans le mouvement des chômeurs’, in Écrits 
historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1988), p. 77. 
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Mayor, however, conceded to ‘raise the wage, perhaps even to grant the salary of 
twenty-five francs a day demanded by the unemployed’,159 while ‘their [insistence] on 
its being fulfilled’160 compounded its perception as communist socialism. This is not 
evidence alone of Weil’s socialist tendencies, but it is evident that Weil had being 
thinking according to the Left tradition. It was also a critical point in Weil’s 
syndicalism, as not only did she protest, she became even more adamant. 
 In January 1932, La Tribune published a second communiqué from the 
Committee of the Unemployed, titled, Une histoire instructive,161 again written but 
unsigned by Weil. This time, even harsher in its tone and demands, it states that the 
unemployed are tired of being exploited in being ‘deigned to permit them to engage 
in exhausting work for a derisory salary’.162 Weil suggests that the mayor was 
‘frightened and that afterward, he failed to keep his word’163 by juxtaposing, without 
foundation, that ‘the morality of the elite is undoubtedly very different from the 
morality of the workers, who are naive enough to regard courage and loyalty as two 
virtues that can be transgressed only at the cost of dishonour’.164 Originally distancing 
 
159 ‘Le maire a fait une nouvelle concession. Il a promis d’élever le salaire, et peut-être même d’accorder 
le salaire de vingt-cinq francs par jour réclamé par les chômeurs. Les chômeurs prendront acte de cette 
promesse; ils en arracheront l’application’. Simone Weil, ‘Une nouvelle étape dans le mouvement des 
chômeurs’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 77. 
160 ‘Le maire a fait une nouvelle concession. Il a promis d’élever le salaire, et peut-être même d’accorder 
le salaire de vingt-cinq francs par jour réclamé par les chômeurs. Les chômeurs prendront acte de cette 
promesse; ils en arracheront l’application’. Simone Weil, ‘Une nouvelle étape dans le mouvement des 
chômeurs’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 77. 
161 An informative story. 
162 ‘Daignait leur permettre de se livrer à un labeur épuisant pour un salaire dérisoire’. Simone Weil, 
‘Une histoire instructive’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 
1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 78. 
163 ‘[Il a eu] peur, et que, par la suite, il a manqué à sa parole’. Simone Weil, ‘Une histoire instructive’, 
in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 78. 
164 ‘La morale de l’élite est sans doute bien différente de la morale des travailleurs, qui sont assez naïfs 
pour regarder le courage et loyauté comme des vertus auxquelles on ne saurait manquer sans 
déshonneur’. Simone Weil, ‘Une histoire instructive’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: 
L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), pp. 78-79. 
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herself from the rhetoric of the Left, Weil makes a significant leap from syndicalist 
organiser to an implicit threat of physical force. Stating, ‘if the unemployed are forced 
to recognise that they can only obtain something insofar as they make people tremble, 
they will learn this lesson well’.165 Previously Weil wrote of force in terms of it 
industrial force to crush man and suggested, without complete explanation, of a natural 
force. Her pronouncement in Le Puy marks a transition in Weil’s thinking. Instead of 
adhering to pacifist and syndicalist ideals, where the revolution is heralded through 
education, Weil is seduced by a more physical action. Acknowledging interpersonal 
force, she states that ‘between the unemployed and the ruling class there are only 
relations of force’.166 This is an early expression that Weil recognises that force can 
be a response to counteract force: she concludes that ‘perhaps someday the working 
class will thank them by showing them that it has learned its lesson’.167 The lessons 
she is thankful for is the realisation that ‘these relations of force are sometimes 
disguised by the public powers with fine appearances; sometimes, they are left naked, 
and then they educate the working class more effectively than anyone ever can’.168 By 
this she means that public officials and politicians may appear to care, but when they 
are confronted with people on the street, in this instance, their empathy recedes. Her 
bombastic language can be downplayed, as she is writing the communique for a 
 
165 ‘Si l’on oblique les chômeurs à reconnaître qu’ils ne peuvent obtenir quelque chose que dans la 
mesure où ils font trembler, ils se le tiendront pour dit’. Simone Weil, ‘Une histoire instructive’, in 
Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1988), p. 79. 
166 ‘Il n’y a entre eux et la classe dominante que des rapports de force’. Simone Weil, ‘Une histoire 
instructive’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 79. 
167 ‘Peut-être un jour la classe ouvrière sera-t-elle à même de les remercier en leur montrant qu’elle a 
compris la leçon’. Simone Weil, ‘Une histoire instructive’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: 
L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 79. 
168 ‘Ces rapports de force, parfois les Pouvoirs publics les déguisent sous de belles apparences; parfois 
ils les laissent à nu, et ils font alors mieux que n’importe qui l’éducation de la classe ouvrière’. Simone 
Weil, ‘Une histoire instructive’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, 
Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 79. 
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collective, but this is the first sign that Weil will eventually condone the overt use of 
violence, as we will see in chapter four of this thesis. 
During the Le Puy period Weil is not yet entirely hostile to joining a political 
party, though she considered whether it was necessary to join both a union and a party. 
Her conviction is still that ‘the only action that is likely to be effective is for activists 
to give the trade union movement, wherever they can, its true character’.169 In Aprés 
la mort du Comité des 22, an article published in L’Effort in early January 1932, Weil 
seems to demonstrate quite clearly that from 1931 onwards she had only contempt for 
the activities of the political parties. 
Traditionally, those who desire the advent of this or that form of society or preservation of the 
existing form, are grouped according to their mutual affinities. At all times, the groups thus 
formed, under the name of parties or under other names, have, depending on the occasion, 
allied, spared or passionately fought. Alliances and fighting ghosts. Such groupings may, if 
they are highly disciplined, lead the movements that excite society in various senses; they 
never create them. They cannot bite on the real constitution of society. Behind these groups 
there are others who themselves does not rely on the compliance of opinions, but, unlike the 
first, regulate or constitute the social order. These groups are those that relate in any way to 
the production.170 
Viewing the method of production as a greater issue than whether the members of the 
C.G.T.U. were independent of the Communist party or if the Communists were only 
a minority, organised under the name of M.O.R. (Minorité Oppositionnelle 
révolutionnaire171), the contacts that Weil had among the C.G.T. and the C.G.T.U. 
 
169 ‘Dans ces conditions, la seule action susceptible d’efficacité consiste pour les militants à donner au 
mouvement syndical, partout où ils le peuvent, son caractère véritable’. Simone Weil, ‘Après la mort 
du Comité des 22’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 74. 
170 ‘De tout temps, ceux qui désirent l’avènement de telle ou telle forme de société, ou la conservation 
de la forme existante, se sont groupés conformément à leurs affinités mutuelles. De tout temps, les 
groupements ainsi formés, sous le nom de partis ou sous d’autres noms, se sont, selon l’occasion, alliés, 
ménagés ou passionnément combattus. Alliances et combats de fantômes. De tels groupements peuvent, 
s’ils sont fortement disciplines, se mettre à la tête des mouvements qui agitent la société en divers sens; 
ils ne les créent jamais. Ils ne peuvent mordre sur la constitution réelle de la société. Derrière ces 
groupements, il en existe d’autres qui, eux, ne reposent aucunement sur la conformité des opinions, 
mais qui, contrairement aux premiers, règlent ou constituent l’ordre social. Ces groupements, ce sont 
ceux qui se rapportent de quelque manière à la production’. Simone Weil, ‘Après la mort du Comité 
des 22’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), pp. 71-72.  
171 Revolutionary Oppositional Minority. 
58 
 
unions meant that through the United Federation of Miners at Saint-Etienne Weil 
obtained the authorisation to visit a mine. A former shop steward permitted Weil to go 
down into a small artisan-type mine in Sardou near Rive-de-Gier where she 
experiences using a pickaxe and a compressed-air drill. She publishes an article in 
L’Effort in March 1932 entitled, Après la visite d’une mine172 that details her 
experience. She described the miner’s condition in terms of the tool that he uses, or 
rather the tool that he serves. Where man was once close to source, since the advances 
in technology, the relationship is now between ‘coal and the compressed air’,173 and 
where ‘forced to intervene in this struggle between gigantic forces, man is crushed’.174 
She concludes that 
[i]t will not be enough for a miner to expropriate the companies to become the master of the 
mine. The political and economic revolutions will become real only if they are extended into 
a technical revolution that will re-establish, within the mine and the factory, the domination 
that it is the worker’s function to exercise over the conditions of work.175 
Here again we encounter the problem that concerns her more than any other: under 
what conditions could a revolution really be effective? Political changes are a trifling 
matter in that they only achieve to replace one form of oppression with another. In 
recognising that an underlying oppression remains, even as politics and especially the 
production methods advance, Weil extracts the main topics for later work. In an article 
published by L’Effort in March 1932, entitled, Le capital et l’ouvrier,176 she criticises 
 
172 After visiting a mine. 
173 ‘Le charbon et l’air comprimé’. Simone Weil, ‘Après la visite d’une mine’, in Écrits historiques et 
politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 
96.  
174 ‘Contraint d’intervenir dans cette lutte de forces gigantesques, y est écrasé’. Simone Weil, ‘Après la 
visite d’une mine’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 96. 
175 ‘Il ne suffira pas au mineur d’exproprier les Compagnies pour devenir maître de la mine. La 
révolution politique, la révolution économique ne deviendront réelles qu’à la condition d’être 
prolongées par une révolution technique, qui établira à l’intérieur même de la mine et de l’usine, la 
domination que le travailleur a pour fonction d’exercer sur les conditions du travail’. Simone Weil, 
‘Après la visite d’une mine’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, 
Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 97.   
176 Capital and the worker. 
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technology in general not only certain machines. She described technology as the most 
oppressive feature of capitalism. 
Capitalism is apparently defined by the fact that the worker is subject to a material capital 
composed of instruments and raw materials, which the capitalist is only representing. The 
capitalist regime consists in the fact that the relationship between the worker and the means of 
work has been reversed; the worker, instead of dominating them, is dominated by them.177 
Still yet to define who the capitalists were, shopkeepers or steel moguls, the nature by 
which she laments their existence is disconcerting. Still adhering to the Marxist 
ideology, she quotes: 
The machine, Marx says, does not leave anything more to man than the purely mechanical role 
of a motive force, while it imparts to him the new task of supervising the machine [...]. In 
manufacture and handicrafts, the worker makes use of his tools; in the factory, he serves the 
machine.178 
Despite demonstrating that one must enact a profound transformation of technology, 
in the same article she also argues that technology relates to a collective mode of 
production that formidably augments the productivity of human labour. It is therefore 
necessary ‘to re-establish the worker’s domination over the conditions of work without 
destroying the collective form that capitalism has stamped on production’.179 The 
solution to this problem ‘is the complete revolution’.180 Without a comprehensive 
articulation of a complete revolution, it’s outcomes must be prepared to, not only raise 
 
177 ‘Le capitalisme se définit en apparence par le fait que l’ouvrier est soumis à un capital matériel 
composé d’instruments et de matières premières, que le capitaliste ne fait que représenter. Le régime 
capitaliste consiste en ce que les rapports entre le travailleur et les moyens de travail se renversent: le 
travailleur au lieu de les dominer est dominé par eux’. Simone Weil, ‘Le capital et l’ouvrier’, in Écrits 
historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1988), p. 92. 
178 ‘La machine, dit Marx, ne laisse plus à l’homme que le rôle purement mécanique de force motrice, 
en même temps qu’elle lui départit le travail nouveau de surveiller la machine [...]. Dans la manufacture 
et le métier, l’ouvrier se sert de l’outil; à la fabrique, il sert la machine’. Simone Weil, ‘Le capital et 
l’ouvrier’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 94. 
179 ‘Rétablir la domination du travailleur sur les conditions de travail sans détruire la forme collective 
que le capitalisme a imprimée à la production’. Simone Weil, ‘Le capital et l’ouvrier’, in Écrits 
historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1988), p. 94. 
180 ‘C’est la Révolution tout entière’. Simone Weil, ‘Le capital et l’ouvrier’, in Écrits historiques et 
politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 
94. 
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the level of the proletariat’s culture and knowledge, as Weil attempted, but also insist 
on a theoretical inquiry into the problem that, if not solved before or during the 
revolution, must be revisited again after the revolution. The question that the 
revolutionary faces is not how to overturn the government, but rather, how to envisage 
and create a form of organisation so that the revolution does prove futile? During this 
year at Le Puy, Weil’s reflections always return to this: one must analyse the real 
causes of oppression to be able to judge how and by what method oppression can be 
eliminated or reduced in other ways than mere appearances. So long as this work of 
analysis is not done, it seems reckless to work for a revolution that entails inevitable 
evils juxtaposed against advantages that are far from certain. This obstacle is lamented 
in January 1932, when she writes in an article, Les modes d’exploitation181 that ‘[s]ince 
there are exploited people, there are people who revolt. These rebels have killed, have 
been killed; yet they have neither destroyed exploitation nor did they even generally 
mitigate it. It is not enough to revolt against a social order based on oppression; one 
must change it, and one cannot change it without knowing it’.182 It is this distinction 
between the day before the revolution and the mitigation of the effects that caused the 
revolution the day after that is the defining separation of Weil and Marx at this point. 
 On the death of Briand183 some professors had been assigned the task of 
explaining France’s efforts toward peace to their pupils. They avoided giving Weil 
this task as it was known that she did not approve of France’s foreign policy. She had 
expressed her opinion in an article published in L’Effort in February 1932, entitled, La 
 
181 Modes of exploitation. 
182 ‘Depuis qu’il y a des exploités, il y a des révoltés. Ces révoltés ont tué, se sont fait tuer; ils n’ont ni 
ne détruit ni même le plus souvent fait adoucir l’exploitation. Il ne suffit pas de se soulever contre un 
ordre social fondé sur l’oppression, il faut le changer, et on ne peut le changer sans le connaître’. Simone 
Weil, ‘Les modes d’exploitation’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, 
Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 94. 
183 Aristide Briand was a French statesman who served eleven terms as Prime Minister of France. 
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Conférence du désarmement.184 In the article, she criticises both the French 
memorandum to the Conference for Disarmament and Litvinov’s speech at this same 
conference. France had proposed the creation of an international force at the service 
of the League of Nations, yet Weil was sceptical that this proposal ever had a chance 
of being adopted. Another French proposal seemed more serious to her, that of 
establishing rules to protect the civilian populations in case of war and aerial 
bombardment. But, in her view, this proposal only helped to increase the probability 
of war by guaranteeing the safety of governments and generals staff as ‘during the last 
war, the planes, by tacit agreement, refrained from bombarding the [headquarters] of 
the enemy’s army’.185 She felt that everyone should be in danger if any one person 
was, and that equality of danger might mitigate against war. Weil certainly wanted 
peace above all and did not countenance a revolution brought on by the war. During 
her stay in Paris, she writes the article, U.R.S.S. et Amérique,186 which is published in 
L’Effort in July 1932. In an interview, Stalin expresses admiration for American 
‘efficiency’,187 and especially their progression in industry and technique. Weil states 
that ‘nowhere else has this subordination [of man to the machine] been pushed so far 
as in America’.188 In merging the differences between the Fascists and Stalinists, Weil 
concludes that the capitalist system also worked for the collective. In the latter 
 
184 The conference on disarmament. 
185 ‘Déjà pendant la dernière guerre, les avions, par une convention tacite, s’abstenaient de bombarder 
le G.Q.G. de l’armée ennemie’. Simone Weil, ‘La Conférence du désarmement’, in Écrits historiques 
et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), 
p. 86. 
186 USSR and America. 
187 ‘L’efficience’. Simone Weil, ‘U.R.S.S et Amérique’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: 
L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 106. 
188 ‘Subordination n’a été poussée à un aussi haut degré qu’en Amérique’. Simone Weil, ‘U.R.S.S et 
Amérique’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 106. 
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situation, the work of the worker is used to develop the productive apparatus, which 
never ended due to competition. However, Weil states 
[t]he fact that Stalin, on this issue which is at the Centre of the conflict between capital and 
labour, has abandoned Marx’s point of view and has allowed himself to be seduced by the 
capitalist system in its most perfect form, this fact shows that the USSR is still far from 
possessing the foundations of a working-class culture.189 
As Russia also engaged in the same form of capitalist competition, the only difference 
being that it could constrain its labourers from selling their labour elsewhere, Weil 
rejected war as an end and as a tool for the revolution. Secondly, by using the concept 
of bureaucratic oppression, Weil collapsed some of the differences between Russia 
and the capitalist system that were driven by competition, profits and relied upon a 
division of labour and man’s subjugation by the machine and its production methods. 
Once again, Weil is not restrained by the accepted polarities of her time. She 
rejects distinctions between fascists and Stalinists, and between capitalists and 
communists, because they are organised by hierarchal elite and oppress the worker 
using similar methods. Rejecting the permissibility of sacrificing the individual to the 
collective, she concludes that Stalin had abandoned Marx’s point of view, having been 
seduced by the capitalist system in its most perfect form found in America. In this one 
article, we can find the distinguishing division between Weil, Marx and Stalin’s 
Marxism: the value of the individual in society. Weil’s last refuge of a real workers’ 
revolution now lay in Germany, which she believes could surpass Russia’s now-
disintegrating revolution. 
  
 
189 ‘Le fait que Staline, sur cette question qui se trouve au centre du conflit entre capital et travail, a 
abandonné le point de vue de Marx et s’est laissé séduire par le système capitaliste sous sa forme la 
plus parfaite, ce fait montre que I’U.R.S.S. est encore loin de posséder les bases d’une culture ouvrière’. 
Simone Weil, ‘U.R.S.S et Amérique’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement 
syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 107. 
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2.3 Germany and Workers’ Revolution 
 
In the summer of 1932, Weil travels to Germany because, as Athanasios Moulakis 
states in Simone Weil and the Politics of Self-denial, ‘she thought that was where she 
would be able to witness the alternative between fascism and revolution in its most 
acute form—an alternative facing the entire world, she believed, given the economic 
crisis’.190 The problem with Weil’s decision to travel is that it is propelled by a 
fractured France, waning support for Russia, and, one could argue, a romanticised 
expectation that Germany would follow a similar path as the revolution in Russia. 
Essentially, she sought a cohesiveness and an idealist purity in Germany that was no 
longer available in either France or Russia. It should be considered whether any 
romanticisation of Germany led to a clouded vision, which impaired her view of 
fascism’s rise. Writing in La situation en Allemagne,191 Weil states that 
the life of the German workers is of vital importance to us as well. For, in the breakdown of 
the capitalist economy that is threatening to wipe out the gains of the workers in the democratic 
countries and even in the USSR by a wave of reaction, our greatest hope lies in the German 
working class, the most mature, the most disciplined, the most educated in the world; and 
especially in the working-class youth of Germany.192 
It is debatable if Weil’s motives were ‘to witness the alternatives between fascism and 
revolution’, because if that was the case, then why not visit Italy, the seat of European 
fascism. A sentiment that must be remembered, particularly when it comes to her 
comments on Czechoslovakia in her later work, is that Weil’s concern is not for the 
 
190 Moulakis, Simone Weil and the Politics of Self-Denial, p. 60. 
191 The situation in Germany. 
192 ‘Et la vie des ouvriers allemands est d’importance vitale aussi pour nous. Car, dans cette 
décomposition de l’économie capitaliste qui menace de détruire, sous une vague de réaction, les 
conquêtes des ouvriers dans les pays démocratiques et peut-être même en U.R.S.S., notre plus grand 
espoir réside dans cette classe ouvrière allemande, la plus mûre, la plus disciplinée, la plus cultivée du 
monde; et plus particulièrement dans la jeunesse ouvrière d’Allemagne’. Simone Weil, ‘La situation en 
Allemagne’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 145. 
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entire category of people. Her concern is for workers, and more pointedly, the 
proletariat. Weil’s ideological leanings are clear, as she states: 
And, despite the electoral defeats, if the crisis lasts and a revolutionary movement has not 
triumphed, the Hitlerian assault troops, behind which may be found from one day to the next 
the State apparatus, constitute a permanent threat of extermination for the best workers. But 
even apart from the possibility of a systematic extermination, the crisis itself, if it lasts for 
some time, will destroy generations of German workers, especially the younger generations.193 
One must be tentative, because it appears that Weil is demarcating her difficulty with 
extermination as it will involve the death of the best workers and not simply 
extermination. It clear that Weil is searching for something in Germany. We are meant 
to sense a projection of the Leninist expectation of 1919, that the European proletariat, 
with the German proletariat as the vanguard, will follow the Russian example and that 
the detonation of the October Revolution will ignite the European powder keg that is 
assumed to exist. But, according to Moulakis, ‘Weil never voiced any great hopes for 
the probability of revolution in Germany. She merely noted that both fascism and 
revolution in Germany would have worldwide repercussions.’194 Yet, we can read, 
contrary to Moulakis’ statement, in Weil’s own words. 
The situation in Germany can therefore be called revolutionary. The most conspicuous sign is 
that the thoughts and conversations of everyone, including the eleven-year-old children, are 
constantly and naturally concerned with the problem of the social system, and with the 
seriousness and sincerity peculiar to the Germans.195 
 
 
193 ‘Et, en dépit des défaites électorales, tant que la crise durera et qu’un mouvement révolutionnaire 
n’aura pas triomphé, les troupes d’assaut hitlériennes, derrière lesquelles peut se trouver d’un jour à 
l’autre l’appareil d’État, constituent une menace permanente d’extermination pour les meilleurs 
ouvriers. Mais, même en dehors de l’éventualité d’une extermination systématique, la crise elle-même, 
pour peu qu’elle dure encore quelque temps, détruira des générations d’ouvriers allemands, et plus 
particulièrement les jeunes générations’. Simone Weil, ‘La situation en Allemagne’, in Écrits 
historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1988), p. 145. 
194 Moulakis, Simone Weil and the Politics of Self-Denial, p. 61. 
195 ‘La situation, en Allemagne, peut donc être dite révolutionnaire. Le signe le plus apparent en est que 
les pensées et les conversations de chacun, y compris les enfants de onze ans, se portent constamment 
et naturellement sur le problème du régime social, et avec le sérieux et la sincérité propres aux 
Allemands’. Simone Weil, ‘La situation en Allemagne’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: 
L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 143. 
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Weil clearly had revolutionary hopes, yet she did also state that ‘there is no sign of the 
revolution in action’, which validates Moulakis’ statement. From the above passage, 
we can read that Weil appears to discover a Germany populous engaged with their 
social system and its problems, and that the most intimate decisions and personal 
perspectives engaged the ‘framework of society’.196 It was the crisis that seemed to 
create that dependence of the individual on society that revolutionary theory talks 
about. In this theory, society is understood as the system of economic relations. 
For almost every German, at least in the petty bourgeoisie and the working class, prospects, 
good or bad, that concern even the most intimate aspects of one’s own life are immediately 
formulated, especially if one is young, as prospects that concern the future of the regime. Thus, 
the amount of a people’s energy that ordinarily is almost entirely absorbed by various passions 
and the defence of private interests is, in present-day Germany, brought to bear on the 
economic and political relationships that constitute the very framework of society.197 
Weil never grew tired of expressing enthusiasm for the young German workers’ love 
of sports and of nature, for their love of music and literature, extolling that ‘one cannot 
imagine anyone more courageous, more lucid, or more fraternal than the best of them, 
despite this life’.198 The contact with nature is of great significance, as the experience 
of necessity, as natural beauty, or as athletic control over one’s own body. Weil’s 
writing combines a Rousseauian romanticism and the ideal of Stoic discipline, 
allowing her to transform the German working youth into a prefiguration of the 
 
196 ‘Ainsi la somme d’énergie qui est d’ordinaire, dans un peuple, absorbée presque tout entière par 
diverses passions et par la défense des intérêts privés, se trouve, en ce moment, en Allemagne, porter 
sur les rapports économiques et politiques qui constituent l’ossature même de la société’. Simone Weil, 
‘La situation en Allemagne’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, 
Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 143. 
197 ‘Pour presque chaque Allemand, du moins dans la petite bourgeoisie et la classe ouvrière, les 
perspectives bonnes ou mauvaises concernant les aspects même les plus intimes de sa vie propre se 
formulent immédiatement, surtout s’il est jeune, comme des perspectives concernant l’avenir du régime. 
Ainsi la somme d’énergie qui est d’ordinaire, dans un peuple, absorbée presque tout entière par diverses 
passions et par la défense des intérêts privés, se trouve, en ce moment, en Allemagne, porter sur les 
rapports économiques et politiques qui constituent l’ossature même de la société’. Simone Weil, ‘La 
situation en Allemagne’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 
1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 143. 
198 ‘Rien n’est plus écrasant que la vie de dépendance, d’oisiveté et de privations qui est faite aux jeunes 
ouvriers allemands; et l’on ne peut rien imaginer de plus courageux, de plus lucide, de plus fraternel 
que les meilleurs d’entre eux, en dépit de cette vie’. Simone Weil, ‘La situation en Allemagne’, in Écrits 
historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1988), p. 145. 
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emancipated ideal socialist. She admires most of all the way the young Germans 
remained steadfast as they became disillusioned, that the best among them were not 
inclined to give themselves over to compensatory raptures. 
They are not trying to forget; they are not complaining; in this hopeless situation, they are 
resisting every form of despair. In general, they are trying— some with more energy than 
others, and the best wholly achieve it—to build a fully human life within the inhuman situation 
in which they have been placed.199  
Weil is convinced that if these young people survive the fascist onslaught, they would 
represent the brightest hope for the future of Europe. The problem though, is that her 
adulation did not strictly apply to the young as a category, which was merely a 
combination of the ‘German working class, which, as we saw, seemed to be the most 
cultured, most disciplined, and most mature working class in the world’.200 This raises 
the question, how was this ideal personification of perfection not able to resist fascism, 
much less bring about the revolution? In this situation, who failed the analysis? Is Weil 
over-wrought by ideological shortcomings? There is a strong sense that she is 
subjugated, even allowing herself to be lulled, by an adoration of a labour revolution 
consisting of the German proletariat. Like the air compressor in the mine, Weil is being 
subjected to a greater machine and crushed by greater forces. Observing how events 
unfolded, a fermentation of unrest existed. Weil analysed the state of the society for a 
proletariat revolution and missed the seething undertones of a humiliating First World 
War defeat.  
 
199 ‘Ils ne cherchent pas à s’étourdir; ils ne se plaignent pas; ils résistent, dans cette situation sans espoir, 
à toutes les formes de désespoir. Ils cherchent en général avec plus ou moins d’énergie, et les meilleurs 
y arrivent pleinement, à se faire, dans la condition inhumaine où ils sont placés, une vie humaine’. 
Simone Weil, ‘La situation en Allemagne’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement 
syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 145. 
200 ‘Car, dans cette décomposition de l’économie capitaliste qui menace de détruire, sous une vague de 
réaction, les conquêtes des ouvriers dans les pays démocratiques et peut-être même en U.R.S.S., notre 
plus grand espoir réside dans cette classe ouvrière allemande, la plus mûre, la plus disciplinée, la plus 
cultivée du monde; et plus particulièrement dans la jeunesse ouvrière d’Allemagne’. Simone Weil, ‘La 
situation en Allemagne’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 
1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 145. 
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The problem that Weil witnessed is that in the economic crisis every single act 
of rebellion is challenged by the rigidity of the social structure. The problem of 
transforming the social order, as well as the means of production, confronts an 
inhomogeneous working class. For this reason, it is incapable of sustained and 
effective action. The only time that the rigidity of a social structure can be bended is 
when most of the social structure assents. Labour reform could not affect enough of 
the social structure, whereas re-establishing in the German state benefitted all. 
Thus, even though the crisis forces almost every German worker or petit bourgeois to feel, at 
one time or another, that all his hopes are being dashed against the very structure of the social 
system, it does not by itself group the German people around the workers determined to 
transform that system.201 
Weil recognises the lack of support, advancing the argument that the German people 
are not unified behind the German proletariat. Arguing from the perspective of a 
particular sect of the German workers, she states that the ‘German proletariat is also 
weakened by the number of office workers in it’.202 These office workers, who, as a 
consequence of the ‘number that has been increased by German capitalism, in a period 
of prosperity, with the same crazy prodigality that it displayed in building its factories 
and modernising its machinery’,203 consist of a very considerable segment of all wage 
earners and the unemployed. This presents, in Weil’s view, a serious weakness in 
popular solidarity. On the one hand, they were ‘not much inclined to join ranks with 
the factory workers’204 and, on the other, they ‘are incapable, by the very nature of 
 
201 ‘Ainsi la crise, si elle force presque chaque ouvrier ou petit-bourgeois allemand à sentir, un moment 
ou l’autre, toutes ses espérances se briser contre la structure même du système social, ne groupe pas par 
elle-même le peuple allemand autour des ouvriers résolus à transformer ce système’. Simone Weil, ‘La 
situation en Allemagne’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 
1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 144. 
202 ‘Le prolétariat allemand est affaibli aussi par le nombre des employés de bureau, nombre qui a été 
accru par le capitalisme allemand, en période de prospérité, avec la même prodigalité folle qu’il a mise 
à bâtir ses usines et à renouveler son outillage’. Simone Weil, ‘La situation en Allemagne’, in Écrits 
historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1988), p. 144. 
203 Ibid. 
204 ‘Car les employés de bureau, qui forment ainsi une partie considérable des salariés et des chômeurs 
allemands, sont peu enclins à se serrer autour des ouvriers, et incapables, par leur métier même, de 
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their profession, of wanting to take their fate into their own hands’.205 From this line 
of argument, we have to consider whether Weil assumed that all the German people 
agreed with the workers, and if office workers agreed with the proletariat too. In fact, 
the difficulty arises because she has also clearly distinguished between the office 
worker and the factory worker, the unemployed and the employed, the capitalist and 
the proletariat, exactly down the Marxist divide of intellectual and physical labour. 
Moulakis states that ‘there is fundamental and historical accuracy in her 
psychological observation that those who have fallen out of their class or who are 
threatened by such a fate are not inclined to join ranks with the class to which they 
have sunk’.206 Neither Weil nor Moulakis ever advance the argument as to why they 
should join the ranks of the labour movement, they merely advocate that they should. 
This entrenched thinking, solely from the position of labour or the proletariat, is a 
defining touchstone for Weil. Sometimes Weil does write of a German people. But in 
these rare instances, it is to lament why people do not support the proletariat. When 
she does write of the proletariat, Weil does not include office workers, the employed 
and certainly not any version of her understanding of capitalists. Echoing a sentiment 
of my argument, Moulakis states, ‘[i]t thus becomes clear that Weil shared the vulgar 
Marxist prejudice against the tertiary sector of the economy’.207 The point where she 
and Marx differ is that any movement, set in motion by the crisis, is a concrete 
manifestation of the dialectic of weakness and strength, of employed and unemployed, 
rich and poor, of capital and labour. The matter is greatly confused when Weil insists 
that ‘spontaneous struggle has always proved itself to be ineffective, and organised 
 
vouloir prendre leur sort en leurs propres main’. Simone Weil, ‘La situation en Allemagne’, in Écrits 
historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1988), p. 144. 
205 Ibid. 
206 Moulakis, Simone Weil and the Politics of Self-Denial, p. 66. 
207 Ibid. 
69 
 
action almost automatically secretes an administrative apparatus which, sooner or 
later, becomes oppressive’.208 The distinct problem that faces Weil at his point is that 
nothing can be started or sustained that is not ineffective or oppressive. It is difficult 
not to agree with Weil on these points. Yet it is also confusing as to how one might 
proceed. According to Weil, the weaknesses at the foundation can be remedied only 
by strong organisation, but this is fraught with problems. 
[C]onversely, an uprising of the masses left in the factories is the only thing that can really 
endanger the bourgeoisie. The existence of a strong revolutionary organisation, therefore, is a 
nearly decisive factor. But for a revolutionary organisation to be said to be strong, the 
phenomenon that reduces the proletariat to impotence in times of crisis must not be reflected 
in the organisation, or reflected in it only to a very slight degree.209 
Weil examines the organisations of the workers’ movement according to this criterion. 
These organisations did not appear to be able to stem the dissolution of demoralised 
individuals and engender effective action. In her view, the starting points of 
organisational action lie, on the one hand, in the emotional reaction of the masses to 
the crisis and, on the other, in the existence of pockets of the population both capable 
and determined to act. If Weil’s analysis is correct, she has greatly reduced the avenues 
and scope for effective organisations or movements that might change a given 
situation. Weil’s hope for a revolution in Germany lay in a spontaneous action of the 
masses that did not devolve into an oppressive nature, and her assurances of success 
were slight indeed: 
 
 
208 ‘La lutte spontanée s’est toujours révélée impuissante, et l’action organisée sécrète en quelque sorte 
automatiquement un appareil de direction qui, tôt ou tard, devient oppressif’. Simone Weil, 
‘Perspectives. Allons-nous vers la révolution prolétarienne’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome 
II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 279. 
209 ‘Ce déplacement de l’axe du mouvement révolutionnaire permet, seul, à la bourgeoisie de traverser 
une crise sans y sombrer; et inversement, seul, un soulèvement des masses demeurées dans les 
entreprises peut véritablement mettre la bourgeoisie en péril. L’existence d’une forte organisation 
révolutionnaire constitue dès lors un facteur à peu près décisif. Mais, pour qu’une organisation 
révolutionnaire puisse être dite forte, il faut que le phénomène qui, en période de crise, réduit le 
prolétariat à l’impuissance, ne s’y reflète pas ou ne s’y reflète que très atténué’. Simone Weil, ‘La 
situation en Allemagne’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 
1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 164. 
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If factory workers and the unemployed decide to rise in unison, the working class will emerge 
in its full strength, with far greater brilliance than it did in Paris in 1871 or in St. Petersburg in 
1905. But who can say whether such a struggle would not end in a defeat, such as has put an 
end to all spontaneous uprisings up to now?210  
Consequently, the ineffectiveness of the potential German workers’ revolution and the 
1933 seizure of power by the National Socialists forces Weil to abandon her belief that 
revolutionary syndicalism could affect the change that she thought necessary. 
  
 
210 ‘Vienne le moment où tous ensemble, ouvriers des entreprises et chômeurs, voudront se soulever, la 
classe ouvrière apparaîtra dans sa force avec bien plus d’éclat qu’à Paris en 1871 ou à Saint-Pétersbourg 
en 1905! Mais qui peut dire si une telle lutte ne se terminerait pas par la défaite qui a écrasé jusqu’ici 
tous les mouvements spontanés?’. Simone Weil, ‘Impressions d’Allemagne: l’Allemagne en Attente’, 
in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 137. 
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Conclusion 
 
On the surface, the tensions and problems with governments, political parties and 
movements, unions and intellectuals in both politics and labour in Europe can be 
examined from the perceived economic ramifications ensuing from revolutionary’s 
attempts to wrest dominionship from a privileged status quo. As a Marx critique, this 
would be essentially true. He crudely pitted those who have little against those who 
have more. 
Weil, however, brings a sophistication of examination and critique, 
challenging, not only man against man, but man against nature. Marx may have 
attempted a more scientific approach, even attempting to unravel and deal with the 
economics of the era. As wealth, money or materiality is essentially always the 
foundation of political strife, if not religion, Weil ignores the subject of economics. 
Any references are implicit rather than explicit. Weil called for pacifist revolutionary 
unity among workers and a rejection of oppression, and her writing must be interpreted 
as an effort to effect change through a form of collectivism by individuals. From 1931 
onwards we find a marked engagement with syndicalist movements as an attempted 
means of improving the proletariat’s position in an ever-increasingly mechanised era 
of production. We find, however, that Weil still advocated for syndicalism when the 
unions could not even agree on an aim, never mind a method. This problem was 
glaringly evident in Germany, but Weil was aware of this discord in France. I state 
earlier in this thesis that a transition in Weil’s political thinking shifted away from 
syndicalism in Le Puy after a year of attempting to corral organisational unity. Her 
second communiqué from the Committee of the Unemployed of Le Puy, where I argue 
that she recognises force as a countermeasure is a critical development in her thinking. 
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It demarcates a gradual transition away from pacifism. For Weil, revolution is not an 
end itself, it is merely a means for arriving at optimal social conditions. Like all 
methods, she judged it not only by its professed aims but also by its unintended, 
unpredictable, but inevitable consequences. ‘The revolution is a job, a methodical task 
that the blind or people with blindfolded eyes cannot perform. And that is what we are 
at this moment’.211 Yet, she argues, revolution is proclaimed not as a solution to 
existing problems but as a kind of miracle that relieves us of the necessity to face 
problems. The revolution seems possible only as a diversion, not as methodical work 
with a clear vision of aims and side effects. It is this inquiry into how we might 
function the day after the revolution that again distinguishes Weil from Marx. 
 After travelling to Germany to assess the prospect of a workers’ revolution and 
finding the rise of totalitarianism, Weil returns dejected to France, unconvinced by the 
role of syndicalist revolutionary politics. Whether she pre-empts the contagion of 
Hitler’s fascism is a question that Weil falls on the wrong side. I suggest that her 
ideological perseverance in solely advocating for the proletarian revolution means she 
left unaware of the bigger, more sinister, picture. The naive or cynical concealment of 
reality, the attempts at deception and self-deception, perhaps the will to pass off the 
hopelessness of the revolutionary aspirations in Germany as historical promise: these 
happen while Weil is concentrating on workers and labour, and not on the realities of 
segregation and violence. I argue that focusing on worker and labour politics distanced 
Weil from the unfolding situation. Viewing the events from a very particular 
viewpoint, that of the socialist Left, Weil is concerned with proletariat problems, rather 
than an infectious malaise that left the country vulnerable. 
 
211 Letter to Urbain Thévenon. Pétrement, Simone Weil: A Life, p. 151. 
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If Weil believes that Marxism had become an applied dogma212 rather than a 
living doctrine and productive method, then I argue that Weil is entrapped by a version 
of indoctrination. Weil argues that the scientific theory of socialism is dogma, along 
with all the results obtained by modern science because everyone believes the 
conclusion without understanding the method. This illegitimate appeal to Marx’s 
authority is an expression of that dominant way of thinking that a liberating discourse 
should aim to defeat. Diagnosing the difficulties with a revolutionary theory that fails 
to overcome alienation and oppression, she sees it as a construct of dogmas separated 
from its methodological preconditions and deteriorating into one of the most acute 
forms of disjunction. But, if we acknowledge that Weil distinguishes between the 
German proletariat, the unemployed, the workers and the office workers, 
notwithstanding the forms of maligned capitalist, shopkeeper or steel mogul - and then 
the remainder of political and social life - Weil develops an unnecessary subdivision 
of society. In focusing on a very particular situation, i.e. a workers’ revolution, from 
the perspective of socialist Left, Weil’s overt concern with labour disfigured a nation 
in crisis. 
 Reducing a great swath of criticism to a succinct difference, we can say the 
foundational difference between Weil and Marx is that Marx was concerned with the 
relations between society and class struggle that divides us, while Weil is more 
concerned with the causes and effects that surround our relations: Marx believes that 
alienation can be relived; Weil knows that oppression can only be mitigated. Weil 
connected her criticism of doctrine with her fundamental condemnation of a 
 
212 ‘Quant à nous, Marx représente pour nous, dans le meilleur des cas, une doctrine; bien plus souvent 
un simple nom, que on jette à la tête de l’adversaire pour le pulvériser; presque jamais une méthode’. 
Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions concernant la technocratie, le national-socialisme, l’U.R.S.S. et quelques 
autres points’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 213. 
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specialising, alienating, mystifying science, which makes it impossible to reconstruct 
and thus to overcome any division of labour. Such a battle of the dogmas, blocking 
the way to its own objectives, cannot be credited as either a science or theory. If, Weil 
wrote, Lenin is correct when he states that ‘without a revolutionary theory there can 
be no revolutionary movement, we must also accept that there is practically no 
revolutionary movement at present’,213 then is Marxism unravelled in one paragraph 
when she states: ‘We are living on a doctrine elaborated by a great man certainly, but 
a great man who died fifty years ago. He created a method; he applied it to phenomena 
of his time; he could not apply it to phenomena of our own time’.214 The consideration 
should not be whether Weil is right in this assertion, but to what extent does the 
penetration of Weil’s analysis negate Marxism? This is a question which I discuss in 
the next chapter. 
It has already been shown above how Weil’s initial engagement with social 
change through revolutionary syndicalism disintegrated when it encountered the 
events evolving in 1930s Germany. At the beginning of this chapter we found a 
sympathetic Marxist and a pacifist revolutionary syndicalist; by the end of this chapter 
I showed the conditions that dissuaded Weil’s revolutionary syndicalism sympathies. 
Marx’s methodology continues to guide her in many ways, but the object of its 
concrete analyses, the society of its day, no longer existed. ‘[W]e must recognise that 
the two economic categories established by Marx—capitalists and proletariat— are no 
 
213 ‘Celui qui admet la formule de Lénine: Sans théorie révolutionnaire pas de mouvement 
révolutionnaire est forcé d’admettre aussi qu’il n’y a à peu près pas de mouvement révolutionnaire en 
ce moment’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions concernant la technocratie, le national-socialisme, l’U.R.S.S. et 
quelques autres points’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 214. 
214 ‘Nous vivons sur une doctrine élaborée par un grand homme certes, mais un grand homme mort il y 
a cinquante ans. Il a créé une méthode; il l’a appliquée aux phénomènes de son temps; il ne pouvait 
l’appliquer aux phénomènes du nôtre’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions concernant la technocratie, le 
national-socialisme, l’U.R.S.S. et quelques autres points’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: 
L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 213. 
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longer sufficient to grasp the form of production’.215 The negation of prognoses by 
facts reflects on the methods themselves and leads to uncovering internal 
contradictions: ‘[I]t is not by comparison with the facts, but in itself, that I consider 
Marxist doctrine to be defective’.216 Largely due its internal deficiencies and 
inconsistencies, Marxism, according to Weil, cannot meet the task assigned to it: to be 
a revolutionary theory. The problem that Weil has with Marx is that ‘he worked out 
the conclusions before the method’.217 I have outlined to what extent I believe that 
Weil considered revolution only in terms of scientific labour and the proletariat. She 
did defer to a misguided lack of confidence, that of a young person before the ‘great 
minds’218 who had embraced Marxism. Her case is an example of a false belief in 
authority, as states, ‘[h]ow many young minds are not thus led, through lack of self-
confidence, to stifle their most justified doubts?’.219 
  
 
215 ‘Et nous devons reconnaître que les deux catégories économiques établies par Marx, capitalistes et 
prolétariat, ne suffisent plus à saisir la forme de la production’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions concernant 
la technocratie, le national-socialisme, l’U.R.S.S. et quelques autres points’, in Écrits historiques et 
politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 
215. 
216 ‘Ce n’est donc pas par comparaison avec les faits, c’est en elle-même que j’estime la doctrine 
marxiste défectueuse; ou plutôt, je pense que l’ensemble des écrits rédigés par Marx, Engels et ceux 
qui les ont pris comme guides ne forme pas une doctrine’. Simone Weil, ‘Sur les contradictions du 
marxisme’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, 
Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 135. 
217 ‘Ce n’est pas étonnant: il a élaboré les conclusions avant la méthode’. Simone Weil, ‘Sur les 
contradictions du marxisme’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et 
l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 135. 
218 ‘Leur évidence même, à ce moment, m’a empêchée de faire confiance à mon propre jugement; je 
me disais que tant de grands esprits, qui ont adhéré au marxisme, avaient dû apercevoir aussi ces 
incohérences, ces lacunes si claires; qu’elles avaient donc certainement été les unes comblées, les autres 
résolues, dans d’autres ouvrages de doctrine marxiste’. Simone Weil, ‘Sur les contradictions du 
marxisme’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, 
Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 134. 
219 ‘A combien d’esprits jeunes n’arrive-t-il pas ainsi d’étouffer, par défiance d’eux-mêmes, leurs doutes 
les mieux fondés?’. Simone Weil, ‘Sur les contradictions du marxisme’, in Écrits historiques et 
politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 135. 
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Once her efforts to apply the Marxist schema had proved factually false, Weil’s 
suspended doubts were reaffirmed. Although previously setting those doubts aside out 
of reverence, they had first occurred to her with respect to the theoretical coherence of 
Marx’s design. She saw herself compelled to work out with the greatest possible 
precision the inadequacy of the interpretational scheme. In this effort, she transitions 
increasingly from attempting to extract a Marxian purity in the face of a Marxist 
coarsening to a fundamental critique of Marxism. One of the results of this analysis is 
the insight that the immediate future would be determined not by a revolutionary 
emancipation of the proletariat, but by the war that would deliver the opposite of all 
the presumptive promises of liberation. Years later in London she would write: 
‘Twentieth century: war has replaced profit as the dominant motive [of human 
behaviour]’.220 Weil’s retreat from syndicalist engagement is accompanied by a return 
to her own analytical frame of reference. Accordingly, the analysis presented in 
Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale and in the 
supplementary shorter texts shows Weil delivering a sustained critical dissection of 
Marxism, a direction to which this thesis will now turn its attention. 
  
 
220 ‘Vingtième siècle. La guerre a remplacé le profit comme mobile dominant’. Simone Weil, 
‘Fragments et Notes’, in Écrits de Londres et dernières lettres (Paris: Gallimard, 1957), p. 175. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Oppression and Liberty in Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de 
l’oppression sociale 
 
Introduction 
 
In contrast to her syndicalist approach detailed in the chapter, where I show how her 
engagement with the trade union movement led to an awareness of their inability to 
ensure emancipation for workers, by 1934 Weil’s involvement with the syndicalist 
revolution had ended. Viewing the revolutionary syndicalist and political stagnation 
in Germany, Weil wrote Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression 
sociale. Written before working in Paris factories, this long essay is the seminal work 
from her early writings, which is typified by an engagement with Marxism and 
concerns surrounding modern technology and automation in labour. Réflexions is 
important because it moves beyond Marx’s criticisms, seeking to investigate the nature 
of oppression and liberty and their limits. Claiming that oppression is an inescapable 
social phenomenon of the human condition, unlike Marx, who believes it is the organ 
of a social function, Weil argues that it can be mitigated. As such, this chapter focuses 
on Réflexions to describe how she distances herself methodically from Marx, whether 
such mitigation from oppression is practicable, and what manner of thought and action 
might allow for a realisation of liberty. 
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The contrast between Weil and Marx, which Weil increasingly acknowledges, 
is that, while she admits that ‘[i]t would seem that man is born a slave and that 
servitude is his natural condition’,221 the fundamental aspect to human existence is that 
‘[…] nothing on earth can stop man from feeling himself born for liberty. Never, 
whatever may happen, can [man] accept servitude; for he is a thinking creature’.222 
This trichotomy between slavery and feeling born for liberty and its relationship with 
the social order is the examination that is undertaken within Réflexions. A ‘perfect 
liberty’,223 Weil states, is unattainable, one which ‘the communism imagined by Marx 
is the most recent form that this dream has taken’.224 Unlike Marx’s liberty, who 
imagined an end to oppression, Weil thinks more practically, emphasising that man 
‘can steer toward the ideal’225 if he (can) think and act correctly. The intention is not 
the attainment of the ideal, instead she applies it as a method of mensuration to 
recognise the degree of separation between the actuality and the ideal. Hence, the 
parentheses, denoting the capability for thinking, are important if oppression is to be 
mitigated for all. The parentheses represent the distinction between whether man is at 
liberty to think and whether he is allowed by others. This is important because the 
 
221 ‘Il semblerait que l’homme naisse esclave, et que la servitude soit sa condition propre’. Simone Weil, 
‘Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, 
Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1991), p. 71. 
222 ‘Et pourtant rien au monde ne peut empêcher l’homme de se sentir ne pour la liberté. Jamais, quoi 
qu’il advienne, il ne peut accepter la servitude; car il pense’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions sur les causes 
de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience 
ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 71. 
223 ‘C’est la liberté parfaite qu’il faut s’efforcer de se représenter clairement, non pas dans l’espoir d’y 
atteindre, mais dans l’espoir d’atteindre une liberté moins imparfaite que n’est notre condition actuelle; 
car le meilleur n’est concevable que par le parfait’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté 
et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu 
à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 72. 
224 ‘Le communisme imaginé par Marx est la forme la plus récente de ce rêve’. Simone Weil, 
‘Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, 
Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1991), p. 71. 
225 ‘On ne peut se diriger que vers un idéal’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de 
l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la 
révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 72. 
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category of an ideal of liberty is in direct relation with the category of mitigating 
oppression. Consequently, where Weil once argued that syndicalism is the correct 
form of workers’ revolution, this chapter charts how Weil’s Marxist tendencies 
dissolve when she critically engages Marx. 
Where the previous chapter details how Weil transitions away from 
syndicalism, this chapter shows why Weil’s transitions away from Marxism. This 
chapter is subdivided into three main sections. The first section discusses ‘Concepts 
of Oppression and Liberty’, her ‘Factory Labour’ and the correlation between ‘Weil 
and Marxism’. Firstly, it presents Weil’s understanding of her concepts of oppression 
and liberty. A consideration that must be discussed is whether Weil focuses 
inordinately on the proletariat working-class and fails to account for the entire problem 
of oppression and liberty. Secondly, it offers a brief account of Weil’s labour in Paris 
factories, citing that Réflexions is written beforehand. I argue that because of Weil’s 
lifelong ill-health her conclusions should be read with an element of interpretation. 
Lastly, it discusses Marx and Marxism because any engagement with Weil is indelibly 
linked to Marxism. To narrow the inquiry, Marx will only be discussed in so far as to 
critique Weil’s critique of Marxism. This thesis is not an overt critique of Marx, but it 
will show where Weil and Marx differ. An initial point of note is that Réflexions is an 
extension beyond Marx’s materialistic concept of history and oppression. The second 
section of this chapter engages with the initial two chapters of Réflexions; ‘Critique du 
marxisme’226 and ‘Analyse de l’oppression’,227 while the third section of this chapter 
reflects on the two concluding chapters of Réflexions; ‘Tableau théorique d’une 
 
226 Critique of Marxism. 
227 Analysis of oppression. 
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société libre’228 and ‘Esquisse de la vie sociale contemporaine’. 229 The rationale for 
bisecting Réflexions is that I argue that Weil’s thought radically shifts between the end 
of the chapter, ‘Tableau théorique d’une société libre’ and the beginning of ‘Esquisse 
de la vie sociale contemporaine’. I contend that the different chapters, which 
encompass the initial half and the latter half of the essay, offer considerably different 
positions. The first position is an analysis of a theoretical picture of a free society, 
while the second position is a sketch of contemporary social life and its ability to 
absorb this theory of a free society. ‘Tableau théorique d’une société libre’ is an 
optimistic presentation of an ideal society, whereas ‘Esquisse de la vie sociale 
contemporaine’ is a punctured realisation of a contemporary society. Where Marx 
argues that alienation (and oppression) can be erased, Weil’s concept of activity and 
freedom in thought contrasts sharply with a devastating reality. This is of paramount 
importance in the evolution of Weil’s thought transitioning away from Marxism. It is 
not that the ideal fell short, it is that Weil recognises the theoretical limitations of 
Marx’s ideal. Where Weil stretches an unlikely aspiration, she believes that Marx did 
not fully grasp the problem. This is another essential pivot of Weil’s thought, one 
which is defined by a complete transition from a Marxist position. 
  
 
228 Theoretical picture of a free society. 
229 Sketch of contemporary social life. 
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Section One 
 
3.1.1 Concepts of Oppression and Liberty 
 
Developing a concept of liberty through her critique of Marxism in Réflexions enabled 
Weil to conceive of a theory capable of dissecting the nature of social oppression. 
Réflexions’ opening line states that Weil’s purpose is to ‘bring everything into question 
again’230 because she feels that the world provided few reasons for living. In search of 
an answer, she tasks herself with identifying the precise nature of oppression in 
contemporary society. In her early writings, Weil drew heavily on Marx’s 
understanding that socialism was to be above all the abolition of ‘the degrading 
division of labour into intellectual and manual labour’231 and consequently directs her 
attention on labour as a form of oppression. This concentration is important to the 
understanding of Weil’s later conclusions concerning the spirituality of labour as the 
core of a reordered social life. According to Blum and Seidler in in A Truer Liberty: 
Simone Weil and Marxism: 
Weil also believed that this division was not merely a mechanical reflection of the categories 
of class provided for in Marx’s theory. For Weil, the division between conception and 
execution ultimately was not reducible to class divisions, and the assumption that it could be 
marginalised the force of Marx’s own insights on the all pervasiveness of the degradation with 
which capitalist society had infused human experience.232 
 
230 ‘La période présente est de celles où tout ce qui semble normalement constituer une raison de vivre 
s’évanouit, où l’on doit, sous peine de sombrer dans le désarroi ou l’inconscience, tout remettre en 
question’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits 
historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 29. 
231 ‘De même la séparation entre les forces spirituelles qui interviennent dans la production et le travail 
manuel, ou, selon une autre formule, la dégradante division du travail en travail manuel et travail 
intellectuel est la base même de notre culture, qui est une culture de spécialistes’. Simone Weil, 
‘Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, 
Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1991), p. 33. 
232Lawrence A. Blum and Victor J. Seidler, A Truer Liberty: Simone Weil and Marxism (Oxon: 
Routledge, 1989), p. 107.  
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It is crucial then for Weil to recognise the implications of the fact that the division 
between intellectual and manual labour had not been transcended in the Soviet 
Union.233 Agreeing with the aim of Marx, and hoping to see the spirit of the Russian 
Revolution extend to France and Germany, Weil is disillusioned by the realities. A 
position that I will assess more critically within this chapter, Blum and Seidler state 
that ‘these concerns and their consequences for human dignity form the framework 
within which Weil considered the potential for transformation of oppression to 
liberty’.234 This point is echoed in Weil’s  Lénine: Matérialisme et 
empiriocriticisme235 in 1933, where she states, ‘we do not seem to have understood 
what the conditions of such a transformation are’.236 Political stagnation and technical 
developments in Germany and France had led to eventual disillusionment with 
political parties, unions and revolutionary syndicalism. These problems in Europe led 
Weil to studying oppression and liberty to examine what is was that activists of change 
sought. Blum and Seidler make the point that 
this task was crucial because if we have an unreal sense of liberty, our efforts to attain it will 
be misdirected or, worse, will themselves undermine our aspirations to freedom by generating 
different and deeper structures of subordination.237 
Weil realises that neither the problems nor the solutions could be encompassed by an 
uninformed perspective but I argue that Weil’s view predominantly focuses on labour 
and oppression in the proletariat class. Weil is influenced by Marx, but argues that his 
analysis must be applied to current problems and that capitalist oppression is not the 
final form of oppression. A greater, more oppressive force has developed in society 
 
233 Weil deals with this issue in her 1933 essay, Perspectives. Allons-nous vers la révolution 
prolétarienne, and in her essay, Lénine: Matérialisme et empiriocriticisme. 
234 Blum and Seidler, A Truer Liberty, p. 108. 
235 Lenin: Materialism and Empiriocriticism. 
236 ‘Cependant l’on ne semble pas avoir compris quelles sont les conditions d’une telle transformation’. 
Simone Weil, ‘Lénine: Matérialisme et empiriocriticisme’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: 
L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 308. 
237 Blum and Seidler, A Truer Liberty, p. 80. 
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namely, bureaucratic oppression. Bureaucratic oppression is a result of industrial 
development. Closely related to its development are evolutions in science and 
specialisation. A class who manages, and who have a monopoly on the knowledge of 
overall process, has the power to destroy the culture and creativity of those who work 
under their control. It is because of this power that Weil believes technology plays a 
central role in the oppression of the workers. She realises that the workers need to re-
establish control over their conditions of work. Thus, she felt that the role of 
technology was another oppression that required study. According to Blum and 
Seidler, when she wrote in Réflexions 
Weil’s conception of liberty was fundamentally tied to a Kantian framework characterised by 
its identification of freedom, morality, and reason, with freedom conceived as an essentially 
inner quality and the aspiration to freedom inviolable.238 
Weil believes that oppression occurs in the workplace through isolated technique and 
distant bureaucracy. Apart from the physical labour involved, Weil’s main concern is 
that an ever-evolving production-automation technology limits the mind’s ability to 
think and engage. Hence, when Weil discusses liberty it is that of a mind free to think, 
to engage with all the aspects of labouring. This is an important distinction in the 
direction of her development. Rush Rhees in Discussions of Simone Weil advises 
though, that ‘[i]f we say [liberty] is possible, we should recognise that what I do, the 
life I lead, is limited by the special time and place in which I live, by the hardships and 
misfortunes I meet, by the death of friends and those whom I depend, by the obstacles 
I could never have foreseen’.239 Yet, instead of encompassing labour into life, Weil 
argues that labour, and its full engagement, is a core experience of what it is to be fully 
human, thus subsuming life into work. Blum and Seidler argue that ‘Weil took from 
 
238 Blum and Seidler, A Truer Liberty, pp. 80-81. 
239 Rush Rhees, Discussion of Simone Weil, ed. D.Z. Philips, ass. Mario von der Ruhr (Albany: State 
University of New York, 1999), p. 3. 
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Kant the notion that we must exercise our freedom in our thoughts and our actions’.240 
This is a valid assessment of Weil’s understanding of freedom, yet it shows the 
contradictions of tolerance in Weil’s argument. Considering that Blum and Seidler 
insist that ‘she brought Kant’s sense of moral capacity as the source of dignity in 
human existence to her thinking on the inadequacies of the conception of freedom she 
believed implicit in orthodox Marxism’,241 a problem of tolerance as much as freedom 
is found in Weil. Blum and Seidler restate that by Réflexions ‘Weil already moves 
towards a critique of the Kantian inheritance that sees freedom as radically a matter 
for the individual’,242 yet we must consider if this is a similar version of freedom that 
Weil is discussing. Blum and Seidler state that 
Weil develops a conception of liberty [in Réflexions] as something that we can exercise only 
in our relations with the world. Freedom can only be meaningfully thought about in relation 
to necessity and to our orientation to necessity. This makes work and our relation to our work 
integral to our potential to actualise our liberty. Freedom thereby gains substance.243  
If liberty is of the mind and linked with work, then we must consider whether Weil’s, 
and seemingly Blum and Seidler’s, concept that work should be integral to liberty is a 
version of freedom that everyone desires. For some, a hobby or a family may be their 
ideal of freedom. Roy Pierce states in Sociology and Utopia: The Early Writings of 
Simone Weil that ‘[t]his view of liberty is presented, of course, only as an ideal, not 
existing in any real situation. No man can alone forge the conditions of his existence. 
But it is an ideal which man can seek to approximate’.244 The contradiction with Weil, 
Blum and Seidler, and Pierce is that they all account for work as an activity that must 
be subsumed into the very essence of a person’s life, thereby directly linking it liberty. 
 
240 Blum and Seidler, A Truer Liberty, p. 81. 
241 Ibid. 
242 Ibid. 
243 Ibid. 
244 Roy Pierce, ‘Sociology and Utopia: The Early Writings of Simone Weil’, Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 77, No. 4 (Dec. 1962), p. 513. 
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Again, for some people, this could represent a narrow definition of liberty that places 
work and its value at the centre of life. We can infer that Weil is stating that only 
liberty can be found through work, meaning that to not work is to be unfree. 
Contradictory, this is not a conclusion that Marx reaches. 
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3.1.2 Factory Labour 
 
From December 1934 until August 1935, after she wrote Réflexions, Weil is employed 
as an unskilled labourer in various French factories in the surrounds of Paris. She spent 
the first four months in the Alsthom electrical plant, then moves to the Forges de 
Basse-lndre, before finally ending her labours at Renault. Robert Chenavier remarks 
in Simone Weil: Attention to the Real that ‘[Weil] tried to respond to the utter 
confusion of her era by what she called her Great Work, […] which she set herself to 
complete before she went to work in a factory. The dead ends of her reflections on the 
social question and the dangers of methodical action pushed Simone Weil to become 
a worker’.245 In a letter to Auguste Detoeuf, the manager of the Alsthom works, 
outlining her experiences, she illuminates what Mary Dietz states in Between the 
Human and the Divine: The Political Thought of Simone Weil as ‘the foreign nature 
of the working condition:’246 
The obedience I had to practice can be defined as follows. To begin with, it shrinks the time 
dimension down to a few seconds. […] My attention had to be constantly restricted to the 
movement I was performing. […] Secondly, it is an obedience to which one’s entire being is 
committed. In your own sphere, obedience to an order means directing your activity in a certain 
way; but for me an order might overwhelm soul and body together because—like some of the 
others—I was almost constantly at the limit of my strength. […] In the third place, this 
discipline relies upon no incentives except the most sordid form of gain, on a paltry scale, and 
fear.247 
Although it is without challenge that the experiences in the factories had a profound 
effect upon Weil, Dietz takes issue with Weil, stating that ‘it would be misleading to 
suggest that Weil’s factory labours shaped or otherwise determined her critique of the 
modern world and her understanding of oppression’.248 Weil does observe that, ‘[i]n 
 
245 Robert Chenavier, Simone Weil: Attention to the Real, trans. Bernard E. Doering (Notre Dame: Notre 
Dame University Press, 2012), p. 9. 
246 Mary G. Dietz, Between the Human and the Divine: The Political Thought of Simone Weil (New 
Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield,1988), p. 37. 
247 Weil, Seventy Letters, translated and arranged by Richard Rees, p. 56. 
248 Dietz, Between the Human and the Divine, p. 37. 
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this situation, the greatness of soul which allows one to despise injustice and 
humiliation is almost impossible to exercise’.249 The argument which Dietz states is 
that by 1934, before undertaking her factory experiences, Weil already completes 
Réflexions. However, where Dietz’s argument may falter, in suggesting that 
‘[Réflexions] set out in more theoretical and analytical terms what her year of work 
and her factory journal confirmed’,250 presumes, if not alters, Weil’s conclusions. If 
the factory work is the opportunity of any intellectual discovery, since the essential 
themes of her social philosophy were settled as early as 1934, the conditions provide 
the opportunity to verify or to substantiate the hypotheses which she drew up in 
Réflexions. In the light of experience, she could refine certain analysis. But again, there 
is nothing of what she addresses in La Condition Ouvrière251 that is not already 
detailed in Réflexions. Demonstrating the philosophical principles developed in 
Réflexions in the factories, Weil illuminates the evolutionary causes that led the 
revolutionary syndicalism to be contaminated by Fascism. However, Philippe 
Dujardin remarks in Simone Weil: Idéologie et politique252 that ‘[t]he tendency of 
Simone Weil to exaggerate the value of this experience, which she had ardently 
desired, is, moreover, very clear and expressed with brilliance in one of the first letters 
she addressed to Albertine Thévenon:’253 
When I think that the great Bolshevist leaders were claiming to create a free working class and 
that none of them Trotsky surely not, Lenin I do not believe either - probably set foot in a 
factory and as a result had - no longer a faint idea of the real conditions which determine 
servitude or liberty for the workers politics appears to me as a sinister joke.254 
 
249 Weil, Seventy Letters, translated and arranged by Richard Rees, p. 56. 
250 Dietz, Between the Human and the Divine, p. 37. 
251 The Workers’ Condition. 
252 Simone Weil: Ideology and politics. 
253 ‘La tendance de Simone Weil à majorer à l’extrême la valeur de cette expérience, qu’elle avait 
ardemment souhaitée, est d’ailleurs très nette, et s’exprime avec éclat, dans l’une des premières lettres 
qu’elle adressa à Albertine Thévenon’. Philippe Dujardin, Simone Weil: Idéologie et Politique (Presses 
Universitaires de Grenoble: Grenoble, 1975), p. 132. 
254 ‘Quand je pense que les grands chefs bolchevistes prétendaient créer une classe ouvrière libre et 
qu’aucun d’eux Trotsky sûrement pas, Lénine je ne crois pas non plus - sans doute mis le pied dans une 
88 
 
The bitter experience of the status of a specialised worker in a country affected by 
unemployment and recession did not in any way bring Weil closer to the revolutionary 
groups she had attended. On the contrary, it led her, as her letter to Thévenon testifies, 
to move further away from the theoretical principles of Marxism. It is possible that for 
the first time we find an emerging spirituality in Weil’s thinking. Françoise Meltzer 
states in The Hands of Simone Weil that work entailed more than just labouring: 
Weil’s own factory work was intended to demonstrate to herself her conviction that assembly 
line work prevents attention in her sense, indeed, prevents thought altogether. Repeatedly, the 
journal she kept during her factory work attests to her crushing fatigue and inability to think. 
And yet attention for Weil is only possible through work. The paradox is for her one of the 
profound scandals of high capitalism.255 
On the one hand, she introduces in her analyses the criteria of the lived subjective 
experience to the detriment of conceptual construction. On the other hand, it proposes 
remedies for the flaws of contemporary capitalism borrowed from a Marxist tradition 
that we will tentatively call reformist. According to Chenavier, ‘it was the very 
conditions of work that had to change, and the urgency of this task led her to think 
about the primary conditions for a new regime in the factories’.256 However, such was 
the fragility of Weil’s body and her employment of a methodology that sought to 
confirm rather than investigate, this is the extent that I will engage with Weil’s factory 
years. 
  
 
usine et par suite n’avait - la n’avait plus faible idée des conditions réelles qui déterminent la servitude 
ou la liberté pour les ouvriers la politique m’apparaît comme une sinistre rigolade’. Simone Weil, La 
Condition Ouvrière (Paris: Gallimard, 1951), p. 16. 
255 Françoise Meltzer, ‘The Hands of Simone Weil’, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Summer, 2001), 
p. 614. 
256 Chenavier, Simone Weil: Attention to the Real, p. 9. 
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3.1.3 Weil and Marxism 
 
In undertaking an examination of Marx, Weil’s admiration ends when her critique 
sources the weakness of a theory that cannot rigorously demonstrate the underlying 
factors that define its prophesied vision. However brilliant the analyses that outlines 
man’s progress toward a utopian socialist free society, Weil dismisses their validity 
when they fail to trace the source of oppression outside of the societal structure. 
Nevertheless, Weil is indebted to Marx’s materialism, stating that the ‘Marxist view, 
according to which social existence is determined by the relations between man and 
nature established by production’257 is the only appropriate ‘basis for any historical 
investigation’258 of oppression. Marx and Engels’ understanding of oppression in The 
Communist Manifesto in 1848 states that oppression arises when ‘every occupation 
hitherto honoured and looked up to with reverent awe […] has converted the 
physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, into its paid wage-
labourers […] veiled by religious and political illusions, [leading to] naked, shameless, 
direct, brutal exploitation’.259 Considering the demanding productive forces and the 
clinical division of labour in man’s relation with man, Marx writes four years earlier, 
‘[i]f he relates to his own activity as to something unfree, it is a relationship to an 
 
257 ‘La vue marxiste selon laquelle l’existence sociale est déterminée par les rapports entre l’homme et 
la nature établis par la production reste bien la seule base solide pour toute étude historique; seulement 
ces rapports doivent être considérés d’abord en fonction du problème du pouvoir, les moyens de 
subsistance constituant simplement une donnée de ce problème’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions sur les 
causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience 
ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 60. 
258  ‘La vue marxiste selon laquelle l’existence sociale est déterminée par les rapports entre l’homme et 
la nature établis par la production reste bien la seule base solide pour toute étude historique; seulement 
ces rapports doivent être considérés d’abord en fonction du problème du pouvoir, les moyens de 
subsistance constituant simplement une donnée de ce problème’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions sur les 
causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience 
ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 60. 
259 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (London: Penguin, 2004), p. 6. 
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activity that is under the domination, oppression, and yoke of another man’.260 The 
difference that defines Weil’s dissatisfaction with Marx is that increased production 
begets oppression, which cyclically stimulates the oppressive productive forces. Man 
is not released from the forces of production under Marxism, he continues to work in 
a similar manner. It is just the ownership that of the production that changes hands, 
not the manner of the work. By the end of Réflexions, Weil’s analysis is far removed 
from Marxism, a point with which Dietz agrees, who states that 
part of the unusual quality of [Réflexions] is that it is written by a thinker and activist who 
sympathises with the aims of the working-class and respects basic aspects of Marx’s thought, 
but rejects Marxist doctrine and social theory as an explanation of oppression or a program of 
action.261 
Herein, after her view of Marx’s (mis)understanding of the real causes of oppression, 
Weil’s social analysis gradually shifted its emphasis from economically determined 
power relations to, what Moulakis states, as ‘the mechanics of the formation of 
collective opinion as the decisive factor of oppression’.262 This is the basis of her 
concept of materialism,  and whereas Marx understood oppression as the organ of a 
social function, namely, class struggle or categorisation, Weil states that 
Marx’s truly great idea is that in human society as well as in nature nothing takes place 
otherwise than through material transformations. ‘Men make their own history, but within 
certain fixed conditions’. To desire is nothing; we have got to know the material conditions 
which determine our possibilities of action; and in the social sphere these conditions are 
defined by the way in which man obeys material necessities in supplying his own needs, in 
other words, by the method of production.263 
 
260 Karl Marx, Karl Marx: Selected Writings, ed. David McLellan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), p. 92. 
261 Dietz, Between the Human and the Divine, p. 38. 
262 Moulakis, Simone Weil and the Politics of Self-Denial, p. 113. 
263 ‘La grande idée de Marx, c’est que dans la société aussi bien que dans la nature rien ne s’effectue 
autrement que par des transformations matérielles. Les hommes font leur propre histoire, mais dans des 
conditions déterminées. Désirer n’est rien, il faut connaître les conditions matérielles qui déterminent 
nos possibilités d’action; et dans le domaine social, ces conditions sont définies par la manière dont 
l’homme obéit aux nécessités matérielles en subvenant à ses propres besoins, autrement dit par le mode 
de production’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in 
Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), pp. 36-37. 
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Weil understands the principal error of Marx’s social physics to be the implausible 
prognosis that in the end the weak will have force on their side and will wield power 
while concurrently remaining weak. This belief is in contradiction with Weil’s view 
that force is relative to dominance. 
Marx’s revolutionary materialism consists in positing, on the one hand that everything is 
exclusively regulated by force, and on the one hand that a day will suddenly come when force 
will be on the side of the weak. Not that certain ones who were weak will become strong – a 
change that has always taken place; but that the entire mass of the weak, while continuing to 
be such, will have force on its side.264 
If Marx’s materialist method is to work, it has to achieve the same kind of progress 
that Darwin’s theory gained in recognition with Lamarck’s theory, which states that 
‘the function creates the organ’.265 Juxtaposing Marx’s explanation of social 
oppression analogous to Lamarck’s biological theory, in accordance to how function 
gives rise to emergence or adaptation of a specific organ, the idea of a natural selection 
of individual efforts that prove viable within the context of living conditions 
explains the social form without any need to surrender the core of free will in man to 
an invisible hand that would determine historical changes. 
Investigating the ideas of liberation and revolution and that power is being 
abused, Weil argues that ideological orthodoxy and state bureaucracy are crippling the 
individual’s freedom to critically engage with the world. New social forces both sacred 
and secular promise salvation but deliver oppression. The problem which Weil is 
unable to surmount is that social relations are unbalanced. This contrasts with Marx 
who believes that the equity distinction is erasable, if enough of the material aspects 
 
264 ‘Le matérialisme révolutionnaire de Marx consiste à poser, d’une part que tout est règle 
exclusivement par la force, d’autre part qu’un jour viendra soudain où la force sera du côté des faibles. 
Non pas que certains qui étaient faibles deviendront forts, changement qui s’est toujours produit; mais 
que la masse entière des faibles, demeurant la masse des faibles, aura la force de son côté’. Simone 
Weil, ‘Y-a-t-il une Marxiste doctrine ?’ in Oppression et liberté (Paris: Gallimard, 1955), p. 208. 
265 ‘La première consiste à adopter pour l’histoire humaine le principe d’explication de Lamarck, la 
fonction crée l’organe; ce principe selon lequel la girafe aurait tellement essayé de manger des bananes 
que son cou se serait allongé’. Simone Weil, ‘Y-a-t-il une Marxiste doctrine ?’ in Oppression et liberté 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1955), p. 243. 
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are realtered. Concluding that ‘[s]omebody’s nature will always be violated’,266 Winch 
outlines the hurdle in Simone Weil: The Just Balance. 
So, the presence of another human being will always be an essential threat to one’s realisation 
of one’s own projects; and the only way to avert that threat is to dominate the other. Naturally, 
not everyone can achieve a dominating position, so human relations will always be between 
those who dominate and those who submit; but since the essential reality of a human being is 
to be active, such relations will never constitute an equilibrium.267 
Winch’s argument of domination and power (in)equilibrium268 moves Weil further 
away from a Marxist position, in that material differences may be overcome but that 
relationships always entail the subjection of one person to another. Weil’s argument 
is that a person’s activity, which stems from how she characterises thought in Science 
and Perception – I (can) act, therefore, I am, defines their liberty. This activity in work 
– freedom of thought – also defines their humanness. Winch states that the problem 
that Weil had in conceptualising genuine equilibrium is ‘that the moment such beings 
become mutually dependent, as they do when their attempts to assert their active 
natures in the face of a hostile nature lead to a division of labour, the active 
independence of some, and perhaps of all, is inevitably threatened.’269 For Weil, 
freedom stemmed not solely from the freedom to choose, but to be able to restrain, or 
to control the manner of work or a lived day. A capitalist, utilitarian based system 
conceives of liberty as the ability to satisfy desires, whereas Weil would argue that 
freedom is a person’s ability to act freely. Then fundamentally, if a person is still 
bound to the nature of productive forces, then they are not free nor relived of 
oppression. 
 
266 Peter Winch, Simone Weil: The Just Balance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 
87. 
267 Peter Winch, Simone Weil: The Just Balance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 
87. 
268 Winch defines equilibrium as […] a stable relation between things of a sort which involves no 
violation of the reality of any of the things related. Two active human beings, therefore, could be in 
equilibrium with each other only in so far as the actions of each respected the reality of the other. Winch, 
The Just Balance, p. 87. 
269 Winch, The Just Balance, p. 90. 
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In a simplistic sense, Weil agrees with Marx’s overall precepts of revolution 
and believes that the working-class should be relieved of oppression, but she disagrees 
with Marx’s reliance on science as a method of analysis, his theory of productive 
forces and his concept of the revolutionary potential of the proletariat. Her critique is 
underpinned by both an intellectual and experiential dimension as she deconstructed 
Marx’s theory. Submission is a key aspect for Weil, and Winch, who states: 
Drawing on ideas in Hegel and Marx (amongst other writers at least as far back as Plato) [Weil] 
points out that domination itself characteristically involves an element of submission, though 
this fact may be hidden even from the one who thinks to occupy the dominating position.270 
If this is true, then the possibility of rectifying or mitigating the problem is weakened. 
Whilst Weil’s argument is not that domination by some is acceptable, including the 
state, the bureaucracy and capitalists, she does not elucidate her argument by creating 
a dichotomy between oppressor and oppressed while also advocating for the 
oppressed. Winch’s argument is that we are all capable of being oppressed while some 
are capable of being the oppressor. Drawing their oppressive power from their 
environment, Winch remarks, that it ‘is in very large measure a human, social 
environment. So their power comes, in large, probably pre-eminent, measure from the 
society in which they exercise their domination’.271 The argument advanced by Weil 
and then Winch is that people dominate (some) other people ‘only in so far as, one 
way or another, they have the support of others’.272 For Weil, an analysis of societal 
oppression must conduct an examination of the nature and quality of work, something 
that Marxism and capitalism ignores. 
 
 
270 Winch, The Just Balance, p. 88. 
271 Ibid. 
272 Ibid. 
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Marx identifies the source of oppression as the capitalist exploitation of surplus 
labour and so proletariat ownership became a defining principle of revolution. For 
Weil, this analysis ignores the working conditions and type of work, just as the 
capitalist industrial system had with its scientific measurements of factory labour. 
Weil applies her critique equally between socialism and capitalism because both 
systems emphasise the maximisation of production and exploitation of the worker, 
albeit for different reasons. This leads to the alienation of the worker, and the increased 
mechanisation of human labour results in less knowledge. The relationship between 
the individual worker and their ability to comprehend the structure of the labour 
process is paramount. The connection between the workers’ intellectual control of 
their actions that interested Weil, as she states: 
An artisan who has his own tools is more independent than a factory worker whose hands 
become useless as soon as it pleases the boss to stop him from working his machine [….] To 
sum up, the least evil society is that in which the general run of men is most often obliged to 
think while acting, have the most opportunities for exercising control over collective life, and 
enjoy the greatest amount of independence.273 
Weil separates the systems of power relations from the machines and technology used 
in the work and claims that any system could just as easily reproduce oppression. Marx 
had not foreseen this aspect and so, even though a system of oppression could be 
replaced with a similarly oppressive form of Marxist production, Weil argues that a 
similar form of oppression exists within any system that does not account for 
oppression in this manner. This is one of the clear examples where we see Weil 
agreeing with Marx in a sense but refining the analysis with greater acuity. According 
to Winch, ‘[h]er chief criticism of Marx is directed against the idea that industrial 
 
273 ‘Un artisan qui possède ses outils est plus indépendant qu’un ouvrier d’usine dont les mains 
deviennent inutiles lorsqu’il plaît au patron de lui retirer l’usage de sa machine […] En résumé la société 
la moins mauvaise est celle ou le commun des hommes se trouve le plus souvent dans l’obligation de 
penser en agissant, a les grandes possibilités de contrôle sur l’ensemble de la vie collective et possède 
le plus d’indépendance’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits 
historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 89. 
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society could ever itself evolve conditions in which things were fundamentally 
different’.274 If this is the case, then Weil reaches an impasse, however much she 
recognises the problem. Instead of the abstract Hobbesian state of nature, where 
society is yet to be formed under consensual values or social norms, in Réflexions Weil 
discusses competition in a complex industrialised society. If Weil is attempting to 
sketch the human condition in Réflexions, one which would make a genuine 
equilibrium between human beings at least conceivable, Winch states ‘[s]he was 
always realistically pessimistic about the possibility of ever bringing such an 
equilibrium about as a lasting state of affairs’.275 The important aspect of this pursuit, 
much like her ideal of liberty, is that detailing such an equilibrium provides a 
perspective route to an approximation of the ideal. 
Consequently, Weil disagrees with Marx’s believe in the revolutionary 
potential of the proletariat. Weil wonders how the disenfranchised workers might 
transform their consciousness as well as overthrow the ruling class. This question 
defines Weil’s critique of the Marxist theory of the proletarian revolution. Fred Rosen 
remarks in Marxism, Mysticism, and Liberty: The Influence of Simone Weil on Albert 
Camus that:  
At a time when many intellectuals […] were joining the Communist party in response to the 
crisis of capitalism and the rise of fascism, Simone Weil perceptively observed that Marxism 
and the Russian state provided an empty hope for the emancipation of the proletariat and that 
capitalism, fascism, and socialism were becoming in practice more alike, as production in 
these forms of society came under the domination of a technocratic elite. She believed that 
many people had failed to see that Russia was not a workers’ state in the sense that workers 
possessed democratic institutions, nor could it be in a ‘transitional’ phase […] when the 
workers were oppressed by a ‘bureaucratic caste’. This failure, she argued, was due to the 
tendency to distinguish only between the two kinds of state, the capitalist and the workers’, 
while the Russian regime was neither the one nor the other, but a new and oppressive form.276 
 
274 Winch, The Just Balance, p. 88. 
275 Ibid. 
276 Fred Rosen, ‘Marxism, Mysticism, and Liberty: The Influence of Simone Weil on Albert Camus’, 
Political Theory, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Aug. 1979), p. 302. 
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For Weil, the revolutionary impulse is developed from a state of consciousness that is 
significantly diminished by the capitalist system of production. Thus, to carry through 
and sustain the revolution, certain qualities of mind and attitudes are necessary. 
Despite the tendency for the proletariat to develop a significant solidarity through 
factory work in relation to the bourgeoisie, the oppression experienced in the capitalist 
system served to dispossess the worker of the revolutionary spirit. So, any intellectual 
or knowledge-based attempts to instruct these dispossessed workers to understand the 
proletarian revolution would fall short according to Weil. It must come from a 
cultivated sense of character, one which is also developed in environments conducive 
to freedom and creativity. Liberty is not some external structural force that can be 
transferred to the worker. Without a genuine spirit of revolution, Weil is unable to see 
how workers will resist reproducing oppression and the problems of state bureaucracy, 
as she states: 
And yet, though one can see very well how a revolution can ‘expropriate the expropriators’, 
one cannot see how a method of production founded on the subordination of those who do the 
work to those who co-ordinate could do otherwise than produce automatically a social 
structure of which the distinguishing mark is the dictatorship of a bureaucratic cast.277 
As such, Weil disputes the teleology found within Marx’s conception of history. 
Rather than inverting Hegel’s dialectic of the spirit, as Marx claimed he was doing, 
Weil suggests that he simply injected the material explanation of historical force with 
a spirit. For her, there was no basis to accept Marx’s claim that history is unfolding 
toward greater progress or increased production. Nor is there any reason to accept the 
 
277 ‘Et cependant, si l’on voit très bien comment une révolution peut exproprier les expropriateurs », on 
ne voit pas comment un mode de production fondé sur la subordination de ceux qui exécutent à ceux 
qui coordonnent pourrait ne pas produire automatiquement une structure sociale définie par la dictature 
d’une caste bureaucratique’. Simone Weil, ‘Perspectives. Allons-nous vers la révolution prolétarienne’, 
in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 272. 
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nineteenth century cult of progress that promised a positive direction to history, as she 
states: 
The whole of this doctrine, on which the Marxist conception of revolution entirely rests, is 
devoid of any scientific basis278 […]. The term religion may seem surprising relating to Marx; 
but to believe that our will coincides with a mysterious will which is at work in the universe 
and helps us to conquer is to think religiously, to believe in Providence.279 
It is faith in ‘the historical mission of the proletariat’280 that provides the mythological 
backdrop for Marxist ideology. If history, spirit or God is on your side then revolution 
seems more inevitable, and yet, revolution became a meaningless word for Weil, both 
because it was used differently and because the revolution never actually manifests as 
intended. A bureaucracy, party elite or new ruling class is always formed and 
oppression, in Weil eyes, is not mitigated or erased.  Stating, ‘the word revolution is a 
word for which you kill, for which you die, for which you send working masses to 
their death, but which does not possess any content’,281 violent insurrection is often 
thought of as a genuine form of revolution, offering a clean break from the previous 
system of oppression. However, Weil believes that during the French Revolution the 
ruling class had already lost much of its support by the time of the violent overthrow. 
The example of the problem with the disintegrating notions of revolution is that the 
Russian Revolution simply transferred the oppressive systems into new hands, as she 
 
278 ‘Toute cette doctrine, sur laquelle repose entièrement la conception marxiste de la révolution, est 
absolument dépourvue de tout caractère scientifique’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de 
l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la 
révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 35. 
279 ‘Le terme de religion peut surprendre quand il s’agit de Marx; mais croire que notre volonté converge 
avec une volonté mystérieuse qui serait à la l’œuvre dans le monde et nous aiderait à vaincre, c’est 
penser religieusement, c’est croire à la Providence’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de 
l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la 
révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 36. 
280 ‘La mission historique du prolétariat’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression 
sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, 
Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 36. 
281 ‘Le mot de révolution est un not pour lequel on tue, pour lequel on meurt, pour lequel on envoie les 
masses populaires à la mort, mais qui n’a aucun contenu’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de 
l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la 
révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 45. 
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states, ‘the institutions arising out of the insurrection did not perhaps effectively 
function for as long as a single morning; and the real forces, namely big industry, the 
police, the army, the bureaucracy, far from being smashed by the revolution, attained 
thanks to it, a power unknown in other countries’.282 Furthermore, Weil asks of Marx 
‘why the oppressed in revolt has never succeeded in founding a non-oppressive 
society’.283 Though Marx did provide the basis and fuel for a revolution, Weil asks the 
question, what happens afterwards? For, if a form of oppression just changed hands, 
then no real revolution has occurred. 
 Essentially, the distinction between revolution and reform is false. In some 
ways, she both accepts and rejects these ways of approaching social change. She 
criticises reform tendencies for not seeing the radical nature of the critique necessary 
to bring about change and rejects the idea that violence could lead to drastic change. 
Indeed, the thinking about social solutions did need to be revolutionary or radical. 
However, she rejects the notion that society could undergo a quick revolution and end 
oppression. According to Pierce, ‘[i]n the conflict between revolution and reform, 
Simone Weil was squarely on the side of reform. Yet at the same time, she was 
convinced that a utopian vision was essential, no matter how far distant it may be from 
reality’.284 Weil did acknowledge the possibility of creating a society with less 
oppression. But she points out that Marx and his followers never clearly define what 
 
282 ‘Les institutions surgies au cours de l’insurrection n’ont peut-être pas été effectivement en fonction 
l’espace d’un matin; et que les forces réelles, à savoir la grande industrie, la police, l’armée, la 
bureaucratie, loin d’avoir été brisées par la révolution, sont parvenues grâce à elle à une puissance 
inconnue dans les autres pays’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in 
Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 66. 
283 ‘Pourquoi les opprimés en révolte n’ont jamais réussi à fonder une société non oppressive’. Simone 
Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: 
L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), 
p. 48. 
284 Pierce, ‘Sociology and Utopia: The Early Writings of Simone Weil’, p. 510. 
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constitutes less oppression and without this analysis it is impossible to properly 
examine the situation, stating: 
for as long as the worst and the best have not been defined in terms of a clearly and concretely 
conceived ideal, and then the precise margin of possibilities determined, we do not know 
which is the lesser evil, and consequently we are compelled to accept under this name anything 
effectively imposed by those who dispose force, since any existing evil whatever is always 
less than the possible evils which uncalculated action invariably runs the risk of bringing 
about.285 
Accordingly, Weil rejects Marx’s reduction of society to economic forces and argues 
for a more complex understanding of social life. In Méditation sur l’obéissance et la 
liberté,286 war is distinct from the economy and plays a central role in oppression as 
‘however much you may resort to all kinds of subtleties to show that war is an 
essentially economic phenomenon, it is palpably obvious that war is destruction and 
not production’.287 This is an aspect of understanding economics and war that changes 
in the latter part of Réflexions, but in Méditation force is the central determining factor 
to understanding oppression on a social basis according to Weil. Systems of 
production do not determine the level of oppression. Rather, Weil recognises that 
irrespective of the form of economy, whether feudal, capitalism or communism, 
abuses of power can and will occur. This is simply the nature of existence. No 
transformation of any economic system can rid the world of the human tendency to 
exploit.  Using the examples of command and obedience, Weil points out that, despite 
those in power being less in number, they garner a force capable of controlling the 
 
285 ‘Car tant qu’on n’a pas défini le pire et le mieux en fonction d’un idéal clairement et concrètement 
conçu, puis déterminé la marge exacte des possibilités, on ne sait pas quel est le moindre mal, et dès 
lors on est contraint d’accepter sous ce nom tout ce qu’imposent effectivement ceux qui ont en main la 
force, parce que n’importe quel mal réel est toujours moindre que les maux possibles que risque toujours 
d’amener une action non calculée’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, 
in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 51.  
286 Meditation on obedience and freedom. 
287 ‘On a beau avoir recours à toutes sortes de subtilités pour faire de la guerre un phénomène 
essentiellement économique, il éclate aux yeux que la guerre est destruction et non production’. Simone 
Weil, ‘Méditation sur l’obéissance et la liberté’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: 
L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), 
p. 129. 
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masses. Due to ignorance, most misplace their critique and a ‘veil is thrown over the 
fundamental absurdity of the social mechanism’.288 Many simply accept Marx’s 
theory of economic determinism. Weil states in Examen critique des idées de 
revolution et de progrès,289 that ‘people would rather believe that Marx has 
demonstrated the future, an imminent constitution of a socialist society, than study his 
works to see if they can discover even the remotest attempt at demonstration’.290 
Whereas Marx believes the bourgeoisie acted primarily to obtain a disproportionate 
amount of goods, Weil believes they acted solely to retain power. This creates a sharp 
distinction with Marx on the issue of scarcity. 
There are many contributing factors to oppression, not simply whether a 
society has a lack of abundance or not. Here again, power or its underlying force is 
central to Weil’s thought as she states, ‘at times war occupies the forefront, at other 
times the search for wealth, at other times production; but the evil remains the same’291 
where ‘we should be mistaken likewise in assuming that oppression to be ineluctable 
as soon as the productive forces have been sufficiently developed to ensure welfare 
and leisure for all’.292 Weil also disagrees that it is both possible and desirable to 
 
288 ‘Des deux côtes, on jette un voile sur l’absurdité radicale du mécanisme social’. Simone Weil, 
‘Méditation sur l’obéissance et la liberté’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience 
ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 130.  
289 Critical examination of ideas of revolution and progress. 
290 ‘On aime mieux croire que Marx a démontré la constitution future et prochaine d’une société 
socialiste, plutôt que de chercher dans ses œuvres si on y peut trouver même la moindre tentative de 
démonstration’. Simone Weil, ‘Examen critique des idées de révolution et de progrès’, in Écrits 
historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 148. 
291 ‘Tantôt la guerre apparait au premier plan, tantôt la recherche de la richesse, tantôt la production; 
mais le mal reste le même’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits 
historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 58.  
292 ‘On se tromperait de même en supposant que l’oppression cesse d’être inéluctable dès que les forces 
productives sont assez développées pour pouvoir assurer à tous le bien-être et le loisir’. Simone Weil, 
‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: 
L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), 
p. 59. 
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overcome scarcity. Describing the idea that not needing to work as ‘mad’293 is not 
surprising as work for Weil is a central part of what it is to be a free human and a 
dignified activity when done with understanding and intelligence. However, Weil does 
recognise the stream of thought in Marx’s early writings, which emphasises the 
importance of work, as she states: 
It must take from thence precisely that which has been almost forgotten by what is called 
Marxism: the glorification of productive labour, considered as man’s highest activity; the 
assertion that only a society wherein the act of work brought all of man’s faculties into play, 
wherein the man who works occupied the front rank, would realise human greatness to the 
full. We find in Marx’s early writings, lines concerning labour that have a lyrical accent […] 
This new poetry, appropriate to our time, which forms perhaps its chief claim to greatness, 
must not be lost. Therein the oppressed must find evoked their own mother-country, which is 
hope.294 
Therefore, Weil disagrees with the orthodox interpretation of Marxism which focusses 
on ideas within Capital but perhaps finds similarities with his earlier writings.295 
Related to the issue of scarcity is that of private property. Again, Weil fundamentally 
disagrees with Marx. He believes that once private property is abolished the 
oppression of workers disappears simultaneously. For Weil, this is another false 
conclusion. Contrary to Marx, she believes any societal system of production could 
produce oppression. Since power is the central tool for oppression in Weil’s analysis, 
and since hierarchies are inevitable, oppression will always be reproduced. Whereas 
private property represented the misuse of surplus labour to Marx, it remains a neutral 
 
293 ‘La folle idée’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits 
historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 45. 
294 ‘Il a à y prendre ce qui a été précisément presque oublie par ce qu’on nomme le marxisme: la 
glorification du travail productif, conçu comme l’activité suprême de l’homme; l’affirmation que seule 
une société où l’acte du travail mettrait en jeu toutes les facultés de l’homme, où l’homme qui travaille 
serait au premier rang, réaliserait la plénitude de la grandeur humaine. On trouve chez Marx, dans les 
écrits de jeunesse, des lignes d’accent lyrique concernant le travail […]. Cette poésie nouvelle, propre 
à notre temps, et qui en fait peut-être la principale grandeur, ne doit pas se perdre. Les opprimés doivent 
y trouver l’évocation de leur patrie à eux, qui est une espérance’. Simone Weil, ‘Sur les contradictions 
du marxisme’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la 
révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 141. 
295 In his 1844 Manuscripts Marx never posited the notion of a work free utopian society but these ideas 
can be found within Capital. Orthodox Marxism ignored his earlier writings. And there is a similarity 
between Weil’s emphasis on work and Marx’s early writings. 
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factor for Weil’s understanding of oppression. The argument over ownership of 
property becomes secondary to the structure of labour and the organisation of power 
within the workplace. Therefore, it is Weil’s argument that Marx fails to fully 
investigate the problem of oppression which is key to her position on oppression and 
consequently, liberty. 
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Section Two 
 
3.2.1 Perspectives. Allons-nous vers la révolution prolétarienne 
 
In her 1933 article, Perspectives. Allons-nous vers la révolution prolétarienne,296 Weil 
demonstrates the germination of analysis which we find more complete in the 1934 
Réflexions. By comparing the social and political developments in Russia, Germany, 
France, and America, Weil concludes that ‘capitalist expansion has now nearly 
reached the point where it will be halted by the actual limits of the earth’s surface 
[and] yet never have there been fewer premonitory signs of the advent of socialism’.297 
Despite the obvious shortcomings in this statement, Weil nevertheless reminds her 
readers that the individual worker, as opposed to the collective, should be the supreme 
value and that the goal should be to support the value of the worker by opposing 
specialisation. This is achieved by dignifying manual labour through helping the 
worker understand his work. Weil summarises the task of her generation as follows: 
We want to get back to man, that is to say to the individual, the power which it is his proper 
function to exercise over nature, over tools, over society itself; to re-establish the importance 
of the workers as compared with material conditions of work; and instead of doing away with 
private property, to turn individual property into something real, by transforming the means of 
production [...] which at present serve above all to enslave and exploit labour, into mere 
instruments of labour freely and co-operatively performed.298 
 
296 Prospects: Are we heading for a proletarian revolution. 
297 ‘L’expansion capitaliste n’est plus loin du moment où elle se heurtera aux limites mêmes de la 
surface terrestre. Et cependant jamais le socialisme n’a été annoncé par moins de signes précurseurs’. 
Simone Weil, ‘Perspectives. Allons-nous vers la révolution prolétarienne’, in Écrits historiques et 
politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 
260. 
298 ‘Nous voulons rendre  à l’homme, c’est-à-dire a l’individu, la domination qu’il a pour fonction 
propre d’exercer sur la nature, sur les outils, sur la société elle-même; rétablir la subordination des 
conditions matérielles du travail par rapport aux travailleurs; et, au lieu de supprimer la propriété 
individuelle, faire de la propriété individuelle une vérité, en transformant les moyens de production […] 
qui servent aujourd’hui surtout à asservir et exploiter le travail, en de simples instruments du travail 
libre et associé’. Simone Weil, ‘Perspectives. Allons-nous vers la révolution prolétarienne’, in Écrits 
historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1988), p. 277. 
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This criticism and the subsequent critique of Marx starts to place Weil outside the 
mainstream ideologies and movements. It is shown above that this focus on labour, 
particularly from the viewpoint of the individual worker, is continued in Réflexions so 
we turn our attention to the specifics of the essay. 
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3.2.2 Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression 
 
After she relinquishes hope of revolutionary syndicalism alleviating the plights of the 
common worker, the themes of Perspectives. Allons-nous vers la révolution 
prolétarienne that continue in Réflexions comprises a further development in Weil’s 
political thought Encapsulated in a critique of all current developments, her criticism 
extends to intellectuals, labour unionists, Marxists, Stalinists, capitalists and fascists. 
Leaving few unchastised, Réflexions is important because it demystifies Marx by 
1933-34. Citing work as the core of society and workers as the supreme value, the 
main function in writing Réflexions is to remind readers that these aspects should be 
the focus of any social reform. Weil is critical of everything that moves the individual 
worker away from problem’s locus. When the concerns of individual workers are 
diminished, Weil believes that focus has been lost. Consequently, her criticism 
includes revolution, specialisation, and bureaucracy. Weil’s Réflexions is divided into 
four parts, entitled, ‘Critique du marxisme’, ‘Analyse de l’Oppression’, ‘Tableau 
théorique d’une société libre’, and ‘Esquisse de la vie sociale contemporaine’. The 
first two parts focus on critique and analysis, whereas in the last two parts Weil 
develops an ideal against which she compares the state of contemporary social life. 
This section of this thesis will subsequently outline the first two parts: ‘Critique du 
marxisme’ and ‘Analyse de l’Oppression’. 
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3.2.3 Critique du marxisme 
 
In the first section of Réflexions Weil dissects the Marxist position that modern 
techniques, once freed from capitalist forms of economy, can give men enough leisure 
to enable them to develop their faculties harmoniously, and consequently bring about 
the disappearance, to a certain extent, of the degrading specialisation created by 
capitalism. The further development of technique must lighten the burden of material 
necessity, and, as an immediate consequence, that of social constraint, until humanity 
reaches at last a truly paradisiacal state in which the most abundant production would 
be at the cost of a trifling expenditure of effort. From his earliest writings on the 
alienation of labour, Marx states:   
We started from the presuppositions of political economy. We accepted its vocabulary and its 
laws. We presupposed private property, the separation of labour, capital, and land, and 
likewise of wages, profit, and ground rent; also, division of labour; competition; the concept 
of exchange value, etc. Using the very words of political economy we have demonstrated that 
the worker is degraded to the most miserable sort of commodity; that the misery of the worker 
is in inverse proportion to the power and size of his production; that the necessary result of 
competition is the accumulation of capital in a few hands, and thus a more terrible restoration 
of monopoly; and that finally the distinction between capitalist and landlord, and that between 
peasant and industrial worker disappears and the whole of society must fall apart into the two 
classes of the property owners and the propertyless workers.299 
The difficulty Weil has with this bifurcation of people into classes who have property 
and those who do not is that it does not account for oppression. This problem 
intensifies when an increase in productive forces is unquestioned by Marx in his 1857-
58 The Economics, where he states that capital tears ‘down all obstacles that impede 
the development of productive forces, the expansion of needs, the diversity of 
production and the exploitation and exchange of natural and intellectual forces’300 and 
‘there is a limit not inherent to production generally’.301 Weil criticises Marx for 
 
299 Karl Marx: Selected Writings, ed. David McLellan, p. 85. 
300 Karl Marx: Selected Writings, ed. David McLellan, p. 398. 
301 Karl Marx: Selected Writings, ed. David McLellan, p. 399. 
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holding a religious fervour in the power of matter to subvert the given working 
conditions. The effect of this argument is that socialism continues to oppress workers 
by subjecting them to historical progress. Marx’s concern in his latter writings is not 
of oppression but of capital that 
[t]he universality towards which it is perpetually driving finds limitations in its own nature, 
which at a certain stage of its development will make it appear as itself the greatest barrier to 
this tendency, leading thus to its own self-destruction.302 
According to Weil, ‘Marx’s truly great idea is that in human society as well as in 
nature nothing takes place otherwise than through material transformations.’303 In 
society man is subject to material necessities otherwise known as material production. 
To make any change or improvement in social organisation, a study of the method of 
production is necessary. One should ascertain the actual and potential output of the 
production mode, the forms of social and cultural life compatible with it, and the 
potential transformations of the production mode. Weil is convinced of the importance 
of the materialist method, but she also laments Marx by stating, ‘the only really 
valuable idea to be found in Marx’s writings is also the only one that has been 
completely neglected. It is not surprising that the social movements springing from 
Marx have failed’.304 Essentially, Weil and Marx are interested in different aspects of 
the workers’ condition. We find that Weil agrees in principle with Marx’s intentions 
to change the system, but that his assessment of the major obstacles and his 
methodology in achieving them fail to recognise the true nature of the workers’ plight. 
 
302 Karl Marx: Selected Writings, ed. David McLellan, p. 398. 
303 ‘La grande idée de Marx, c’est que dans la société aussi bien que dans la nature rien ne s’effectue 
autrement que par des transformations matérielles’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de 
l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la 
révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 36. 
304 ‘La seule idée vraiment précieuse qui se trouve dans l’œuvre de Marx est la seule aussi qui ait été 
complétement négligée. Il n’est pas étonnant que les mouvements sociaux issus de Marx aient fait 
faillite’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et 
politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 36. 
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Overt specialisation or mundane labour that leads to work devoid of a worker’s ability 
to be active only add to his oppressive weight. 
 Weil examines the argument that modern technique might provide welfare and 
leisure equally to everyone in order that the individual does not suffer under modern 
working conditions. She concludes that eliminating private property would never in 
itself provide the solution since ‘the abolition of private property would be far from 
sufficient to prevent work in the mines and in the factories from continuing to weigh 
as a servitude on those who are subjected to it’.305 Dispelling hope that the modern 
state of technique is a solution for the situation of the workers, Weil examines the 
presumption of unlimited future development of technique. The presupposition 
underlying such development is the potential for an unlimited increase in productivity. 
That Weil recognises the presupposition of unlimited growth separates her from the 
assumption of unlimited growth that is imbedded in both the capitalist and socialist 
theories. Weil proceeds to apply the unused method ‘of studying the conditions of a 
given phenomenon and the limits implied by them’306 to the notion of technical 
progress. Yet, criticising Marx, and expounding a further point of divergence, Weil 
states that his ‘dialectical method should have saved him from such an error, [yet he] 
fell into it on this point just like other people’.307 It is this difference in methodology 
that Weil creates a creates an intellectual divergence with Marx. 
 
305 ‘La suppression de la propriété privée serait loin de suffire à empêcher que le labeur des mines et 
des usines continue à peser comme un esclavage sur ceux qui y sont assujettis’. Simone Weil, ‘Les 
causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience 
ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 38. 
306 ‘D’étudier les conditions d’un phénomène et les limites qu’elles impliquent’. Simone Weil, ‘Les 
causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience 
ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 38. 
307 ‘Méthode dialectique devait préserver d’une telle erreur, y est tombé sur ce point comme les autres’. 
Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, 
Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1991), p. 38. 
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 In compartmentalising the technical progress and its factors, Weil wants to 
study these procedures separately. The first stage underlying the technical progress, 
which promised to produce more with less effort, is the utilisation of natural sources 
of energy. Not assuming an unlimited source, the energy must be wrestled from nature 
and transformed through labour. She describes the end of non-renewable resources as 
‘simply daydreaming’,308 lamenting the idea that a source of energy will be found that 
can be immediately utilisable without requiring human labour to transform it. The 
second stage underlying the technical progress, which intended to decrease human 
effort, is ‘the rationalisation of human labour’.309 Weil’s ideal of production is that 
labour can be understood as the relationship between ‘simultaneous efforts’.310 Weil 
distinguishes between production that is created in simultaneous partnership and 
products that are created between ‘successive efforts’,311 whereby products are created 
in successive stages, like on production line. In both these modes of production, 
progress is derived by a combination of both modes of production. This is an 
organisation of work to maximise production, whether it involves a sequence of 
repeated operations or a process of production. Weil questions whether this type of 
‘progress is unlimited and if not, whether we are still a long way from the limit’.312 
The third stage underlying the technical progress, which had promised to produce 
 
308 ‘C’est rêver’.  Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques 
et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 39. 
309 ‘La rationalisation du travail’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in 
Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 40. 
310 ‘Les efforts simultanés’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits 
historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 40. 
311 ‘Les efforts successifs’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits 
historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 40. 
312 ‘Progrès est illimité, et, dans le cas contraire, si nous sommes encore loin de la limite’. Simone Weil, 
‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: 
L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), 
p. 40. 
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more with less effort, is the rationalisation of labour in space. This factor included the 
concentration, division and coordination of labour. Concentration of labour relates to 
the reduction of overheads. The coordination of labour involves making the possible 
efforts reach beyond the scope of a single person to increase the speed of production. 
This is possible because one person assumes the work of coordination on behalf of 
others. Thus, ‘division and coordination of effort makes possible gigantic works, 
which would be infinitely beyond the scope of a single man’.313 However, after stating 
one of the rare positive aspects concerning a capitalist mass-production system, she 
concludes that these ‘labour-saving’314 devices contain ‘within themselves a limit, 
beyond which they form factors of expenditure’ and ‘this limit had been reached and 
overstepped’.315 The fourth stage underlying the technical progress is the coordination 
of labour in time. This factor Weil considers the most important and most difficult to 
analyse. The analysis of this factor requires a confrontation with a notion prevalent 
since Marx that ‘living labour’316 could eventually be replaced by ‘inanimate 
labour’.317 Weil criticises this idea as the modern scientific culture and the 
consequential extrapolation of Marx’s misunderstanding of the conditions of labour. 
In 1844, Marx states in first-stage manuscripts of Economics that ‘the worker can 
 
313 ‘La division et la coordination des efforts rendent possibles des œuvres colossales qui d’passeraient 
infiniment les possibilités d’un homme seul’. Simone Weil, Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression 
sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, 
Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 40. 
314 ‘D’économie comportent’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in 
Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 40. 
315 ‘Une limite au-delà de laquelle ils deviennent facteurs de dépense, mais encore que cette limite est 
atteinte et dépassée’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits 
historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 40. 
316 ‘Travail mort’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits 
historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 41. 
317 ‘Travail vivant’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits 
historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 41. 
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create nothing without nature’,318 but five years later, he states in Wage-labour and 
Capital: 
Machinery brings about the same results [of competition] on a much greater scale, by replacing 
skilled workers by unskilled, men by women, adults by children. It brings about the same 
results, where it is newly introduced, by throwing the hand workers on to the streets in masses, 
and, where it is developed, improved and replaced by more productive machinery, by 
discharging workers in smaller batches.319 
Later in Capital, Marx is convinced of the problem, stating ‘we see, that machinery, 
while augmenting the human material that forms the principal object of capital’s 
exploiting power, at the same time raises the degree of exploitation’.320 Weil states 
that the idea that inanimate labour would replace human effort is ‘a dangerously vague 
formula in the sense that it conjures up the picture of a continuous evolution towards 
a stage of technique where, if one may express it, all the jobs to be done would be 
done already’.321 In contrast to all the hopes for infinite development of automation, 
of which the robot is the ultimate symbol, Weil states, ‘no technique will ever relieve 
men of the necessity of continually adapting, by the sweat of their brow, the 
mechanical equipment they use’.322 The difference in approach is that Weil argues that 
Marx fails to recognise that increases in automation accounts for more oppression in 
labour not less, whereas Marx’s concern is the economic exploitation of labour. 
 
 
318 Karl Marx: Selected Writings, ed. David McLellan, p. 87. 
319 Karl Marx: Selected Writings, ed. David McLellan, p. 291. 
320 Karl Marx, Capital, trans. Samuel Moore, Edward Aveling and Ernest Untermann (Hertfordshire: 
Wordsworth Editions Limited, 2013), p. 273. 
321 ‘Formule d’une redoutable imprécision, en ce sens qu’elle évoque l’image d’une évolution continue 
vers une étape de la technique ou, si l’on peut parler ainsi, tous les travaux à faire seraient déjà faits’. 
Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, 
Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1991), p. 41. 
322 ‘Jamais aucune technique ne dispensera les hommes de renouveler et d’adapter continuellement, à 
la suer de leur front, l’outillage dont ils se servent’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de 
l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la 
révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 43. 
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 In developing a critique which, although influenced by Marx, hazards a more 
encompassing view, Weil cautions that oppression must be distinguished from the 
suppression of personal whims to a social order. The constraint which society imposes 
on individuals should not be confused with oppression unless it results in a division of 
those who exercise it and those who are subject to it, giving those in command the 
power to crush those who obey. Having made this distinction, Weil cautions against 
the assumption a priori that the abolition of oppression is possible. Marx demonstrates 
that big industry reduces the worker to an instrument in the hands of the employers, 
but Weil concludes that it is useless to hope that the technical progress alleviates the 
double burden imposed by man and society. Weil asks whether it is possible to 
conceive of a system of production that allows the necessities imposed by nature and 
social constraint to be exercised without grinding down souls and bodies under 
oppression. The difficulty in understanding Weil’s position with Marx is that we 
cannot account for which period of Marx she is discussing and their language. While 
interrelated, it means attempting to correlate where Weil’s use of oppression and 
Marx’s use alienation in his early work and exploitation thereafter speak to the same 
problems. 
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3.2.4 Analyse de l’Oppression 
 
In the second part of Réflexions, entitled, ‘Analyse de l’Oppression’, Weil explains 
her method of studying social oppression, which she introduces in ‘Critique du 
marxisme.’ Outlining that Marx eventually recognises that if oppression is linked to 
the material producing conditions of the social system it will not be abolished if the 
conditions causing oppression remain. Developing a theory of oppression wherein 
oppression is interpreted ‘as the organ of a social function’323 of developing productive 
forces, ‘no longer […] as the usurpation of a privilege’,324 Marx and Engels’ theory of 
exploitation fragmented in The Communist Manifesto, which is linked to the 
bourgeois’ exploitation of private property and capital to solidify a division of labour, 
states that ‘private property is the final and most complete expression of the system of 
producing and appropriating products, that is based on class antagonism, on the 
exploitation of the many by the few’.325 Yet, according to Weil, Marx perceives that 
oppression ‘stimulates the further development of the productive forces’,326 
transforming itself when production demands it, and eventually disappearing when it 
no longer proves itself helpful. Weil, however, remains dissatisfied with Marx’s theory 
of exploitation, stating: 
 
 
 
323 ‘Qu’organe d’une fonction sociale’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression 
sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, 
Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 47. 
324 ‘Non plus en tant qu’usurpation d’un privilège’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de 
l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la 
révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 47. 
325 Karl Marx: Selected Writings, ed. David McLellan, p. 256. 
326 ‘Provoque le développement ultérieur des forces productives’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté 
et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu 
à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 47. 
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It only partially describes its origins; for why should the division of labour necessarily turn 
into oppression? It by no means entitles us to a reasonable explanation of its ending; for if 
Marx believed himself to have shown how the capitalist system finally hinders production, he 
did not even attempt to prove that, in our day, any other productive system would hinder it in 
like manner. Furthermore, one fails to understand why oppression should not manage to 
continue, even after it has become a factor of economic regression. Above all, Marx omits to 
explain why oppression is invincible if it is useful, why the oppressed in revolt have never 
succeeded in founding a non-oppressive society, whether based on the productive forces of 
their time, or even at the cost of an economic regression which could hardly increase their 
misery; and lastly, he leaves completely in the dark the general principles of the mechanism 
by which a given form of oppression is replaced by another.327 
Not only did Marxism fail to solve these problems, its proponents do not recognise 
that these problems are in their remit. The Marxist explanations rely on, as previously 
states above, the Lamarckian principle of development wherein ‘the function creates 
the organ’328 and assumes that social oppression ‘corresponds to a function in the 
struggle against nature’.329 By contrast, Weil proposes a method based on the 
conditions of existence. In her proposal, evoking Darwin, the function does not create 
the organ but the function is the result of the organ. Weil argues that ‘non-viable 
structures’330 would be eliminated and therefore ‘adaptation is henceforth conceived 
as an exterior and no longer as an interior necessity’.331 Placing Marx’s method in a 
 
327 ‘Il n’en décrit que partiellement la naissance; car pourquoi la division du travail se tournerait-elle 
nécessairement en oppression ? Il ne permet nullement d’en attendre raisonnablement la fin; car, si 
Marx a cru montrer comment le régime capitaliste finit par entraver la production, il n’a même pas 
essayé de prouver que, de nos jours, tout autre régime oppressif l’entraverait pareillement; et de plus 
on ignore pourquoi l’oppression ne pourrait pas réussir à se maintenir, même une fois devenue un 
facteur de régression économique. Surtout Marx omet d’expliquer pourquoi l’oppression est invincible 
aussi longtemps qu’elle est utile, pourquoi les opprimés en révolte n’ont jamais réussi à fonder une 
société non oppressive, soit sur la base des forces productives de leur époque, soit même au prix d’une 
régression économique qui pouvait difficilement accroître leur misère; et enfin il laisse tout à fait dans 
l’ombre les principes généraux du mécanisme par lequel une forme déterminée d’oppression est 
remplacée par une autre’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits 
historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 48. 
328 ‘La fonction crée l’organe’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in 
Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 48. 
329 ‘Correspond à une fonction dans la lutte contre la nature’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et 
de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à 
la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 48. 
330 ‘Les structures non viables’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in 
Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 49. 
331 ‘L’adaptation est dès lors conçue par rapport aux êtres vivants comme une nécessité extérieure et 
non plus intérieure’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits 
historiques et politiques, Tome II : L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 49. 
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Lamarckian framework, she insists his theory requires a Darwinian improvement. 
Marx’s understanding of social evolution would theoretically give rise to an infinite 
number of forms of social organisation. Conditions of existence limit the infinite 
variations. A type of natural selection among human efforts eliminates all human 
innovations that are incompatible.  
These conditions of existence are determined in the first place, as in the cases of living beings, 
on the one hand by the natural environment and on the other hand by the existence, activity, 
and especially competition of other organisms of the same species, [namely] other social 
groups. […] a third factor enters, namely, the organisation of the natural environment, capital 
equipment, armaments, methods of work and warfare.332 
The third factor quoted in the above text holds a unique position in that it acts upon 
the form of social organisation. But as the third factor, namely, the organisation of the 
natural environment, equipment, armaments and methods of work and warfare, acts 
upon the form of social organisation, it is also subject to the methods of work and 
warfare. Consequently, it is the only factor over which society can legitimately exert 
control. Weil recommends a definition of the conditions of oppression by proposing 
the ideal limit. The actual conditions would have to be transformed to bring them 
closer to the ideal. Subsequently, it is ‘the least oppressive form of social 
organisation’333 for a specific set of social conditions which need to be discovered. 
Within this design, the power of an individual’s actions and responsibilities would also 
need to be defined. To analyse further the nature of social oppression, Weil traces its 
origins historically to various forms of social organisation. The few forms of social 
 
332 ‘Ces conditions d’existence sont déterminées tout d’abord, comme pour les êtres vivants, d’une part 
par le milieu naturel, d’autre part par l’existence, par l’activité et particulièrement par la concurrence 
des autres organismes de même espèce, c’est-à-dire en l’occurrence des autres groupements sociaux. 
Mais un troisième facteur entre encore en jeu, à savoir l’aménagement du milieu naturel, l’outillage, 
l’armement, les procédés de travail et de combat’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de 
l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la 
révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 49. 
333 ‘La moins oppressive d’organisation sociale’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de 
l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la 
révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 50. 
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organisation that are free of oppression correspond to a low level of production in a 
subsistence economy because the energy required for subsistence mitigates oppression 
or warfare for conquest. This is contestable, since it can be argued that as oppression 
is accompanied by higher forms of production, there is a difference in degree and kind 
between a primitive and a developed economy. Production is transformed in the 
transition from primitive to developed economy. A primitive economy is completely 
subject to nature, whereas a developed economy is less immediately subject to nature, 
due partly to the accumulation of surplus. This development occurs in stages where 
primitive man defies nature, that, as Weil states, nature ‘gradually loses her divine 
character and divinity more and more takes on human shape’.334 However, Weil states 
that this appearance of increasing freedom from nature is not present. She admits that 
while primitive man in a primitive economy ‘is necessarily free with respect to other 
men’,335 he faces a greater weight of force in that ‘he is narrowly subjected to nature’s 
dominion’.336 In a more complex economy, where ‘human action continues, as a 
whole, to be nothing but pure obedience to the brutal spur of immediate necessity; 
only, instead of being harried by nature, man is henceforth harried by man’.337 
Immediate necessity manifesting as force exerts pressure on man through oppression 
in the form of power, and because of the interrelation between force and nature, in that 
 
334 ‘La nature perd graduellement son caractère divin, et la divinité revêt de plus en plus la forme 
humaine’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et 
politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 53. 
335 ‘Est nécessairement libre à l’égard des autres hommes’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de 
l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la 
révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 52. 
336 ‘Assujetti à la domination de la nature’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression 
sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, 
Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 52. 
337 ‘L’action humaine continue, dans l’ensemble, à n’être que pure obéissance a l’aiguillon brutal d’une 
nécessite immédiate; seulement, au lieu d’être harcelé par la nature, l’homme est désormais harcelé par 
l’homme’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et 
politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 53. 
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force originates in nature, power cannot be eliminated. Hence, for Weil, oppression 
can only be mitigated. 
 Consequently, now force becomes important to Weil’s study of liberty, 
oppression and power. The point she stresses is that the very nature of force, as 
opposed to how it is used, determines whether it is oppressive. The first objective 
condition which gives rise to oppression is the existence of privileges. In the process 
of social evolution, ‘certain circumstances […] give rise to forces […] between the 
ordinary man and his own conditions of existence […] which are, inherently, the 
monopoly of the few, since they cannot be shared among all’,338 and as such, ‘equality 
is destroyed’ in the process. Weil uses the example of priests in a primitive society 
who acquire specialised knowledge of religious rites, claiming to have power over 
nature. Her example can also be applied to a more complex society, as she states, 
‘nothing essential is changed when this monopoly is no longer made up of rites but of 
scientific processes, and when those in possession of it are called scientists and 
technicians instead of priests’.339 This statement illustrates one of the essential 
differences between Weil and Marx. Weil compared the modern form of science to a 
new form of religion, and yet her objection is not against science, but against its use 
by individuals to develop a monopoly of knowledge. Weil felt that Marx’s critique of 
religion, who states in the introduction of Towards a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy 
 
338 ‘Certaines circonstances, qui correspondent à des étapes sans doute inévitables de développement  
humain, font surgir des forces qui s’interposent entre l’homme du commun et ses propres conditions 
d’existence, entre l’effort et le fruit de l’effort, et qui sont, par leur essence même, le monopole de 
quelques-uns, du fait qu’elles ne peuvent être réparties entre tous; dès lors, ces privilégiés, bien qu’ils 
dépendent, pour vivre, du travail d’autrui, disposent du sort de ceux mêmes dont ils dépendent, et 
l’égalité périt’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques 
et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 53. 
339 ‘Rien d’essentiel n’est changé lorsque ce monopole est constitué non plus par des rites, mais par des 
procédés scientifiques, et que ceux qui le détiennent s’appellent, au lieu de prêtres, savants et 
techniciens’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et 
politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1991), pp. 53-54. 
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of Right that ‘man makes religion, religion does not make man […]. Religion is only 
the illusory sun which revolves around man as long as he does not revolve around 
himself’340 needs to apply to science. In Lénine: Matérialisme et empiriocriticisme 
Weil writes that ‘Marx’s excellent observation about the criticism of religion, as being 
the condition of all criticism, must be extended also to include modern science. 
Socialism will not even be conceivable as long as science has not been stripped of its 
mystery’.341 The key is that everyone would be able to understand all the aspects of 
method and discovery. The second objective condition which gives rise to privilege is 
the existence of arms. When arms require special knowledge to handle them or when 
they eliminate the possibility that unarmed men can defend themselves against armed 
men, privilege is established. A similar development of privilege arises whenever the 
struggle against men or nature requires the coordination of effort. Complex 
coordination results in leaders who demand obedience. Privileges alone, however, are 
not enough to cause oppression. The struggle for power is the factor which produces 
oppression. Weil states that Marx understood, in his analysis of capitalism, that ‘power 
contains a sort of fatality which weighs as pitilessly on those who command as on 
those who obey; much more, it is to the extent that it enslaves the first that, through 
them, it crushes the second’.342 To illustrate the discussion of power as it relates to 
oppression, Weil contrasts power in the struggle of man against nature to the struggle 
of man against man. When man struggles against nature the fight is restricted by 
 
340 Karl Marx: Selected Writings, ed. David McLellan, pp. 71-72. 
341 ‘Aussi la belle formule de Marx concernant la critique de la religion comme condition de toute 
critique doit-elle être étendue aussi à la science moderne. Le socialisme ne sera même pas concevable 
tant que la science n’aura pas été dépouillée de son mystère’. Simone Weil, ‘Lénine: Matérialisme et 
empiriocriticisme’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), pp. 308-309. 
342 ‘La puissance enferme une espèce de fatalité qui pèse aussi impitoyablement sur ceux qui 
commandent que sur ceux qui obéissent; bien plus, c’est dans la mesure où elle asservit les premiers 
que, par leur intermédiaire, elle écrase les seconds’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de 
l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la 
révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), pp. 54-55. 
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certain limiting necessities. By contrast, no limits exist in the struggle of man against 
man since ‘the preservation of power is a vital necessity for the powerful’.343 Those 
who have power constantly fight against their rivals and their subjects as it is malleable 
and flows between people. The two ways to break this circle are ‘by abolishing 
inequality, or else by setting a stable power’344 wherein a balance is obtained between 
‘those who command and those who obey’.345 Weil associates the second option, 
namely the establishment of a stable power, with ‘sincere and thoughtful men of the 
Right’.346 Her evaluation of this option was that ‘this stability of power, objective of 
those who call themselves realists, shows itself to be a chimera [...] on the same 
grounds as the anarchists’ utopia’.347 This option, evident in history from Roman times 
until modern France, is not a real solution because of the nature of power. Power 
contains a contradiction that prevents it from becoming consolidated. Those who rule 
are always trying to establish a dominion impossible to attain. ‘It would be otherwise’, 
Weil states, ‘if one man could possess in himself a force superior to that of many other 
men put together; but such is never the case; the instruments of power; arms, gold, 
machines, magical or technical secrets, always exist independently of him who 
 
343 ‘Conserver la puissance est, pour les puissants, une nécessité vitale’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de 
la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière 
et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 55. 
344 ‘Supprimant l’inégalité, ou en établissant un pouvoir stable’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté 
et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu 
à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 55. 
345 ‘Ceux qui commandent et ceux qui obéissent’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de 
l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la 
révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 56. 
346 ‘Des hommes de droite sincères et réfléchis’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de 
l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la 
révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 56. 
347 ‘Mais cette stabilité du pouvoir, objectif de ceux qui se dissent réalistes, apparaît comme une 
chimère, si l’on y regarde de près, au même titre que l’utopie anarchiste’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de 
la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière 
et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 56. 
120 
 
disposes of them, and can be taken up by others’.348 But one man or men cannot 
indefinitely retain a superior  and so Weil concludes ‘that all power is unstable’.349 
In social relationships, the methods of labour and warfare produce inequality. 
The race for power consequently enslaves everyone including the strong and the weak. 
The truth of this principle extends beyond the capitalist system. In any race for power, 
the methods to obtain power subject men by becoming absolute ends. Weil concludes 
that the race for power reveals human history as 
the history of the servitude which makes men — oppressors and oppressed alike — the 
plaything of the instruments of domination they themselves have manufactured; and thus, 
reduces living humanity to be the chattel of inanimate chattels.350 
Weil suggests it is things that prescribe the limits in the race for power. The actions of 
the oppressed are futile, even though they occasionally succeed in driving out one set 
of oppressors for another, or changing the form of oppression. Oppression itself cannot 
not be abolished if the sources of it are not abolished. Even if the sources of oppression 
are abolished by a social group, they would be enslaved by another group which had 
not undertaken the same process of abolition. They would also not survive since they 
would be in capable of primitive production and ‘cannot recover immediate contact 
with nature’.351 To make an abstract preliminary description of the interplay between 
 
348 ‘Il en serait autrement si homme pouvait posséder en lui-même une force supérieure à celle de 
beaucoup d’autres réunis; mais ce n’est jamais le cas; les instruments du pouvoir, armes, or, machines, 
secrets magiques ou techniques, existent toujours en dehors de celui qui en dispose, et peuvent être pris 
par d’autres’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et 
politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 56. 
349 ‘Ainsi tout pouvoir est instable’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, 
in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 56. 
350 ‘L’histoire de l’asservissement qui fait des hommes, aussi bien oppresseurs qu’opprimés, le simple 
jouet des instruments de domination qu’ils ont fabriqués eux-mêmes, et ravale ainsi l’humanité vivant 
à être la chose inertes’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits 
historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 58. 
351 ‘On ne peut retrouver le contact immédiat avec la nature’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et 
de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à 
la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 59. 
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power and methods of production, Weil lists the necessities which limit all species of 
power. First, a power ‘relies upon instruments which have in each situation a given 
scope’.352 Second, ‘since the power that a human being really exercises extends only 
to what is effectively under his control, power is always running up against the actual 
limits of the controlling faculty’.353 Third, ‘the exercise of any form of power is subject 
to the existence of a surplus in the production of commodities, and a sufficiently large 
surplus so that all those engaged, whether as masters or as slaves, in the struggle for 
power, may be able to live on’.354 These three factors enable one to conceive of 
political and social power as analogous to measurable force. Weil adds the comment 
that the use of power is cemented by ‘a religion of power’355 and kings or military 
leaders believe they rule by divine right and those who are under them feel crushed by 
a ‘divine or diabolical’356 power. But, while this religion of power thereby ‘falsifies 
all social relations by enabling the powerful to command over and above what they 
can impose’,357 at times of agitation, oppressors and the oppressed fail to recognise 
how heavy the weight of this oppression can be felt. 
 
352 ‘Quelconque s’appuie sur des instruments qui ont dans chaque situation une portée déterminée’. 
Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, 
Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2, Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1991), p. 60. 
353 ‘Comme le pouvoir qu’exerce réellement un être humain ne s’étend qu’a ce qui se trouve 
effectivement soumis à son contrôle, le pouvoir se heurte toujours aux bornes mêmes de la faculté de 
contrôle’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et 
politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 61. 
354 ‘L’exercice d’un pouvoir quelconque a pour condition un excédent dans la production de 
subsistances, et un excédent assez considérable pour que tous ceux qui se consacrent, soit en qualité de 
maitres, soit en qualité d’esclaves, a la lutte pour le pouvoir, puissent vivre’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes 
de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience 
ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 61. 
355 ‘Cette religion du pouvoir’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in 
Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 62. 
356 ‘Divine ou diabolique’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits 
historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 61. 
357 ‘Qui fasse tous les rapports sociaux en permettant aux puissants d’ordonner au-delà de ce qu’ils 
peuvent imposer’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits 
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It is obvious that Weil’s analysis of the nature of power goes beyond Marx. 
Oppression might only end when it becomes detrimental to production. The idea of 
the revolt of the productive forces described by Trotsky as a factor in history is 
dismissed by Weil as ‘pure fiction’.358 Oppression does not disappear when the 
productive forces has evolved to the point of providing welfare and leisure for all. In 
this society, the struggle for subsistence is only one factor in the struggle for power. 
This analysis reveals how Weil uses Marx’s analysis but moves beyond it to formulate 
more refined theory of oppression. This is confirmed when she states: 
The Marxist view, according to which social existence is determined by the relations between 
man and nature established by production, certainly remains the only sound basis for any 
historical investigation; only these relations must be considered first in terms of the problem 
of power, the means of subsistence forming simply one of the data of the problem.359 
Another aspect of Weil’s analysis of the struggle for power contradicts the idea of 
infinite development and extension of power. If power could extend infinitely its 
means of control, ‘it would tend towards ubiquity’,360 while if it could extend its 
resources endlessly, ‘it would be as if the surrounding nature evolved gradually 
towards this unreservedly generosity from which Adam and Eve benefitted in the 
earthly paradise’.361 However, Weil argues that power is subject to limits but that 
 
historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 62. 
358 ‘Une pure fiction’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits 
historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 59. 
359 ‘La vue marxiste selon laquelle l’existence sociale est déterminée par les rapports entre l’homme et 
la nature établis par la production reste bien la seule base solide pour toute étude historique; seulement 
ces rapports doivent être considérés d’abord en fonction du problème du pouvoir, les moyens de 
subsistance constituant simplement une donnée de ce problème’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté 
et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu 
à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 60. 
360 ‘Il s’approcherait indéfiniment d’une limite qui serait comme l’équivalent de l’ubiquité’. Simone 
Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: 
L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), 
p. 63. 
361 ‘Tout se passerait comme si la nature environnante évoluait graduellement vers cette générosité sans 
réserve dont Adam et Ève bénéficiaient au paradis terrestre’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et 
de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à 
la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 64. 
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competition forces power beyond these natural limits. When power extends beyond 
these limits, it surpasses what it can control; attempting to ‘command over and above 
what it can impose, and spends in excess of its own resources’.362 Every oppressive 
system contains within it that contradiction comprised of ‘the opposition between the 
necessarily limited character of the material bases of power and the necessarily 
unlimited character of the race for power considered as a relationship between men’.363 
In terms of Weil’s understanding of oppression, a decadent system does not 
necessarily disappear, and can sometimes become even more oppressive. Even when 
there is a change of regime, oppression does not disappear because it is based on 
patterns which gradually replace those of the declining regime. Weil illustrates this by 
the Russian Revolution, which only reinforced the power of ‘big industry, the police, 
the army, the bureaucracy’.364 Weil concludes that this limited type of revolution is 
not a primary factor of change in history. History consists of slow transformations of 
regimes which involve ‘a dreary play of blind forces that unite together or clash, that 
progress or decline, that replace each other, without ever ceasing to grind beneath them 
the unfortunate race of human beings.’365 
 
362 ‘Il commande au-delà de ce qu’il peut imposer; il dépense au-delà de ses propos ressources’. Simone 
Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: 
L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), 
p. 64. 
363 ‘Elle est constituée par l’oppression entre le caractère nécessairement limité des bases matérielles 
du pouvoir et le caractère nécessairement limité de la course au pouvoir en tant que rapport entre les 
hommes’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et 
politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 64. 
364 ‘La grande industrie, la police, l’armée, la bureaucratie’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et 
de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à 
la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 66. 
365 ‘Qu’un morne jeu de forces aveugles qui s’unissent ou se heurtent, qui progressent ou déclinent, qui 
se substituent les unes autres, sans jamais cesser de broyer sous elles les malheureux humains’. Simone 
Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: 
L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), 
pp. 66.67. 
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 That social oppression and progress is united in the relations between man and 
nature is reflected by primitive man being subject to nature whereas modern man, 
viewed from the collective, appears to have harnessed nature through work. However, 
the mastery of the collective is transformed into servitude when one examines the 
situation from the perspective of the individual. The modern worker is as constrained 
by circumstances as the primitive hunter is subject to hunger. Throughout history man 
has been ‘goaded to work by some outside force’.366The sequence of movements in 
work is often imposed from outside. The imposition of work methods is a mystery 
over which the worker has no control. This mystery is more brutal than that facing 
primitive man, because the latter still had the option to innovate. This liberty to 
innovate is denied to assembly line workers. Furthermore, modern collectives which 
appear to have the power to subject nature only contain members which are subject to 
the race for power. The connection between Weil’s social analysis and the central 
theme of work is evident. From the perspective of the worker, a much harsher 
necessity constrains his actions. This necessity, in the form of oppression, is imposed 
by man on man through the instrument of force contained within collectives who 
organise work. Weil’s analysis is based on the conditions of existence which include 
the organisation of work. The methods of labour produce inequality. The race for 
power based on the assumption of unlimited progress enslaves everyone including 
those who command and those who obey. Weil concludes that progress has not 
changed man’s servility to ‘blind forces in the universe’367 but merely ‘that the power 
 
366 ‘Les hommes n’ont jamais cessé d’être poussés au travail par une force extérieure’. Simone Weil, 
‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: 
L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), 
p. 68. 
367 ‘Toutes les forces aveugles qui composent l’univers’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de 
l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la 
révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 68. 
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which keeps him on his knees has been transferred from inert matter to the human 
society of which he is a member’.368 
 Accordingly, Weil asserts that the conditions and cost of progress should be 
evaluated. In a modern society, humans spend their time accumulating surplus and 
luxury goods. These labours result in an organisation of nature favourable to human 
existence. The efficacy is indirect and separated by many intermediaries so that it is a 
long-term efficacy. Thus, the benefits of labours may only be visible to future 
generations, whereas the pain accompanying the labour is perceived in the immediate. 
The coordination of labour in modern society combines the efforts of one to the efforts 
of all others. Primitive tribes cannot solve the problems of privation, incentive to 
effort, or coordination of labour. However, social oppression does have a solution by 
creating two categories, those who command and those who obey. Those in command 
are not influenced by limits of fatigue or what is necessary and man is thus subject to 
the struggle for power. In this manner, humanity is the plaything of the forces of nature 
in their guise of technical progress. Thus, there is little change from primitive times to 
modern times in relation to man’s subjection by the forces of nature. ‘It would seem 
man is born a slave, and that servitude is his natural condition’.369 
  
 
368 ‘Simplement la puissance qui maintient sur les genoux a été comme transférée de la matière inerte à 
la société qu’il forme lui-même avec ses semblables’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de 
l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la 
révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 68. 
369 ‘Il semblerait que l’homme naisse esclave, et que la servitude soit sa condition propre’. Simone Weil, 
‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: 
L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), 
p. 71. 
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Section Three 
 
3.3.1 Tableau théorique d’une société libre 
 
In the third section of Réflexions, entitled, ‘Tableau théorique d’une société libre’, 
even though Weil has posited that man seems to be born for servitude, it is his ability 
to think that allows him to retain the idea of liberty. The dream of perfect liberty was 
provided in Weil’s time by Marx’s Communism, which, she states, is a ‘form of an 
opium [and that] the time has come to give up dreaming of liberty, and to make up 
one’s mind to conceive it’.370 Weil is reforming an ontological argument for the 
existence of God in the form of conceived liberty. The verb concevoir; to design, is 
more apt than dreaming of an ontological conception of theory. Weil’s initial method 
is not to attempt to form a free society but to conceive of the least oppressive society. 
Rhees states that ‘[o]ne reason for taking thinking as a paradigm of free activity is that 
thinking cannot be brought about by force – a man cannot be forced to think’.371 The 
difficulty is that any least oppressive society will always be in relation to an oppressive 
previous society. Marx cites in an early article for Rheinische Zeitung that freedom in 
relation to the state is tied to rationale, stating, ‘a state that is not a realisation of 
rational freedom is a bad state’372 and in On the Jewish Question defines ‘freedom [as] 
the right to do and perform what does not harm others’.373 In ‘Tableau théorique d’une 
 
370 ‘Ce n’est que comme un opium; il est temps de renoncer à rêver la liberté, et de se décider à la 
concevoir’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et 
politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1991), pp. 71-72. 
371 Rhees, Discussion of Simone Weil, p. 6. 
372 Karl Marx: Selected Writings, ed. David McLellan, p. 24. 
373 Karl Marx: Selected Writings, ed. David McLellan, p. 60. 
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société libre’ Weil begins to formulate her ideas beyond Marx, who is bound by 
economic and legal considerations. 
 An ideal of liberty must be visualised to attain a liberty which is more perfect 
than the present. Weil emphasises that the ideal is ‘just as unattainable as the dream’374 
but, because it differs from the dream in that the ideal is related with the reality, it 
offers a process of evaluation. Perfect liberty is not the abolition of ‘this necessity 
whose pressure weigh continually; as long as the man lives, that is, as long as he is a 
tiny fragment of this ruthless universe, the pressure of necessity will never be released 
for a moment’.375 Here Weil connects the presence of necessity in this world and the 
need to work. A world wherein man did not work would only result in man being 
‘delivered over to the play of passions and perhaps to madness’. 376 Marx and Engels 
state in their Manifesto that ‘[i]n a Communist society, accumulated labour is but a 
means to widen, to enrich, to promote the existence of the labourer’.377 For Weil, self-
mastery results from discipline and the only source of discipline is the ‘effort 
demanded in overcoming external obstacles’.378 It is not enough to overcome obstacles 
in art, science or games. The value of these activities is derived from their imitation of 
work. Therefore, perfect liberty does not involve the abolition of necessity in the form 
of work. Work and necessity are a permanent and useful part of human reality. Weil’s 
 
374 ‘L’idéal est tout aussi irréalisable que le rêve’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de 
l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la 
révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 72. 
375 ‘Cette nécessité dont nous subissons perpétuellement la pression; tant que l’homme vivra, c’est-à-
dire tant qu’il constituera un infime fragment de cet univers impitoyable, la pression de la nécessité ne 
se relâchera jamais un seul instant’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, 
in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 72. 
376 ‘Disparu serait livrée aux passions et peut-être à la folie’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et 
de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à 
la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 72. 
377 Karl Marx: Selected Writings, ed. David McLellan, p. 257. 
378 ‘Que l’effort demandé pas les obstacles extérieurs’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de 
l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la 
révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 72. 
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definition of true liberty is ‘a relationship between thought and action’.379 A free 
person would act according to the ends set by themselves and the means judged to be 
suitable to attain it. One can choose to submit blindly to necessity, which Weil would 
describe as servitude, or one could adapt oneself to the inner representation of it that 
one forms in one’s own mind. The latter would be an extension to the definition of 
liberty. These two oppositions are ideal limits between where some humans live their 
lives without attaining either. A slave would be someone whose movements are 
completely motivated by a source outside his own mind. Weil equates a primitive 
person or a manual worker on an assembly line with the condition of slavery. Complete 
liberty is illustrated by a model of a mathematical problem containing all the elements 
of a solution. Man uses his mind to put together these elements into a solution and can 
‘forge the conditions of his own existence by an act of mind’380, whereas Marx asserts 
that this forging of conditions is achieved by accumulated labour and the collective. 
For Weil, the resulting confrontation with necessity, which, without expecting 
anything other than that derived from his own exertion, means man continually affirms 
his existence. ‘Unlike God, man cannot be the direct author of his existence. However, 
he can possess the human equivalent of that power if the material conditions of his 
existence are the work of his own mind’.381 Man’s destiny brings him in direct contact 
 
379 ‘Un rapport entre la pensée et l’action; serait tout à fait libre l’homme dont toutes les actions 
procéderaient d’un jugement préalable concernant la fin qu’il se propose et l’enchainement des moyens 
propos à amener cette fin’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits 
historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 73. 
380 ‘Il forgerait à chaque moment les conditions de sa propre existence par un acte de la pensée’. Simone 
Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: 
L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), 
p. 74. 
381 ‘L’homme est un être borne à qui il n’est pas donné d’être, comme le Dieu des théologiens, l’auteur 
direct de sa propre existence; mais l’homme posséderait l’équivalent humain de cette puissance divine 
si les conditions matérielles qui lui permettent d’exister étaient exclusivement l’œuvre de sa pensée 
dirigeant l’effort de muscles’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in 
Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 75. 
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with necessity and requires his exertions, and as such, ‘his life is a continual creation 
of himself by himself’.382 This is true liberty where a man can choose to act.  
 However, while true liberty is only an ideal, it is necessary to conceive this 
ideal form of liberty, to ascertain the circumstances that draw it near or push it further 
away. Assessing the factors that keep us from this ideal of liberty, Weil understands 
that the complexity and size of the world are greater than one person’s mind can 
handle. Rhees states that ‘[Weil] does not suggest that what she sketches could ever 
exist. The sketch is to give a standard by which to measure the liberality or 
oppressiveness of communities that do exist or may exist’.383 The results of our actions 
are outside our control, but our actions themselves must be under control of the mind. 
We can relate this to Weil’s dissertation on Descartes where she reforms his ‘I think’ 
to ‘I have power, therefore, I am’. A person should conceive of intermediaries linking 
the movements he is capable of to the results he wishes to obtain. The plan sketched 
out by intelligence limits the disruptive effects of chance. One source of chance that 
cannot be eliminated is the body. All man can do is reduce this source with respect to 
scientific and technological progress. Weil demands however, that this role be 
subordinate ‘and should not prevent method from constituting the very soul of the 
work’.384 Nevertheless, all technical advancements ensure that ‘the human body is 
gradually and increasingly reduced to a docile intermediary role between mind and 
instrument’.385 The separation between method and action in the work process provide 
 
382 ‘Sa vie soit une perpétuelle création du lui-même par lui-même’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la 
liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et 
l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 75. 
383 Rhees, Discussion of Simone Weil, p. 5. 
384 ‘N’empêche pas la méthode de constituer l’âme même du travail’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la 
liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et 
l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 76. 
385 ‘Le corps humain à ce rôle d’intermédiaire docile entre la pensée et les instruments’. Simone Weil, 
‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: 
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an important tool for her analysis of production methods. As a solution, Weil proposes 
widening ‘the sphere of conscious work’,386 which would overcome the separation 
between method and action, and the body and the soul. For Weil, the individual mind 
forms the basis for a free society. In this utopian vision, individuals would exercise 
thought and control in the work process. Manual labour would emerge as the basis for 
the most fully human civilisation. Although labour consisted of an act of conscious 
submission to necessity, this submission could contain creative joy, provided that the 
work process allowed the worker to come to grips with nature. 
Examining the method of production to ascertain which obstacles limit man’s 
freedom in work, Weil observes that an ‘obstacle to liberty is derived from the 
difference separating theoretical speculation from action’.387 Attempting to distinguish 
between intellectual and manual labour in physical labour, like chair-making, Weil 
judges that capital speculation or managing men is an intellectual labour, i.e. non-
manual labour, and is therefore not productive. It is this type of work that Weil believes 
is adding to the malaise of oppression. When the manual worker uses his mind, this 
intellectual labour is transformed to a version close to the ideal of liberty. Weil 
presents the paradox that since the entire process of the work is divided into portions 
continually repeated by each worker, there is an overall process in the work which the 
mind of the worker is not privy. If a person is not allowed to mentally engage in the 
labour, then it becomes oppressive. In opposition to a civilisation wherein everyone 
 
L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), 
p. 78. 
386 ‘Le domaine du travail lucide’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in 
Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 82.  
387 ‘Un nouvel obstacle à la liberté surgirait aussitôt, à cause de la profonde différence de nature qui 
sépare la spéculation théorique et l’action’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression 
sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, 
Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 78. 
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rigidly follows details of work without anyone understanding what they are doing, 
Weil proposes that the worker should be aware of guiding principles behind the work 
to be able to apply the principles in relation to different circumstances. An example 
might be that a person cutting glass in a factory will also know about the composition 
process of glass to better understand its heat retention properties or its solar power 
reproduction. Although this ideal is not fully realisable, whether this type of 
production would lead to a greater consciousness of work would be subordinate to its 
economic viability. What Weil is trying to show is that the person in the above 
example has a greater understanding, not only of the glass producing process or 
possibilities, but of the geological, ecological and environment aspects of their job. I 
believe it would beneficial that instead of specialisation, where one just cuts glass, the 
worker would have a wider understanding of the process which may be utilised in 
another area of the economy. Weil does not overly credit the economic aspect of her 
idea. Her idea of a fuller, wider understanding of any labouring process is important 
so that the worker becomes more engaged intellectually with a process. 
 As such, ‘collective strength infinitely surpasses individual strength’,388 except 
‘in the sphere of the mind’.389 The mind is the only thing truly individual about a 
person. Thinking is the only function which cannot be compelled by force. Weil’s 
model for a free society would hold as a central value the free use of the individual 
mind. The collective life would be subject to men as individuals. Material efforts 
would require intelligence to be applied to the work done and the coordination of this 
work with all other members of the collective. The technique of work would require 
 
388 ‘Les forces collectives dépassent infiniment les forces individuelles’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de 
la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière 
et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 84. 
389 ‘Le domaine de la pensée’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in 
Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 84. 
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continual use of methodical thought in such a manner that each worker would 
understand all the specialised procedures. Each worker would have to understand the 
coordination of work, thereby keeping the collective under control by individuals. If 
each person understands all tasks, then individuals would be able to verify the 
activities of all the rest. The condition of material existence would be based on the 
goal that each person should use his reason and problem-solving skills. The function 
of this model would be to serve as an ideal to use as a standard for evaluation of other 
social patterns. This new social method is akin to Marxism in that it starts with the 
relationships of production. The difference is that Marx classifies the modes of 
production in terms of output, whereas Weil analysed them in terms of the relationship 
between thought and action. Thus, for Weil, a society wherein persons are most often 
obliged to think have the benefit of exercising control over collective life and offers 
the greatest amount of independence in a free society. Weil suggests that if her analysis 
of the problem is correct, ‘the most fully human civilisation would have manual labour 
as its pivot, that in which manual labour constituted the supreme value’.390 The value 
of manual labour should be placed on the person who produces it, not on the object 
produced, because the production also produces the human. 
It is not in relation to what it produces that manual labour must become the highest value, but 
in relation to the man who performs it; it must not be made the object of honours and rewards, 
but to constitute for every human being what he most essentially needs so that his life takes by 
itself a sense and a value in his own eyes.391 
 
390 ‘La plus pleinement humaine serait celle qui aurait le travail manuel pour centre, celle ou le travail 
manuel constituerait la suprême valeur’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression 
sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, 
Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), pp. 89-90. 
391 ‘Ce n’est pas par son rapport avec ce qu’il produit que le travail manuel doit devenir la valeur la plus 
haute, mais par son rapport avec l’homme qui l’exécute; il ne doit pas être l’objet d’honneurs ou de 
récompenses, mais constituer pour chaque être humain ce dont il a besoin le plus essentiellement pour 
que sa vie prenne par elle-même un sens et une valeur a ses propres yeux’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes 
de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience 
ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 90. 
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In this passage Weil argues that manual labour should ideally provide an individual 
with a feeling of value. This is fraught with problems on a social and economic level, 
such as how an individual determines their social value and how others determine the 
economic value of their labour. The world community might value sitting, but not 
value those who make chairs. The market place might not be willing to pay for hand-
crafted, time-consuming labour, possibly costing more than saleable price of the 
product. Weil argues quite validly that working and its value is necessary for more 
than simply producing goods or offering services. Valuing our own work and having 
it validated by society can be important. But it cannot be expected or required. This is 
evidence of the lack of importance that Weil places on market place economics. She 
argues that manual labour must become the highest value. But, tautologically, people 
value what they value. Weil is adopting the Marxist principle that there are those who 
produce value and those who own the method of production, and only those that 
produce have any value. 
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3.3.2 Esquisse de la vie sociale contemporaine 
 
Evaluating the social reality of her time in the final section of Réflexions, entitled, 
‘Esquisse de la vie sociale contemporaine’, Weil uses the example of the individual to 
illustrate what occurs in society. This section is a critical indictment of contemporary 
society and its ability to conform to Weil’s idea of labour and liberty. In its state of 
disequilibrium, individual thought and action have become the prerogative of a 
collective apparatus. Delivering a demonstrative rebuke in the opening lines, Weil 
states that ‘it is impossible to imagine anything more contrary to this ideal than the 
form which modern society has assumed in our day’.392 The ideal she is referring to is 
the conclusion of ‘Tableau théorique d’une société libre’ where the revolutionary 
syndicalists are commended for placing man as a producer of his conditions at the 
centre of the social problem. Such a sentiment made Weil feel ‘proud to belong to a 
civilisation which has brought with it the presage of a new ideal’.393 These two 
statements, the opening statement in ‘Tableau théorique d’une société libre’ and the 
concluding statement in ‘Esquisse de la vie sociale contemporaine’, are diametrically 
opposed. She differentiates between the heralding of the possibility of an ideal, and 
the non-actuality or the non-presence of that ideal in a modern society. 
It is evident, that while Weil holds a view of oppression that, if enacted, might 
mitigate oppression, the opening statement of ‘Tableau théorique d’une société libre’ 
suggests that that ideal is no longer possible because society is beyond a point where 
 
392 ‘Il est impossible de concevoir quoi ce soit de plus contraire à cet idéal que forme qu’a prise de nos 
jours la civilisation moderne’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in 
Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), pp. 93-94. 
393 ‘Nous pouvons avoir la fierté d’appartenir à une civilisation qui a apporté avec le pressentiment d’un 
idéal nouveau’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques 
et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 93. 
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it can be successfully realtered. This marks the most important evolution in Weil’s 
thinking away from Marxism at this stage: where once man had the possibility of 
conceiving an ideal society, in the final section the ability to think has been destroyed. 
Not only has man been ‘delivered up to a blind collectivity’,394 he has never been ‘less 
capable of subordinating their actions to their thoughts’.395 In contrast to the positivity 
offered about the ideal portrayed in the previous section, there is a sense of utter 
dejection in her evaluation of contemporary civilisation. 
Such terms as oppressors and oppressed, the idea of classes – all that sort of thing is near to 
losing all meaning, so obvious are the impotence and distress of all men in face of the social 
machine, which has become a machine for breaking hearts and crushing spirits, a machine for 
manufacturing irresponsibility, stupidity, corruption, slackness and, above all, dizziness.396 
As all distinctions, such as oppressors and oppressed, collapse under the crushing 
effects of the social machine, disequilibrium characterises the present order and 
methodical thought disappears. However, while the collective swamps the individual’s 
role and manual workers are reduced to a passive role by technical progress and mass 
production, we can understand that while Weil engages in investigating the exterior 
elements of oppression weighing on men, she is also disheartened by the response of 
the individual and the collective alike. Aside from exterior elements, including man 
being part of the cause of the problem, the complication is the lack of response from 
man. Weil states in the previous section ‘that only man can enslave man’. There is an 
element of positivity in this statement, aside from the obvious negativity. If man is 
 
394 ‘Livré à une collectivité aveugle’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, 
in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 94. 
395 ‘Jamais les hommes n’ont été plus incapables non seulement de soumettre leurs actions à leurs 
pensées, mais même de penser’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in 
Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 94. 
396 ‘Les termes d’oppresseurs et d’opprimés, la notion de classes, tout cela est bien près de perdre toute 
signification, tant sont évidentes l’impuissance et l’angoisse de tous les hommes devant la machine 
social, devenue une machine à briser les cœurs, à écraser les esprits, une machine à fabriquer de 
l’inconscience, de la sottise, de la corruption, de la veulerie, et surtout de vertige’. Simone Weil, ‘Les 
causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience 
ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 94. 
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responsible for man’s enslavement, this means that he can also free himself or be 
allowed to be freed. If he as an individual or collective is unwilling to attempt to 
become free, then there is little hope for a society being able to conceive an ideal 
society. 
There is no category, group or class of men who completely escapes this devout imbalance, 
except perhaps from a few islands of more primitive life; and the young people, who have 
grown up, who are growing up, reflect more than others within themselves the chaos that 
surrounds them.397 
The inhuman system which Weil describes moulds everyone to its image. Labour 
becomes servitude, machines crush workers, and there is no chance to produce free 
workers. ‘In reality the methodical thought is progressively disappearing, owing to the 
fact that the mind finds less and less matter on which to bite’.398 With the technical 
progress and mass production subjecting the worker to passive engagement, which in 
turn limits thinking, Weil points out that even the ‘men who occupy key posts in social 
life are in charge of matters which are far beyond the compass of any single human 
mind’.399 This problem becomes multiplied when these matters naturally become too 
unwieldy for the mind of a single person. Stating that ‘it is entrusted to a curious 
machine, whose parts are men, whose gears consist of relegations, reports and 
statistics, […] [that which is called the] bureaucratic organisation’,400 she argues, 
 
397 ‘Il n’existe pas de catégorie, de group ou classe d’hommes qui échappe tout à fait à ce déséquilibre 
dévorant, a l’exception peut-être de quelques îlots de vie plus primitive; et les jeunes, qui y ont grandi, 
qui y grandissent, reflètent plus que les autres à l’intérieur d’eux-mêmes le chaos qui les entoure’. 
Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, 
Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1991), p. 94. 
398 ‘Mais en réalité l’esprit méthodique disparait progressivement, du fait que la pensée trouve en moins 
où mord’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et 
politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 95. 
399 ‘Tous les hommes qui se trouvent aux postes importants de la vie sociale sont chargés d’affaires qui 
dépassent considérablement la portée d’un esprit humain’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de 
l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la 
révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 95. 
400 ‘Enfin là où la fonction de cordonner et de dirige est trop lourde pour l’intelligence et la pensée d’un 
homme seul, elle est confiée à une machine étrange, dont les pièces sont hommes, où les engrenages 
sont constitués par des règlements, des rapports et des statistiques, et qui se nomme organisation 
bureaucratique’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques 
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‘almost reach the point of taking the place of leaders’.401 Thus, in all aspects of social 
organisation, the individual is subordinated to the vast mechanisms of collective life. 
It is in this process of enveloping man where the ability to think has become 
mired. With machines, industrialisation and the monetary system, and even the 
sciences, subjugating the individual in favour of the collective, Weil admits that while 
this level of oppression can provoke an individualistic response, it is diminishing, as 
she states: 
Such a stifling state of affairs certainly provokes here and there an individualistic reaction; art, 
and especially literature, bears the marks of it; but since, owing to objective conditions, this 
reaction cannot impinge on either the sphere of thought or that of action, it remains bottled up 
in the play of the inner consciousness or in dreams of adventure and gratuitous acts, in other 
words, it never leaves the realm of shadows; and everything leads one to suppose that even 
this shadowy reaction is doomed to disappear almost completely.402 
It is confirmed in this passage to what extent that Weil has lost any hope for a non-
oppressive ideal society. Even though she agrees that an individualistic response is 
possible, it is one that is fleeting, and by her account, destined to disappear completely. 
Believing, in other words, that, because the world is materialistically orientated and 
that the sciences and technical processes have become so complicated that the mind is 
subordinated, it is incapable of absorbing such multitudes. But with the State 
becoming involved with the economic and social spheres, and tending towards the 
 
et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 96. 
401 ‘Et les mécanismes bureaucratiques parviennent presque à remplacer des chefs’. Simone Weil, ‘Les 
causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience 
ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 96. 
402 ‘Un état de choses aussi étouffant suscite bien çà et là une réaction individualiste; l’art, et notamment 
la littérature, en porte des traces; mais comme en vertu des conditions objectives, cette réaction ne peut 
mordre ni sur le domaine de la pensée ni sur celui de l’action, elle demeure enfermée dans les jeux de 
la vie intérieure ou dans ceux de l’aventure et des actes gratuits, c’est-à-dire qu’elle ne sont pas du 
royaume des ombres; et tout porte à croire que même cette ombre de réaction est vouée à disparaitre 
presque complètement’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits 
historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), pp. 97-98. 
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centre, the bureaucracy’s activities operate as to favour the development of its power. 
Thus, Weil ominously states: 
It seems clear that contemporary humanity tends everywhere towards a totalitarian form of 
social organisation - to use the term which the national-socialists have made fashionable - that 
is to say, towards a system in which the State power comes to exercise sovereign sway in all 
spheres, even, indeed above all, in that of thought.403 
An end to this situation is the stage when chaos reaches the limit and all civilisation 
perishes. Decentralising social life would be a mitigation, because Weil believes the 
current social system destroyed all possibilities for developing alternatives. In the 
economic sphere, conquest is the goal of economic struggle. Cautioning against false 
expectations of change through reform or revolution, the power of an inhuman society 
is contained in its ability to shape everyone according to its image. The solution for 
the totalitarianism of the state, the social system and organisation of work is a 
decentralised system which would allow the workers to be liberated. In the end, I must 
defer to Rhees’s understanding of Weil’s endeavours in Réflexions. He states: 
In Oppression and Liberty Weil is trying to explain the hold which a way of thinking had on 
Marx and his followers; and the way in which it prevented them from criticism or examination 
of their conception of ‘revolution’. What she brings out is the trust which Marx had in science, 
and the idea that the growth of science […] would liberate man (whatever that meant). So that 
mean could lead their own lives rather than submit to a form of life that was imposed on 
them.404 
If we agree that inhumanity in life will increase as the individual’s ability to think 
decreases, then we can reason that Weil’s assessment is both prescient and 
condemnatory. But is Weil delineating another Marxism by another name? If 
civilisation contains the ability to crush man and the only model for our liberation is 
exemplified by skilled labourers, then we are subjected to Weil’s version of what it is 
 
403 ‘Il apparaît assez clairement que l’humanité contemporaine tend un peu partout à une forme 
totalitaire d’organisation sociale, pour employer le terme que les nationaux-socialistes ont mis à la 
mode, c’est-à-dire à un régime où le pouvoir d’État déciderait souverainement dans tous les domaines, 
même et surtout dans le domaine de la pensée’. Simone Weil, ‘Les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression 
sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, 
Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 101. 
404 Rhees, Discussion of Simone Weil, p. 9. 
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to work, or have liberty or be oppressed. Detailing previously that Weil disagrees with 
Marx’s philosophical methodology, we now have evidence that Weil is also offering 
a philosophical methodology on work, liberty and the value of life. This is dangerous 
territory into which Weil is venturing. Suggestive of another division between people, 
she imposes a value and a method of living in continuity with those she is arguing 
against. 
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Conclusion 
 
In 1931, one could describe Weil as revolutionary syndicalist, whereas by 1934 she 
rejected the ideals of revolution and syndicalism. Her intense involvement in various 
aspects of the trade union movement gradually led to a decision to withdraw from 
political or social activities because of syndicalist stagnation to focus on theoretical 
work. Whilst Weil provides a model for society and an assessment of its reality in 
Réflexions, what has been shown is how Weil’s philosophical engagement diverges 
from Marx. It is without value to categorically state whether Weil was an apostle of 
Marx. The rejoinder is somewhere between sympathising with Marx’s aims, to 
disappointment at his failures, to outright critique and then rejection. The corollary is 
that she engaged with Marx without becoming an apologist. She rejects his 
methodology and analysis rather than his ideology. 
According to Weil, Marx accurately describes how an oppressive system 
enslaves some workers. Yet, in focusing their attention on the labour and economics 
respectively, neither Weil nor Marx can satisfactorily identity a solution to their labour 
and economics concerns. Beginning this chapter by detailing an understanding of 
Weil’s conceptualisation of oppression and liberty, we are confronted with the 
obstacle that oppression occurs in the workplace through isolated technique, an over-
reliance on scientific method and a division of intellectual and manual labour that 
denies the worker the critical, thinking engagement that Weil links to liberty. These 
examples of oppression exemplify how her understanding of these concepts situate 
labour at the centre of human flourishing. Work for Weil is a central part of life and a 
dignified activity when done with understanding and intelligence. Weil recognises this 
aspect in Marx’s early writings, which emphasise the importance of work. 
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It must take from thence precisely that which has been almost forgotten by what is called 
Marxism: the glorification of productive labour, considered as man’s highest activity; the 
assertion that only a society wherein the act of work brought all of man’s faculties into play, 
wherein the man who works occupied the front rank, would realise human greatness to the 
full. We find in Marx’s early writings, lines concerning labour that have a lyrical accent […] 
This new poetry, appropriate to our time, which forms perhaps its chief claim to greatness, 
must not be lost. Therein the oppressed must find evoked their own mother-country, which is 
hope.405 
Therefore, Weil disagrees with the orthodox interpretation of Marxism which focuses 
on ideas within Capital and perhaps finds similarities with his earlier writings.406 
Related to the issue of scarcity is that of private property, and again, Weil 
fundamentally disagrees with Marx. He believes that once private property is 
abolished that the oppression of workers would disappear simultaneously. For Weil, 
this is another false conclusion. Contrary to Marx, she believes any societal system of 
production could produce oppression. Since power is the central tool for oppression in 
Weil’s analysis, and since hierarchies are inevitable, oppression will always be 
reproduced. Whereas, private property represented the misuse of surplus labour to 
Marx, it remained a neutral factor for Weil’s understanding of oppression, and thus, 
the ownership of property is secondary to the structure of labour and the organisation 
of power within the workplace. 
Where we observed an agreement between Weil and Marxism is that she 
agreed with Marx’s identification of the bureaucracy as an oppressive system, neither 
present viable structures of organisation that can manage the immensity of a state’s 
 
405 ‘Il a à y prendre ce qui a été précisément presque oublie par ce qu’on nomme le marxisme: la 
glorification du travail productif, conçu comme l’activité suprême de l’homme; l’affirmation que seule 
une société où l’acte du travail mettrait en jeu toutes les facultés de l’homme, où l’homme qui travaille 
serait au premier rang, réaliserait la plénitude de la grandeur humaine. On trouve chez Marx, dans les 
écrits de jeunesse, des lignes d’accent lyrique concernant le travail […]. Cette poésie nouvelle, propre 
à notre temps, et qui en fait peut-être la principale grandeur, ne doit pas se perdre. Les opprimés doivent 
y trouver l’évocation de leur patrie à eux, qui est une espérance’. Simone Weil, ‘Sur les contradictions 
du marxisme’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la 
révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 141. 
406 In his 1844 Manuscripts Marx never posited the notion of a work free utopian society but these ideas 
can be found within Capital. Orthodox Marxism ignored his earlier writings. And there is a similarity 
between Weil’s emphasis on work and Marx’s early writings. 
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economic and social responsibility while also empowering an incorruptible form of 
bureaucratic power. History has shown how versions of Marxism in Russia and China 
directly led to loss of life. Weil’s anarchist or syndicalist version contains same 
problem: defining value for other people and any controlling majority or minority 
being corruptible. Thus, while we can assert that Weil agreed with Marx’s overarching 
critique of society and the need for a reorganisation of labour, and though revering 
Marx’s placement of the social as the site of analysis, her examination begins with the 
individual, knowing this method will benefit the collective. Marxists may disagree, 
citing earlier work or instances where he references individuals, but I contend that he 
is always writing towards a critique of the collective. For Marx, all conditions are 
mitigated through the materialisation of the social. But, as the social structure has an 
influence on the degree of individual oppression in a society, Weil’s investigation 
moves beyond Marx to critique the oppressive nature of all organisations – socialist 
utopias. Importantly, it is the consciously informed and educated individual who 
functions as the instrument of change for the collective, not the collective for the 
individual. Weil did reject a passive explanation of the forces of society, which ascribe 
the causes of a given situation to historical or socially structured conditions. 
Challenging this passive acceptance of the status quo to establish the locus of 
oppression, Weil’s method involved determining an ideal to determine how the 
conditions of existence could be changed by an advance towards this ideal. Hence, as 
she emphasises man’s role as a thinking and acting individual, the juxtaposing 
relationship between oppression and liberty is the initial procedure to a consciousness 
of the conditions and their limits. 
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Weil contends that the underlying current to the social and material world is 
force. In contradiction to the limits inherent in the force of nature, social force weighs 
heavily on man because it is unlimited. Social force is manifest as power, but at least 
that is limited because it shifts as people lose or gain it. As it is not man surviving 
against nature, social force destroys all that is necessary for an individual to be human 
because it is man versus his fellow man. Taking this struggle as a definition of power 
relations, the only power that can mitigate the strength of social force is that of a mind 
freely exercised. Straining to accurately absorb a narrow definition from Weil, I hazard 
that societal force will always exist so long as society exists, but that manifestation of 
force as power; how force is wielded, is malleable. Power has the force to dehumanise, 
crush and kill people, but they have power, however limited, to resist. Weil’s idea of 
resistance is a revolution predicated on conscious, free-thinking individuals. However, 
she does not fully define the boundaries of a freely exercised mind. Weil and Marx 
agreed that within the organisation of labour in modern industry there is no 
consideration of the ideas of force and limit on the mind. In contrast, later Marxism 
deems that a period of denying these limits is necessary for the betterment of those 
who might late reap their benefit. Réflexions places labour at the core of society and 
workers as the supreme value. The social resistance she sought is not just a 
demystification in terms of industrial specialisation, workers must also be given the 
time and space to think. I believe that there is a moral problem in Weil’s social reform. 
In one sense it is inherent in all ideas of social or revolutionary change. If Weil or 
another person wishes to affect change over the long-term, the short-term effects are 
borne by people who may not witness the fruition of the change. If in attempting to 
mitigate long-term oppression, liberty is reduced in the short-term, then is it fair to 
subject some people over the short-term for the benefit some other people over the 
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long-term? I believe not. This is a fallacy that Weil later accepts as she grapples with 
her pacifism, one which I will discuss in the next chapter. 
Reaching the conclusion that oppression cannot be eliminated, unlike Marx’s 
version of a utopian society, Weil articulates the most fundamental critique of both 
Marx and orthodox Marxism. The myth of Marx and the spirit of revolution could not 
prevent her conclusions that Marxism is another defective political and economic 
system sweeping over the popular imagination. In the above ‘Analyse de 
l’Oppression’ it is shown that if oppression is linked to the material producing 
conditions of the social system, oppression will not be abolished if the conditions 
causing oppression remain. This is a clear example of how Weil went beyond Marx’s 
narrow vision. In the name of scientific socialism and reason, Marx proposes a theory 
that according to Weil is almost entirely devoid of both. The authority of institutions, 
political ideologies or state bureaucracies rely upon propaganda of a mythological 
nature and its mass obedience. Despite claiming to have inverted Hegel’s idealism, 
Weil declares that Marx simply relocates his spirit into history. She illustrates how 
there is no evidence that society would unfold as Marx speculates other than his 
reference to an unsound scientific methodology. Additionally, if a powerless group 
were to incite a successful revolution, they would have only achieved a slow but silent 
ascendancy to power and a concurrent loss of identity. In the above ‘Critique du 
marxisme’ it is shown that the difficulty that Weil has with Marx’s bisection of people 
into those who have property and those who do fails to properly account for oppression 
as well. Weil disagrees that the abolition of private property would end oppression, 
and that an attempt to exorcise society of scarcity is not only fictitious but just adds to 
the level of oppression. Marx simply wedded both the cult of science and the 
inevitability of industrial progress to his vision. This results in an attractive but 
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vacuous theory of revolutionary change. As Marx’s theory calculates the accumulation 
of the exploited surplus labour, Weil recognises how the quality and nature of work 
might reinforce oppression instead of alleviating it. Yet, while the relationship 
between the worker and their ability to understand the work process is crucial for 
creating a less oppressive society, Weil does not engage specifically with its impact 
on the economy. Weil instead focuses on the role power and social force, leaving Marx 
to reduce the world to economics and capital. 
 If an increase in productivity is the end, and specialisation and efficiency are 
the means, then individual man is oppressed by the force of this social organisation. 
The complexity of the resulting bureaucracy grows beyond an individual’s capacity to 
understand. Work then separates man’s activities from his mind and, consequently, 
work becomes a form of slavery. Competition and the race for power become the sole 
goals, causing a coalescence of the industrial, military and state spheres, where 
individual workers provide the source for this machine to function. The bureaucratic 
workers are no less oppressed than those whom they oppress in the struggle for power, 
which, with its inherent instability, enslaves everyone. To constitute the ideal society, 
Weil tackles the problem of equilibrium to elucidate the ideal limit. Stating that even 
though man seems to be born for servitude, Weil’s most prescient argument states that 
it is man’s ability to think that allows him to retain the idea of liberty. Yet, 
distinguishing between those who are actively free to think or those who dominate 
leads to disequilibrium. If liberty is the relationship between thought and working in 
the labour sphere, then the radical method of economic change that this would 
necessitate is not accounted for or outlined. Weil does not suggest that the advances 
in science and technology should be abolished but instead cautions against the transfer 
of this consciousness to matter and advocates that the development of technology 
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should be controlled by man. Society, technology, the organisation of work and the 
development of knowledge must remain within the experience and intelligence of the 
individual. Monopoly of any of these consigns the many to oppression by the few. The 
exercise of manual labour, using the strength of the body and the mind in a task, draws 
man to the point of being fully human. Thus, Réflexions presents us with an important 
development in Weil’s political thought. It recognises the magnitude of oppression 
and its link with free-thinking labour, and then combines their relationship to the 
actualisation of a conceptualised ideal. Most importantly, it questions whether 
contemporary society can coordinate such reforms. 
Essentially, Marx provides Weil with a methodical framework with which to 
analyse society, which she then reconstructs. Although she displays acuteness in 
dissecting Marx, she also credits him as the basis for her ideas. Believing that science 
has developed into an unwieldy, unknowable occultism because if its culture of 
specialists and that Marx’s critique of religion needed to be applied to modern 
scientific developments, Weil supports the materialist method but criticises the myth 
of infinite progress and the myth of revolution. Her critique is based on an acceptance 
of necessity as part of human reality. In ‘Esquisse de la vie sociale contemporaine’ 
Weil presents a damning indictment of contemporary society and its ability to absorb 
Weil’s reform ideas on labour, economic oppression and liberty. Unlike Marx, work 
needs to be reformed, not eliminated or reduced to the merest trifle. Weil’s proposals 
for reform are based on an examination of the conditions of existence. Any change 
requires an understanding of the nature of true liberty and oppression so that 
individuals can consciously select and build towards the least oppressive systems.   
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Chapter Four 
 
From Pacifism to Justification of Force 
 
Introduction 
 
During the last three years of the 1930’s, Weil is occupied by the European continent’s 
drift towards war. In this period, her thinking evolves from pacifism to reluctant 
advocate of force. As a pacifist, Weil condemns war for the physical destruction it 
wreaks mainly on the oppressed and the repressive domestic policies it requires. For 
her, only freedom and peace could sustain the value of the individual. Later, as an 
advocate of force, she is still reluctant to countenance the use of force. Developed 
through the misgivings of Marx, her evolving theory of force leads to an alteration of 
her pacifist position when confronted with Germany’s utilisation of force. In the 
decade before the Third Reich ignored the Munich Accords by marching into Prague, 
Weil advocates for peace on the basis that it is the workers and the oppressed who pay 
the heaviest toll, and laments the overextension of power that results during war-time 
and vilifies the hypocrisy of WWI hollow slogans that gave primacy to ends over 
means. Attempting to detail the oppressive effects of deploying force to achieve a goal 
in Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale, she pleads for 
greater lucidity when advocating the use of violence. Despite the eventual centrality 
of force in Weil’s later political thought, I choose to wait until the final chapter so that 
the reader has a greater understanding of how her thought evolves and the nuance 
involved when she decides to break from her pacifist position. 
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This chapter is subdivided into six sections. The first section of this chapter, 
entitled, ‘Power and Force’, presents what Weil understood as force and power in 
Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale. Even though Weil 
had not yet fully defined force, this chapter details how Weil distils force in L’Iliade 
ou le poème de la force. Accordingly, I show that the difficulties in Weil’s initial 
definition in Réflexions are replicated in L’Iliade ou le poème de la force. Charting the 
development of force is crucial to this chapter. To understand force, it is justifiable to 
recount its development chronologically, utilising Weil’s engagement in the Spanish 
Civil War where, though repulsed by force, she is challenged and maybe even 
exasperated by its pervasiveness. Witnessing at a very young age the mutilating effects 
of WWI on the French male population and writing her first pacifist piece at nineteen 
on the value of civil service as an alternative to military service, the second section of 
this chapter, entitled, ‘Reflections on War’, discusses the concern that war affects the 
country’s internal politics and its social and economic conditions. Highlighting the 
multiple and contradictory rationales for violence, the third section of this chapter, 
entitled, ‘A Response to Alain’s Challenge’, deals with the proposition, are the men 
who extoll honour and dignity as being more precious than life disposed to be the first 
to risk their lives? Weil’s principal argument is to question the hypocrisy of those who 
argue that a sanctity of a country’s dignity and honour oblige them to declare war 
while also forcing conscription on those who are forced to submit to the daily 
indignities of oppression within their own country. The fourth section of this chapter, 
entitled, ‘The Spanish Civil War’, reflects on Weil’s participation in the Spanish Civil 
War, where afterwards she argues that those who hold authority with a weapon use it 
to maintain their dominance over the vulnerable despite their initial idealistic 
revolutionary intentions. For Weil, the Spanish militias’ behaviour corroborates the 
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ineluctable contamination of force that corrupts the virtue of their endeavour. The fifth 
section of this chapter, entitled, ‘The Power of Words’, assesses how Weil exposes the 
power of words by stripping layers from emotive-laden and misleading pretences that 
were common in WWI. The analysis of these abstract, vacuous entities, which are not 
weighted accordingly by those under their sway, present how words are a poor pretext 
for conflict. When Germany invades Poland in March 1939, Weil advocates for 
appeasement to avoid another war. However, when Germany’s intentions began to 
manifest, she slowly disavows total pacifism by accepting the existence of force, not 
only in conflict, but also as an inherent part of humanity. It is a stretch to assert that 
Weil advocates a just-war theory, but that her thinking, which is informed by the 
combination of her Spanish experience and theoretical analysis, certainly advocates 
for a just-force theory. The sixth section of this chapter, entitled, ‘The Tipping Point 
of Pacifism’, details Weil’s tipping point of pacifism. Reflecting on her proposition to 
concede part of Czechoslovakia, asserting that war had to be honestly calculated to 
compare respective sacrifices and merits, Weil states that military aggression is not 
only the least desirable response but also the one with the highest price. In contrast, I 
argue that her ideas advocate for the acceptance of short-term injustices and an 
increasement in oppression, which contradicts her understanding of oppression. 
However, when presented with the overwhelming evidence that force is needed to 
deny an opposing force, if one is to resist, Weil eventually succumbs and advocates 
for killing. Consequently, the final section qua conclusion shows how Weil’s revised 
understanding of force in L’Iliade ou le poème de la force completes her transition 
from pacifism to acceptance of the use of force. 
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4.1 Power and Force 
 
Weil countenances the unpalatable idea that force is pervasive in Réflexions sur 
barbarie.407 Acknowledging the need for recourse to force if one is to counteract 
violence, she states, ‘barbarity is a permanent and universal characteristic of human 
nature and develops more or less according to the circumstances that give it play’.408 
In recognition of the need to understand how force is exercised in a society, Weil states 
that ‘one cannot even begin to form any clear ideas on the relationships between 
human beings as long as one has not put the notion of force at their very centre’.409 It 
is important to note that Weil could not have uttered this statement without the 
shedding developments in her earlier work. Therefore, it is important to show the 
syndicalism’s inability to affect change and Marxism’s ineptitude to really understand 
the problems. Rejecting the extent of oppressive force built into a centralised 
bureaucratic government and assessing the tensions of power within a society, Weil’s 
statement on the centrality of force defines the central theme of her final three years’ 
work. 
Based on Homer’s poem L’Iliade that depicts the Trojan War and the Greek 
siege of the city of Troy, force is the central theme to Weil’s L’Iliade ou le poème de 
la force. At the time, force had an undeniable relevance to the contemporary state of 
Europe. Written during the summer of 1940 when Paris is occupied and war raged 
 
407 Reflections on barbarity. 
408 ‘Barbarie comme un caractère permanent et universel de la nature humaine, qui se développe plus 
ou moins selon que les circonstances lui donnent plus ou moins de jeu’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions sur 
la barbarie’, in Écrits historiques et politiques (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), p. 223. 
409 ‘Je ne crois pas que l’on puisse former des pensées claires sur les rapports humains tant qu’on n’aura 
pas mis au centre la notion de force, comme la notion de rapport est au centre des mathématiques’. 
Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions sur la barbarie’, in Écrits historiques et politiques (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), 
p. 223. 
151 
 
across central Europe, Weil analogises Homer’s epic poem on the human condition, 
applying it universally. When Weil writes that ‘the whole of the Iliad lies under the 
shadow of the greatest calamity humanity can experience, the destruction of a city’,410 
she had Paris in mind. Weil’s L’Iliade ou le poème de la force is written in a manner 
that Homer’s The Iliad subsumes a philosophical analysis of force. It laments ‘that 
men are capable of being so transformed’411 by force and marks, not just a transition 
from her previous idea of pacifism above all, but beyond it in order to study its nature 
and so it can be argued that we are also reading the developing concern with spiritual 
values in her writings. Shedding old light on new situations, Weil assesses Western 
culture in the dying light of the Roman and Greek civilisation. According to Blum and 
Seidler: 
[Weil] no longer accepted the terms of reference established by the Western Enlightenment 
tradition for they could not explain the forms of oppression and liberty that exist within modern 
society. Her developing relationship to Christianity cannot be separated from this broadening 
of her vision.412 
In Perspectives. Allons-nous vers la révolution prolétarienne, Weil wants to clarify 
the true relationship between man and nature, to ‘give back to man, that is to say the 
individual, the power which it is his proper function to exercise over nature, over tools, 
over society itself’.413 From this early stage in the development of force we can 
 
410 ‘Toute l’Iliade est sous l’ombre du malheur le plus grand qui soit parmi les hommes, la destruction 
d’une cité’. Simone Weil, ‘L’Iliade ou le poème de la force’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome 
II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 249. 
411 ‘Quant aux guerriers, les comparaisons qui les font apparaître, vainqueurs ou vaincus, comme des 
bêtes ou des choses ne peuvent faire éprouver ni admiration ni mépris, mais seulement le regret que les 
hommes puissent être ainsi transformés’. Simone Weil, ‘L’Iliade ou le poème de la force’, in Écrits 
historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 
1989), p. 250. 
412 Blum and Seidler, A Truer Liberty, p. 211. 
413 ‘Nous voulons mettre en pleine lumière les rapports véritables de l’homme et de la nature, ces 
rapports que déguise, dans toute société fondée sur l’exploitation, la dégradante division du travail en 
travail intellectuel et travail manuel. Nous voulons rendre à l’homme, c’est-à-dire à l’individu, la 
domination qu’il a pour fonction propre d’exercer sur la nature, sur les outils, sur la société elle-même; 
rétablir la subordination des conditions matérielles du travail par rapport aux travailleurs; et, au lieu de 
supprimer la propriété individuelle, faire de la propriété individuelle une vérité, en transformant les 
moyens de production [...] qui servent aujourd’hui surtout à asservir et exploiter le travail, en de simples 
instruments du travail libre et associé’. Simone Weil, ‘Perspectives. Allons-nous vers la révolution 
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tentatively state that power is something that a person possesses (or does not) and force 
is something (external) which acts upon a person, persons or things. Whilst Winch 
states that the ‘[r]ecognition that human action can destroy values is a central theme 
in Simone Weil’s thinking’,414 force should not be considered as solid thing, which 
can be held. We witness the effects of force, like leaves blowing in an invisible wind. 
Defining the relationship between man and nature as the duty of her generation, Weil 
states in Perspectives that ‘for centuries now, ever since the Renaissance, men of 
thought and men of action have laboured methodically to give the human mind 
mastery over the forces of nature’.415 This means that we can chart the development 
of Weil’s understanding of the force of nature through Perspectives. Allons-nous vers 
la révolution prolétarienne to Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression 
sociale to L’Iliade ou le poème de la force. In Perspectives Weil states that 
during the last century it came to be realised that society itself is a force of nature, as blind as 
the others, as dangerous for man if he does not succeed in mastering it. At the present time this 
force weighs upon us more cruelly than water, earth, air and fire; all the more so since it holds 
in its grasp, as a result of the technical progress, the control of water, earth, air, and fire.416 
Still heavily engaged in Marxist critique at this point, Weil understands that the force 
of nature is linked to ‘the total subordination of the individual to the collective 
industrial machine’417 and is the result of the technical process. It is important to note 
 
prolétarienne’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 277. 
414 Winch, The Just Balance, p. 145. 
415 ‘Depuis plusieurs siècles, depuis la Renaissance, les hommes de pensée et d’action travaillent 
méthodiquement, à rendre l’esprit humain maître des forces de la nature; et le succès a dépassé les 
espérances’. Simone Weil, ‘Perspectives. Allons-nous vers la révolution prolétarienne’, in Écrits 
historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1988), p. 277. 
416 ‘Mais au cours du siècle dernier l’on a compris que la société elle-même est une force de la nature, 
aussi aveugle que les autres, aussi dangereuse pour l’homme s’il ne parvient pas à la maîtriser. 
Actuellement, cette force pèse sur nous plus cruellement que l’eau, la terre, l’air et le feu; d’autant 
qu’elle a elle-même entre ses mains, par les progrès de la technique, le maniement de l’eau, de la terre, 
de l’air et du feu’. Simone Weil, ‘Perspectives. Allons-nous vers la révolution prolétarienne’, in Écrits 
historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1988), p. 277. 
417 ‘L’individu s’est trouvé brutalement dépossédé des moyens de combat et de travail; ni la guerre ni 
la production ne sont plus possibles sans une subordination totale de l’individu à l’outillage collectif’. 
Simone Weil, ‘Perspectives. Allons-nous vers la révolution prolétarienne’, in Écrits historiques et 
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in the above passage that Weil situates society as a force of nature within the last 
century and consequently within the timeframe of the emergence of the industrial 
revolution. In Réflexions, whilst discussing the difficulties with Marxism, she 
attributes a version of force to 
[t]his religion of the productive forces in whose name generations of entrepreneurs have 
crushed the working masses without any remorse is also a factor of oppression within the 
Socialist Movement.418  
Still engaged in the primacy of socialism that does not account for an understanding 
of oppression, let alone force, the important point to take from Weil at this stage is 
that force is directly linked with an industrialised society. As primitive man overcomes 
nature (builds shelter and creates agricultural society) and even thrives (early 
medicine). The nature of force morphs, parallels and bifurcates when necessary 
alongside man’s development, giving him different obstacles that if overcome might 
return him to a form of dominionship. 
In short, man seems to pass by stages, with respect to nature, from servitude to dominion. At 
the same time nature gradually loses her divine character, and divinity more and more takes 
on human shape.419 
Yet, instead of man being able to confront and overcome nature by building a shelter 
or feeding oneself sufficiently to satisfy immediate necessity, or where nature has a 
limit, like weather relenting or, in an extreme case, death, when man is pitted against 
man force has only one limit - death. 
 
politiques, Tome II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), 
pp. 277-278. 
418 ‘Cette religion des forces productives au nom de laquelle des générations de chefs d’entreprise ont 
écrasé les masses travailleuses sans le moindre remords constitue également un facteur d’oppression à 
l’intérieur du mouvement socialiste; toutes les religions font de l’homme un simple instrument de la 
Providence, et le socialisme lui aussi met les hommes au service du progrès historique, c’est-à-dire du 
progrès de la production’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression 
sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, 
Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 36. 
419 ‘Bref l’homme semble passer par étapes, à l’égard de la nature, de l’esclavage à la domination. En 
même temps la nature perd graduellement son caractère divin, et la divinité revêt de plus en plus la 
forme humain’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in 
Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), pp. 52-53. 
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Unfortunately, this emancipation is only a flattering semblance. In reality, at these higher 
stages, human action continues, as a whole, to be nothing but pure obedience to the brutal spur 
of an immediate necessity; only, instead of being harried by nature, man is henceforth harried 
by man. However, it is still the same pressure exerted by nature that continues to make itself 
felt, although indirectly; for oppression is exercised by force, and in the long run all force 
originates in nature.420 
Weil attempts to elucidate her understanding of force further, yet at this stage all she 
can offer is that it can be understood not in its composite elements but by its nature. 
Despite disclaiming that the notion of force is far from simple, we can read the 
difficulty she has in accurately articulating its oppressive parameters. 
The notion of force is far from simple, and yet it is the first that must be elucidated in order to 
formulate the problems of society. Force and oppression—that makes two; but what needs to 
be understood above all is that it is not the manner in which use is made of some particular 
force, but its very nature, which determines whether it is oppressive or not.421 
Describing it in relation to the governmental state’s power, in this case (maybe) legal 
powers, to grind down an individual, Weil argues that the state’s force can manifest 
as oppression.422 An (in)ability to withstand this oppression relates to the power of the 
individual. As shown in the previous chapter, a method of mitigating oppression is the 
freedom to think and ability to act. If an individual has privileges, Weilian examples 
would be a priest, a property-holding capitalist, a holder and purveyor of scientific 
knowledge, a holder of arms and weapons or essentially, the monopoly of the few. 
 
420 ‘Par malheur, cette émancipation n’est qu’une flatteuse apparence. En réalité, à ces étapes 
supérieures, l’action humaine continue, dans l’ensemble, à n’être que pure obéissance à l’aiguillon 
brutal d’une nécessité immédiate; seulement, au lieu d’être harcelé par la nature, l’homme est désormais 
harcelé par l’homme. Au reste c’est bien toujours la pression de la nature qui continue à se faire sentir, 
quoique indirectement; car l’oppression s’exerce par la force, et en fin de compte, toute force à sa source 
dans la nature’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in 
Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 53. 
421 ‘La notion de force est loin d’être simple, et cependant elle est la première à élucider pour poser les 
problèmes sociaux. La force et l’oppression, cela fait deux ; mais ce qu’il faut comprendre avant tout, 
c’est que ce n’est pas la manière dont on use d’une force quelconque, mais sa nature même qui 
détermine si elle est ou non oppressive’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de 
l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la 
révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 53. 
422 It is fair to suggest that a forceful government/ state can also wield its power without inflicting 
oppression. Weil might disagree, as she states that power is still concentrated. But in theory, a 
government/ state could act in a manner not consistent with Weil’s beliefs on elite bureaucratic groups. 
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Then that person or persons can withstand an element of force by mitigating their 
experience of oppression by utilising their privileges. However, everyone is still 
subject to force and it is only our ability (power) to mitigate force that differentiates 
us. A statement which possibly defines the history of humanity existing in the state of 
nature, Weil’s concludes on the instability of power in ‘that there is never power, but 
only the race for power’.423 Where mankind attempts to overcome the state of nature 
and recognises that (momentarily) holding power, however unstable, helps to mitigate 
the effects of force. The struggle to hold or gain power is the struggle of mankind. 
Despite articulating definitions of oppression and to a lesser extent power, 
Weil struggles to articulate a definition of force in Réflexions. I surmise that Weil is 
attempting to reveal that force is something which is underpinned by nature and should 
be understood by its nature. As it is rooted in the foundations of our world (natural 
force) and that it can evolve to keep dominionship over society, force has the 
characteristics to apply to any given situation in any time of history. I suggest that an 
outline of Weil’s definition of force includes the weight of nature’s conditions, 
indifferent to one’s existence, and the pressure of humanity as it attempts to coordinate 
and control nature’s meagre provisions. Force ranges from physically battling nature 
to satisfying hunger, to keeping a domicile erect in an environment indifferent to 
human’s survival or overcoming and developing medical provision against disease or 
injury, to withstanding the pressure of surviving politically in a community, state, 
 
423 ‘Car du fait qu’il n’y a jamais pouvoir, mais seulement course au pouvoir, et que cette course est 
sans terme, sans limite, sans mesure, il n’y a pas non plus de limite ni de mesure aux efforts qu’elle 
exige; ceux qui s’y livrent, contraints de faire toujours plus que leurs rivaux, qui s’efforcent de leur coté 
de faire plus qu’eux, doivent sacrifier non seulement l’existence des esclaves, mais la leur propre et 
celle des êtres les plus chers; c’est ainsi qu’Agamemnon immolant sa fille revit dans les capitalistes qui, 
pour maintenir leurs privilèges, acceptent d’un cœur léger des guerres susceptibles de leur ravir leurs 
fils’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits 
historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 57. 
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country or continent scrambling for material subsistence. Where force manifests itself 
as power is the great game that we all play (and is played upon us) so that we might 
survive the force of nature. For McLellan,’[w]hat turned privilege into force more 
brutal than that of natural necessity was the concomitant struggle for power’,424 
meaning all stakeholders in the race for power engage in a struggle to retain their 
power, acquire more or wrest some away. The problem, if we can agree that power is 
unstable, is that physical force; assault, violence or war, can be then reintroduced as a 
method of attempting to preserve power. The idea of holding power is vain, as 
McLellan argues, because ‘at the very heart of power is a contradiction which prevents 
it from ever really existing – the only thing that ever exists is the race for power, a race 
which enslaves the strong as well as the weak’.425 By the time that she writes L’Iliade 
ou le poème de la force Weil has a greater understanding of force, Instead of moving 
directly to this work, it is of greater merit to show how Weil’s pacifism interacted with 
this limited understanding of force as events in Spain and Europe unfolded. 
  
 
424 McLellan, Utopian Pessimist, p. 83. 
425 Ibid. 
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4.2 Reflections on War 
 
When Hitler comes to power in 1933, Weil composes an in-depth analysis regarding 
whether workers could improve their situation through violence. Entitled, Réflexions 
sur la guerre,426 it highlights the multiple and contradictory rationales for violence. 
She shows how history’s long list of revolutions and counterrevolutions prove that war 
and authoritarianism enjoy a close relationship. The French Revolution, Napoleon’s 
imperial reign, and the Russian Revolution had all led to unending struggle and 
deprivation for the common people. These violent changes and their aftermaths show 
that revolutions succeed only in replacing one group of oppressors by another. Any 
theory supporting war or any other violent change that privileges ends over means has 
an inherent faulty premise. Central to whether a country should go to war should show 
conflict will affect the country’s internal politics and its social and economic 
conditions. Readiness for war implies tight political and military control over a 
nation’s people, so the decision to go to war is decided more often by carefully 
orchestrated internal politics than by external relations. The control achieved by the 
state inevitably grind down people’s lives, for ‘arms manipulated by a sovereign state 
bring liberty to no one’.427 Weil’s rationale for peace is predicated on safeguarding 
individual liberty, something which cannot be done during times of war. ‘In any 
circumstance’, she maintains, ‘the worst possible treason consists always in accepting 
one’s subordination to the apparatus and in serving it by crushing underfoot human 
values: one’s own and those of others’.428 I suggest that Weil is analytically brilliant 
 
426 Reflections on war.  
427 ‘Des armes maniées par un appareil d’État souverain ne peuvent apporter la liberté à personne’. 
Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions sur la Guerre’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’engagement 
syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 294. 
428 ‘Dans n’importe quelle circonstance, la pire trahison possible consiste toujours à accepter de se 
subordonner à cet appareil et de fouler aux pieds pour le servir, en soi-même et chez autrui, toutes les 
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in this 1933 article but also quite subjective. By still asserting her pacifist and 
syndicalist ideals, I believe that these adherences, at this stage, obfuscate and delay 
her later conclusion that force is an inherent part of society. 
  
 
valeurs humaines’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions sur la Guerre’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome 
II: L’engagement syndical, Volume 1: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 299. 
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4.3 A Response to Alain’s Challenge  
 
It is evident at this point that Weil has not relinquished her pacifist position and 
continues to probe the nature of force from within the Spanish Civil War. In the early 
spring of 1936, Alain challenges the French intellectuals by publicly asking several 
questions in view of Hitler’s provocative act of occupying the Rhineland. In Réponse 
à une question d’Alain429 Weil states she would ‘only answer the last of Alain’s 
questions:’430 ‘Are men who speak of honour and dignity as more valuable than life 
willing to risk their lives first? And if not, what should we think of them?’431 In her 
response, Weil insists on applying consistent criteria to policy decisions concerning 
questions about war, which can equally apply to a nation’s treatment of its own 
disenfranchised members. Weil singles out the words honneur and dignité as the most 
bloodstained in the language, reminding readers that Poincaré’s432 vacuous formulas 
Peace with dignity and Peace with honour were preludes to the senseless slaughter 
following 1914.433 She argues that these pre-WWI slogans, along with the men who 
proclaimed them without going to war themselves, are partly responsible for the 
 
429 Response to question from Alain. 
430 ‘Je ne répondrai qu’à la dernière des questions d’Alain’. Simone Weil, ‘Réponse à une question 
d’Alain’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, 
Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 329.  
431 ‘Les hommes qui parlent d’honneur et de dignité comme plus précieux que la vie sont-ils disposés à 
risquer les premiers leur vie? Et que penser d’eux s’ils ne le sont pas?’. Simone Weil, ‘Réponse à une 
question d’Alain’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la 
révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 329. 
432 Raymond Poincaré, president of the French Third Republic, 1913-20. L’Appel à la nation française 
signé par Poincaré le 1st Aout 1914 disait: ‘La mobilisation n’est pas la guerre. Dans les circonstances 
présentes, elle apparaît au contraire comme le meilleur moyen d’assurer la paix dans l’honneur’. 
433 ‘La formule la paix dans la dignité ou la paix dans l’honneur, formule de sinistre mémoire qui, sous 
la plume de Poincaré, a immédiatement prélude au massacre, est encore employée couramment’. 
Simone Weil, ‘Réponse à une question d’Alain’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: 
L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), 
p. 329. 
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desecration of human lives. Dignity, signifying self-esteem,434 is contingent 
exclusively upon freely decided actions. Honour also depends on a free, uncoerced 
resolution, in this case to put one’s life in danger for a greater cause. Authorities who 
declare war impel others to go to battle. Consequently, the powerful cannot honestly 
base their conscription to arms on appeals to honour or dignity, for both depend on the 
liberty to make unconstrained choices. As for non-combatants, neither their honour 
nor their self-esteem is at stake in war because, in theory, they have a limited exposure 
to the danger. Stating that ‘war is never a resource to avoid having to despise 
oneself’,435 one can conclude that, because war did not engage anyone’s individual 
honour, appeasement could not be considered dishonourable. 
Weil’s principal point is to underscore the hypocrisy of leaders who argue that 
protection of a country’s dignity and honour obliges a declaration of war and, by 
consequence, conscripting those who are already forced to submit to indignities every 
day within their own country. In her response, Weil brought a higher principle to bear 
on war, which is integrity in applying criteria for major decisions involving violence. 
She exposes the dishonesty of authorities who send men to war by proclaiming empty 
slogans, which deceives them into believing that the slogan’s ideals merit the supreme 
sacrifice of their lives. She declares that war, in both its preparation and its conduct, 
is ‘the essential cog in the mechanism of oppression and inequality’.436 Weil adds that 
 
434 ‘Le mot de dignité est ambigu. Il peut signifier l’estime de soi-même. Simone Weil, ‘Réponse à une 
question d’Alain’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la 
révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), pp. 329-330. 
435 ‘Il faut en conclure que jamais la guerre n’est une ressource pour éviter d’avoir à se mépriser soi-
même’. Simone Weil, ‘Réponse à une question d’Alain’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: 
L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), 
p. 330. 
436 ‘Ces guerres constituent le rouage essential dans le mécanisme de l’oppression et l’inégalité’. 
Simone Weil, ‘Réponse à une question d’Alain’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: 
L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), 
p. 332. 
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civil liberties are curtailed during war and it is generally a certain class of person 
conscripted into the army. This hypocrisy could be dispelled by deciding to honour 
peace over war. I do not disagree with the sentiment of Weil’s argument, but must 
remark that she takes a sweeping approach. It is not inconceivable that some people 
might willingly submit to war on a point of principle. Weil’s arguments for 
nonviolence have a revolutionary tone, in that they advocate equality in human 
relationships and an unemotional, honest, and pragmatic discussion of whether the 
cause merits the terrible human sacrifice. Her language at this time is largely informed 
by Marxism, namely, the ‘essential cog in the mechanism of oppression and 
inequality’ parallels with her tone of dignity in labour and the syndicalist movement. 
Leaving aside slights made against any government’s honour and dignity, Weil does 
not countenance that if people are to be subjected to greater oppression and inequality 
than already exists (when an invading army occupies a country), a call to war can be 
justified because it is the common man and his conditions that bears the brunt of an 
invasion and occupying force. If Weil accords ‘the free decision to risk one’s life is 
the very soul of honour; honour is not involved where some men make decisions 
without taking any risks, and others die in order to carry out their decisions’437 and she 
maintains that dignity and honour are dangerous words, ‘where slaves are invited to 
die in the name of dignity’,438 particularly when used in a national context, I question 
to what extent is dying for the soul of honour any more relevant than that of not dying 
for honour or dignity. An aspect that Weil misses at this point is, notwithstanding 
 
437 ‘La libre résolution de mettre sa vie en jeu est l’âme même de l’honneur; l’honneur n’est pas en 
cause là où les uns décident sans risques, et les autres meurent pour exécuter’. Simone Weil, ‘Réponse 
à une question d’Alain’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à 
la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 330. 
438 ‘Ces guerres où les esclaves sont invités à mourir au nom d’une dignité’. Simone Weil, ‘Réponse à 
une question d’Alain’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à 
la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 332. 
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uncoerced soulful honour and coerced sloganised national honour, that war can be 
foisted upon a country rather than decided upon for honour’s sake. Furthermore, one 
can infer that while coerced war on the grounds of honour and dignity is unjustified, 
individual uncoerced warring is justified. She states that ‘a man who has been grossly 
insulted may need to fight in order to regain his self-respect’.439 A man may fight for 
his own dignity, but not the state’s? Indeed, an oversimplification, as the point that 
Weil wants to underscore is choice, which relates to activity in her thesis. Whilst she 
argues that one should have a choice, I suggest that choice is not always possible. We 
both agree that this limits liberty. I believe that Weil is not able to fully investigate the 
nuances because she is attempting to investigate the root of the problem of force. In 
one sense, Weil is attempting to theorise the problem, in accordance with acting freely, 
and I think that she does not recognise that this route is limited by another agent (in 
this case Hitler) denying this freedom.440 Despite retaining a pacifist standpoint in 
early 1936, it is challenged during her brief spell in the Spanish Civil War, where we 
find the germination of force in her writings. 
  
 
439 ‘Un homme outrage peut avoir besoin de se battre pour retrouver sa propre’. Simone Weil, ‘Réponse 
à une question d’Alain’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à 
la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 330. Weil does state in the 
second clause of the above sentence that ‘this will be the case only if it is impossible for him to submit 
passively to the insult without being convicted of cowardice in his own eyes’. (Ce sera le cas seulement 
s’il lui est impossible de subir passivement l’outrage sans se trouver convaincu de lâcheté a ses propres 
yeux.). 
440 A solution at this stage could be to decide not to fight and submit to whatever course of action, or 
even commit suicide or be killed. When choices appear limited, we can decide to do nothing or the 
unpalatable and accept the consequences. While the external force negates the freedom, Weil should be 
satisfied if one can choose the course of (in)action. 
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4.4 The Spanish Civil War 
 
From the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in July 1936, Weil’s advocacy to preserve 
syndicalism in France is closely bound with the pacifism she believes is a legitimate 
method to keep France from developing in a similar manner to Hitler’s Germany and 
Stalin’s Russia. When General Franco’s army engages with Republican Spain, Weil 
wants to observe the interaction of forces on the battlefield. Whilst participating in the 
Republican’s defence of liberty and democracy, Weil places more emphasis on the 
peasants struggling against proprietors, much like the workers in syndicalist France. 
As such, war itself is a separate matter, one not to be ignored, but her concern is the 
treatment of the oppressed and the oppressive. To her dismay, however, she soon finds 
a complex mix of admirable and reprehensible behaviour on the part of her Republican 
comrades. 
In the two months that Weil participates in the Spanish Civil War, she scarcely 
fought at all and gave no allegiance, yet it is just long enough to perceive the disasters 
of war and to gain a sobering acuity about political ideals when they are placed in the 
crucibles of fear, terror, and cruelty. Her short stint in Spain with an international unit 
of anarchist militias is long enough for her to accept the disheartening fact that force 
does not pick a side in a war. Those who are given a gun and free licence to use it 
maintain their dominance over the vulnerable, scarcely concerning themselves with 
questions of justice or the spilling of blood. The militias she observes succumb to this 
intoxication and lower themselves to the level of their adversaries. Their behaviour 
corroborates that force is ineluctable contaminating. The experience galvanises her 
ready suspicions against all collective endeavour aimed at political power. In Spain, 
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she beholds, as she had been unable to in Germany four years earlier, the ugliest face 
of force. 
Following her to return to Paris (Sept. 1936), Weil is clear-sighted enough to 
appreciate the realities of Spain and her enthusiasm for personal participation wanes. 
Her 1936 article, Réflexions pour déplaire441 points to the common lesson of Russia 
in 1917 and now Spain: revolutionary promises of abolishing the state’s oppressive 
bureaucracy and military machinery vanish behind the war’s intensification of these 
means, with no possibility of popular control over them. She did not question her 
anarchist comrades in Catalonia, but in October 1936 she reflects that 
we see forms of compulsion and instances of inhumanity that are directly contrary to the 
libertarian and humanitarian ideal of the anarchists. The necessities and the atmosphere of civil 
war are sweeping away the aspirations that we are seeking to defend by means of civil war.442 
Now active in the broadly-based Comité de vigilance des intellectuels antifascistes,443 
founded by Alain in 1934, Weil pacifism begins to wane. Despite supporting Léon 
Blum’s policy of non-intervention, which was under strong attack from the 
Communists, particularly after the Stalin—Laval pact of 1935, in which the Soviet 
Union gave its support for French rearmament, she favours sending technical 
assistance and raw materials to Spain. In an October 1936 article, Faut-il graisser les 
godillots444, Weil challenges the misrepresentation of these libertarian and 
humanitarian ideals by writing that ‘for some comrades it is no longer a matter of 
turning international war into civil war, but civil war into international war’.445 For 
 
441 Reflections to displease. (Also translated, Reflections that no one is going to like.) 
442 ‘Là aussi, hélas, nous voyons se produire des formes de contrainte, de cas d’inhumanité directement 
contraires à l’idéal libertaire et humanitaire des anarchistes’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions pour déplaire’, 
in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 389. 
443 Committee of Anti-Fascist Intellectuals. 
444 Do we have to grease our combat boots? 
445 ‘Il ne s’agit plus pour certains camarades de transformer la guerre internationale en guerre civile, 
mais la guerre civile en guerre internationale’. Simone Weil, ‘Faut-il graisser les godillots?’ in Écrits 
historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 386. 
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her, opposition to Fascism is an opposition to all forms of authoritarianism and any 
recourse to war submits to the logic of military prestige and power inherent in fascism 
itself. Her conclusion is unequivocal. 
One must choose between prestige and peace. And whether one claims to believe in the 
fatherland, democracy, or revolution, the policy of prestige means war. […] And if the 
misfortune of time wants the civil war to become a war like any other, and almost inevitably 
linked to the international war, one can only draw a conclusion: we must also avoid civil 
war.446 
Weil detects ambivalence in the foreign policy of the French government, which 
proclaimed neutrality for fear of setting all Europe ablaze. Writing in Non-intervention 
généalisée447 she ‘def[ied] anyone, including Blum, to explain why the reasons that 
deter us from intervening in Spain would be less compelling if it were a question of 
Czechoslovakia’s being invaded by the Germans’.448 The reference to Czechoslovakia 
is prophetic. Weil remains faithful to this point of view up to, and including, the 
Munich crisis. Yet it must be emphasised that her resistance to the war fever, which 
seized France in 1936, is not based on an individualistic pacifism. She is dedicated to 
preserving the substantial gains and hopes that the Fronte Popolare begun securing 
for the workers’ movement. One can question the legitimacy of her correlation 
between France’s non-involvement in the Spanish Civil War and their involvement in 
what would eventually become a total European War. Hitler’s move into the Rhineland 
in April, Mussolini’s war in Ethiopia and his pact with Berlin, and the chaos in Spain 
all contribute a vague urgency to put France on a war economy. Such preparation, 
 
446 ‘Il faut choisir entre le prestige et la paix. Et qu’on se réclame de la patrie, de la démocratie ou de la 
révolution, la politique de prestige, c’est la guerre. Alors? Alors il serait temps de se décider: ou fleurir 
la tombe de Poincaré, ou cesser de nous exhorter à faire les matamores. Et si le malheur des temps veut 
que la guerre civile devienne aujourd’hui une guerre comme une autre, et presque inévitablement liée 
à la guerre internationale, on n’en peut tirer qu’une conclusion: éviter aussi la guerre civile’. Simone 
Weil, ‘Faut-il graisser les godillots?’ in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière 
et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 387. 
447 Generalised non-intervention. 
448 ‘Je défie n’importe qui, y compris Léon Blum, d’expliquer pourquoi les raisons qui détournent 
d’intervenir en Espagne auraient moins de force s’il s’agissait de le Tchécoslovaquie envahie par les 
Allemands’. Simone Weil, ‘Non-intervention généralisée’ in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: 
Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 45. 
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however, is greatly hindered by labour reforms. France’s industrial weakness is 
accentuated in the face of Germany’s build-up. To France’s further detriment, less is 
now required of its inferior work force at the very time when more is imperative. 
In April 1937, Weil outlines this counterproductive element in Les dangers de 
guerre et les conquétes ouvriéres.449 The 1936 June strikes show that a fait accompli 
persuades better than all arguments. Nothing replaces its effectiveness in imposing 
something new. Yet the strikes’ failure to address the basic issues of social life now 
became evident. Both sides of the political spectrum agree that a strong France is 
necessary to ensure peace. That means that factories need to increase production to a 
seventy-hour week and the old, brutal and arbitrary working conditions must return. 
France’s choice is between preparing for war or continuing its commitment to social 
justice. From Weil’s point of view, the two positions are diametrically opposed. 
Ominously she declares that 
one cannot at the same time preserve the regime resulting from June and have a strong France. 
One must choose. If we want a strong France, the liberties of the workers will have to disappear 
one day or another. We shall then have the military strength necessary to defend ourselves 
against the foreigner; only we will have, after all, nothing more to defend. 450 
Aside from the nationalistic vein of defending against the foreigner, this passage 
outlines the crucial position that workers’ rights have in Weil’s ideal French society. 
Even though she does not explicitly used the word droits, we can understand this is 
what she means, for assigning workers’ essential liberties would be problematic. In 
the same month, writing in Prestige national et honneur ouvrier451 she stresses that 
France’s choice of militarism or revolution is effectively a choice between the 
 
449 The dangers of war and the workers’ conquests. 
450 ‘On ne peut pas à la fois conserver le régime issu de juin et avoir une France forte. Il fait choisir. Si 
on veut une France forte, les libertés ouvriéres devront disparaître un jour ou l’autre. On aura alors la 
force militaire nécessaire pour se défendre contre l’étranger; seulement on n’aura, somme toute, plus 
rien à défendre’. Simone Weil, ‘Les dangers de guerre et les conquétes ouvriéres’ in Écrits historiques 
et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 72. 
451 National prestige and worker’s honour. 
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specious claims of national pride and the substantial claims of syndicalism. Drawing 
on tangible humiliations that workers underwent, which she suggests occurred in its 
factories before June 1936, what did it matter if France endures all manner of 
mortifications from Germany now that the honour of its own working people is being 
reclaimed. A bloodless revolt had been carried out against true oppressors, is the 
working class now to be conscripted for one imagined? Weil is underestimating the 
German threat, but her criterion is the tangibility of honour, that no nation can 
genuinely claim while condoning the degradation of its own people. 
There is honour to be defended, it is the honour of those who are at the bottom of the social 
ladder against the abuse of power of those who are above. It must be defended by the daily 
social struggle, which does not involve the use of tanks, cannons, bombing planes. A so-called 
national honour common to oppressors and oppressed deserves not a drop of blood, still less 
millions of corpses.452 
These remarks suggest why, after the Popular Front’s fall in 1938 and the ensuing 
reaction, that the working class take little interest in defending France against 
Germany. They also show that Weil views the war preparation program as 
counterrevolutionary. Most importantly, it shows that the emergent crisis intensifies 
her commitment, against all odds, to a peacetime workers’ revolution. That sense of 
hope lingers in Weil’s Les rapports franco-allemands.453 Although the atmosphere 
that Weil depicts could not have been more inauspicious— ‘uncertainty, ignorance, in 
blind anguish, amid rumours of panic, false news [and] alarmist noises’,454 chiefly 
because no one has access to or control over secret diplomacy, she supports the 
 
452 ‘L’honneur à défendre, c’est l’honneur de ceux qui sont au bas de l’échelle sociale contre les abus 
de pouvoir de ceux qui sont en haut. Il faut le défendre par la lutte sociale quotidienne, lutte qui 
n’implique pas l’emploi des tanks, des avions de bombardement. Un soi-disant honneur national 
commun aux oppresseurs et aux opprimés ne mérite pas une goutte de sang, encore moins des millions 
de cadavres’. Simone Weil, ‘Prestige national et honneur ouvrier’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, 
Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 45. 
453 The Franco-German reports. 
454 ‘Nous vivons dans l’incertitude, l’ignorance, dans une angoisse aveugle, au milieu de rumeurs de 
panique, des fausses nouvelles, des bruits alarmists’. Simone Weil, ‘Les rapports Franco-Allemands’, 
in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1989), p. 47. 
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formula of Léon Jouhaux, the C.G.T.’s president, that ‘peace is not defended by 
preventive war. It defends itself by means of peace’.455 Preventive war or threats of 
war are not be the best means of preserving peace and would not have succeeded 
against Hitler because his fascist regime depended on prestige. The National Socialists 
precipitated a war rather than losing prestige with their own people because, as Weil 
figured Germany is ‘a fascist country, whose government lives on a perpetual 
demagogy, whose leaders have great ambitions’.456 Consequently, negotiation deserve 
first consideration, no matter what the adversary’s internal orientation and foreign 
ambitions. Negotiation aims toward ‘a possible common ground of understanding’457 
with the awareness that ‘foreign nations are what they are, and not what we would like 
them to be’.458 Yet, while she signs a declaration in March 1938, Pour une négotiation 
immédiate459, supporting Neville Chamberlain’s conciliatory policy toward Germany, 
Les rapports franco-allemands demonstrates how far Weil is willing to negotiate and 
subvert her principles for the sake of peace. 
  
 
455 ‘La paix, a dit Jouhaux, ne se défend pas par la guerre préventive. Elle se défend par des moyens de 
paix’.  Simone Weil, ‘Les rapports Franco-Allemands’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers 
la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 48. 
456 ‘L’Allemagne étant ce qu’elle est, c’est-à-dire un pays fasciste, dont le gouvernement vit d’une 
démagogie perpétuelle, dont les dirigeants nourrissent de grandes ambitions.’ Simone Weil, ‘Les 
rapports Franco-Allemands’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 48. 
457 ‘Un terrain d’entente possible’. Simone Weil, ‘Les rapports Franco-Allemands’, in Écrits historiques 
et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 48. 
458 ‘Les nations étrangères sont ce qu’elles sont. Et non ce que nous voudrions qu’elles soient’. Simone 
Weil, ‘Les rapports Franco-Allemands’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, 
Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 48. 
459 For immediate negotiation. 
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4.5 The Power of Words 
 
Developing two of the anti-war arguments in her Réponse à une question d’Alain, 
Weil weaves them into a pragmatic discourse entitled, Ne recommençons pas la guerre 
de Troie.460 Inspired by the play of Jean Giraudoux, La guerre de Troie n’aura pas 
lieu461, the sub-title of the Nouveaux Cahiers essay is Le pouvoir des mots.462 Its thesis 
is that the destruction wrought by war is in inverse proportion to the official pretexts 
for fighting it. ‘The most threatening conflicts have a common character’, Weil states, 
in ‘that they do not have a definable objective’.463 The ten-year-long Trojan War was 
fought for a person about whom the participants, except perhaps for Paris, cared little 
or knew nothing of, indeed in Euripides’s version Helen is not even in Troy at the 
time. Despite Helen being held up as the objective, ‘it was merely the symbol of the 
true stake [that] nobody defined […] and […] could not be defined, for it did not 
exist’.464 In modern wars ‘it is words adorned with capital letters that play the role of 
Helen, [which] if we try to squeeze one of these words, swollen with blood and tears, 
we find it without content’.465 A critique of these abstract entities, which corresponded 
to no clear idea in the minds of those under their sway and whose analysis would show 
 
460 Simone Weil, ‘Ne recommençons pas la guerre de Troie’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome 
II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), pp. 49-66. 
461 The Trojan War will not take place. 
462 The power of words. 
463 ‘Les conflits les plus menaçants ont un caractère commun qui pourrait rassurer des esprits 
superficiels, mais qui, malgré l’apparence, en constitue le véritable danger; c’est qu’ils n’ont pas 
d’objectif définissable’. Simone Weil, ‘Ne recommençons pas la guerre de Troie’, in Écrits historiques 
et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 49. 
464 ‘Sa personne était si évidemment hors de proportion avec cette gigantesque bataille qu’aux yeux de 
tous elle constituait simplement le symbole du véritable enjeu; mais le véritable enjeu, personne ne le 
définissait et il ne pouvait être défini, car il n’existait pas’. Simone Weil, ‘Ne recommençons pas la 
guerre de Troie’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 50. 
465 ‘Pour nos contemporains, ce sont des mots ornés de majuscules qui jouent le rôle d’Hélène. Si nous 
saisissons, pour essayer de le serrer, un de ces mots tout gonflés de sang et de larmes, nous le trouvons 
sans contenu’. Simone Weil, ‘Ne recommençons pas la guerre de Troie’, in Écrits historiques et 
politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 51. 
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them to be much more relative, and therefore less dangerous, is found in Weil’s 
Réponse à une question d’Alain. However, there is a contradiction, or at the least a 
conflation, when she states that ‘a man who has been grossly insulted may need to 
fight in order to regain his self-respect’.466 Weil does not explicitly explain why self-
respect is no less swollen and bloated a word than that of either dignity or honour. It 
is probably fair to suggest that Weil might respond that an individual can chose what 
he wants to fight for. In opposition to her thinking, that one should not fight a war in 
the name of words beginning with capital letters, a country and its citizens can be faced 
by a country and its people declaring war also based on abstract entities and words 
beginning with capital letters. Not fighting a war from the bastion of capitals letters 
and bloated vacuous slogans does indeed have merit. However, this abstraction of the 
words, its demerits and the philosophical difference disappear when faced with actual 
armaments. The reasons for war, vacuous, abstract or otherwise, become redundant 
once the first shell whistles over the capital. One can theorise why one should not 
fight; this is not a defence, however. 
In this 1937 essay, she calls for clear thinking when rushing into war without 
rationally assessing the means, goals, and costs. She pursues her warning against 
abstract words, hollow in meaning, yet charged with emotion, which gain momentum 
when the prestige of one’s nation seems sullied. To make her point about the role 
played by manipulative words in accelerating a nation’s entry into conflicts, Weil 
repurposes the ancient classical tale: The Iliad. Along with dignity and honour, an 
example of a concept that needs demystifying is the idea of national interest and how 
it is the antagonism between capitalists which is the prime cause of war. For her, 
 
466 ‘Un homme outrage peut avoir besoin de se battre pour retrouver sa propre’. Simone Weil, 
‘Réponse à une question d’Alain’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière 
et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 330. 
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Anatole France’s467 view that ‘they think they die for their country […]; they die for 
industrialists’468 is too optimistic; ‘one does not even die for something as substantial, 
as tangible as an industrialist’.469 The economic interests of capitalists increasingly 
overstep national boundaries and, in any case, what is really meant by the national 
interest of a country is not what gives life to its citizens but what gives it the means to 
fight war. If countries are divided by a real opposition of interest, then a compromise 
should be possible. But 
when economic and political interests have no meaning apart from war, how can they be 
peacefully reconciled? It is the very concept of the nation that needs to be suppressed — or 
rather, the manner in which the word is used. For the word national and the expressions of 
which it forms part are empty of all meaning; their only content is millions of corpses, and 
orphans and disabled men, and tears and despair.470 
Language can determine interests and defuse passions, but Weil recognises that 
phantom words have people behind them and that power exists as a social function. If 
power is inherently unstable and held arbitrarily, Weil argues that it must be cloaked 
in prestige and authority to sustain the illusion that it is absolute. Maintaining this 
facade is costly and absurd, especially in international relations, where whole systems 
of prestige become competitive. ‘Another admirable example of bloody absurdity is 
 
467 Anatole France, pseudonym of Jacques-Anatole-François Thibault (born April 16, 1844, Paris, 
France—died Oct. 12, 1924, Saint-Cyr-sur-Loire), was a writer and ironic, sceptical, and urbane critic 
who was considered in his day the ideal French man of letters. He was elected to the French Academy 
in 1896 and was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1921. 
468 ‘On croit mourir pour la patrie, disait Anatole France; on meurt pour des industriels’. Simone Weil, 
‘Ne recommençons pas la guerre de Troie’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, 
Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 53. 
469 ‘On ne meurt même pas pour quelque chose d’aussi substantiel, d’aussi tangible qu’un industriel’. 
Simone Weil, ‘Ne recommençons pas la guerre de Troie’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: 
Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 53. 
470 ‘Mais quand les intérêts économiques et politiques n’ont de sens qu’en vue de la guerre, comment 
les concilier d’une manière pacifique? C’est la notion même de nation qu’il faudrait supprimer. Ou 
plutôt c’est l’usage de ce mot: car le mot national et les expressions dont il fait partie sont vides de toute 
signification, ils n’ont pour contenu que les millions de cadavres, les orphelins, les mutilés, le désespoir, 
les larmes’. Simone Weil, ‘Ne recommençons pas la guerre de Troie’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, 
Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 54. 
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the opposition between Fascism and communism’,471 Weil states, which underlines 
the tense political situation that meant possible civil and probable world war. 
There are no two nations whose structure is more similar than Germany and Russia, who 
threaten each other with an international crusade and pretend to each take the other for the 
Beast of the Apocalypse. Therefore, one can safely say that the opposition between fascism 
and communism has absolutely no meaning.472 
For Weil, the only victory that either side an incur is the extermination of the other 
side, as she states, ‘the anti-Fascist position was that anything was better than Fascism 
— anything, including Fascism, so long as it was called communism, and the anti-
communist position was that anything was better than communism — including 
communism itself, so long as it was labelled Fascism’.473 Mired in meaninglessness, 
the phantom of Helen has a substantial reality in comparison to such non-existent 
distinctions. Even the opposition between democracy and dictatorship, although a real 
opposition, losses much of its force if these words do not represent some discrete 
entity, but as criteria for measuring the characteristics of a given social structure.  
Democracy was no more inherent in France than dictatorship was in Germany 
and that both were the result of a determinate situation open to analysis and change. 
Weil states: ‘there is nowhere either absolute dictatorship or absolute democracy, the 
social organism is always and everywhere a compound of democracy and dictatorship, 
 
471 ‘Un autre exemple admirable d’absurdité sanglante, c’est l’opposition entre fascisme et 
communisme. Le fait que cette opposition détermine aujourd’hui pour nous une double menace de 
guerre civile et de guerre mondiale est peut-être le symptôme de carence intellectuelle le plus grave 
parmi tous ceux que nous pouvons constater autour de nous’. Simone Weil, ‘Ne recommençons pas la 
guerre de Troie’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 54. 
472 ‘Il n’y a pas deux nations dont la structure soit plus semblable que l’Allemagne et la Russie, qui se 
menacent mutuellement d’une croisade internationale et feignent chacune de prendre l’autre pour la 
Bête de l’Apocalypse. C’est pourquoi on peut affirmer sans crainte que l’opposition entre fascisme et 
communisme n’a rigoureusement aucun sens’. Simone Weil, ‘Ne recommençons pas la guerre de 
Troie’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1989), p. 55. 
473 ‘La position des antifascistes, c’est: Tout plutôt que le fascisme; tout, y compris le fascisme sous le 
nom de communisme. La position des anticommunistes, c’est: Tout plutôt que le communisme; tout, y 
compris le communisme sous le nom de fascisme’. Simone Weil, ‘Ne recommençons pas la guerre de 
Troie’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1989), p. 55. 
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with different degrees.’474 The climate of opinion is and was opposed to such analysis. 
If anyone were to suggest an armistice in the Spanish Civil War, the suggestion might 
be greeted with derision on both sides, in that 
each of them has unconsciously lost sight of his ideal and replaced it by an entity without 
substance; for each, the victory of what he still calls his idea can no longer mean anything 
except the extermination of the enemy; and each of them will scorn any suggestion of peace, 
replying to it with the same knock-out argument as Minerva in Homer and Poincaré in 1917: 
‘the dead do not wish it’.475 
In all human conflict, Weil claims, the only legitimate and serious one is class struggle. 
Yet, while it is a struggle of the oppressed against their oppression and not a war, it 
can result in a compromise and a new balance of forces. War for Weil is the 
manipulation of emotion-laden words flaunted as absolutes: democracy, tyranny, 
communism, capitalism, nation, security, authority, order, and freedom. These words 
did not exist as absolutes. Sometimes democracy is tyrannical, some communism 
requires capitalism. Weil construes the role of the abducted Helen as analogous to 
these empty mobilising words. When the Greeks were tempted to return home, Homer 
evokes the sacrifices of the Greeks’ dead compatriots, as if to suggest that the war 
cannot be stopped because the dead did not wish it. Stabbing at Poincaré, who in 1917 
used the same argument, she recounts that reasonable warriors on each side propose 
reasonable conditions for ending the Trojan War, but each time someone burst forth 
with an emotional tirade, clamouring for victory, war trophies, courage, heroes and 
 
474 ‘Il est clair qu’il n’y a nulle part ni dictature absolue ni démocratie absolue, mais que l’organisme 
social est toujours et partout un composé de démocratie et de dictature, avec des degrés différents; il est 
clair aussi que le degré de la démocratie se définit par les rapports qui lient les différents rouages de la 
machine sociale, et dépend des conditions qui déterminent le fonctionnement de cette machine; c’est 
donc sur ces rapports et sur ces conditions qu’il faut essayer d’agir’. Simone Weil, ‘Ne recommençons 
pas la guerre de Troie’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 56. 
475 ‘Chacun des deux a perdu son idéal sans s’en apercevoir, en lui substituant une entité vide; pour 
chacun des deux, la victoire de ce qu’il nomme encore son idée ne peut plus se définir que par 
l’extermination de l’adversaire; et chacun des deux, si on lui parle de paix, répondra avec mépris par 
l’argument-massue, l’argument de Minerve dans Homère, l’argument de Poincaré en 1917: Les morts 
ne le veulent pas’. Simone Weil, ‘Ne recommençons pas la guerre de Troie’, in Écrits historiques et 
politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 57. 
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honour. ‘To push humankind to the most absurd catastrophes’, writes Weil, ‘neither 
gods nor secret conspiracies are needed. Human nature suffices’.476 For Weil, Homer’s 
tale highlights humankind’s inability to deal rationally with force. She inveighs against 
the inability to apply elementary methods of reasonable thought to crucial social 
dilemmas. Though, she writes: 
our science is a storehouse of the most refined intellectual mechanisms to solve the most 
complex problems, [modern civilisation] is almost incapable of applying the elementary 
methods of reasonable thought. In all fields we seem to have lost the notions of limit, measure, 
degree, proportion, relationship, ratio, condition, necessary link, connection between means 
and ends.477 
Without the gauge of specified attainable goals, people lose sight of their own best 
interest. Even those in power do not imagine the wheel of fate turning against them, 
no matter how far they overextend their reach. Weil insists that for present-day 
problems one could not blame gods or international capitalist trusts or any other 
scapegoat: the fault rests with human nature. 
To clarify notions, discredit words congenitally empty, define the use of others through precise 
analysis, is, as strange as it might appear, a labour that could save innumerable human lives. 
(But) our era seems to be inept at this task.478 
Any decision made for or against war requires reliance on explicit methods of 
evaluating the potential impacts of war and all its alternatives. Although dictatorship 
and democracy might appear to be opposites in the extent of order and freedom, they 
 
476 ‘Mais pour acculer les hommes aux catastrophes les plus absurdes, il n’est besoin ni de dieux ni de 
conjurations secrètes. La nature humaine suffit’. Simone Weil, ‘Ne recommençons pas la guerre de 
Troie’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1989), p. 51. 
477 ‘Notre science contient comme dans un magasin les mécanismes intellectuels les plus raffinés pour 
résoudre les problèmes les plus complexes, mais nous sommes presque incapables d’appliquer les 
méthodes élémentaires de la pensée raisonnable. En tout domaine nous semblons avoir perdu les notions 
de limite, de mesure, de degré, de proportion, de relation, de rapport, de condition, de liaison nécessaire, 
de connexion entre moyens and résultants’. Simone Weil, ‘Ne recommençons pas la guerre de Troie’, 
in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1989), pp. 51-52. 
478 ‘Éclaircir les notions, discréditer les mots congénitalement vides, définir l’usage des autres par des 
analyses précises, c’est là, si étrange que cela puisse paraître, un travail qui pourrait préserver des 
existences humaines. Ce travail, notre époque y semble à peu près inapte’. Simone Weil, ‘Ne 
recommençons pas la guerre de Troie’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, 
Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 51. 
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imply that the two terms have significance only in relation to a social structure. Nations 
that are democratic have elements of tight control over behaviour, even though they 
enjoy a high degree of liberty, and dictatorships carry a heavy burden of historic 
baggage that affects the amount of control a despot could exploit. While an adversary 
needs to consider how a dictatorship might be altered without resorting to war, citizens 
of a democracy need to realise that war mobilisation entails severe restriction of 
freedoms. People could find themselves living in an increasingly totalitarian state even 
as they fight to defend their freedom against outsiders. As a temporary sacrifice, such 
a situation might be accepted with enough goodwill, but the vital danger is that 
despotic conditions become permanent. In Weil’s choice of arguments, one reads 
alarm for her countrymen when they face the likelihood of defending their homeland 
by force. She wants them to evaluate carefully all that they stand to lose. 
Fresh from her activism against oppressive internal working conditions, Weil 
argues that basic principles of class struggle apply to conflicts in general, including 
those between nations. Since there is always social tension in relationships between 
groups within a society as well as between societies, there is a constant level of distrust 
between those holding power and those with little or none. She knew that a balance 
between those who command and those who obeyed could never be stable, nor should 
it be. By the nature of things, each side grapples continually to retain or achieve more 
power. Those on top of the ladder strive to maintain the status quo. Those on the lowest 
rungs fight to keep their basic rights as human beings. This contest is endless, but it is 
not war. Society’s delicate balance of powers needs to be constantly realigned, and 
methods need to be found to re-order ever-shifting relationships of stronger and 
weaker groups without resorting to violence. A parallel should exist in international 
relations between stronger and weaker nations. Nations endure an ever-present 
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instability involving perceived power and prestige, just as workers must unflinchingly 
insist on their dignity as contributing members of society. 
Weil recognises that force succeeds force in a spiral without end unless people 
come to their senses. In her observation, all modern nations seek to avoid the loss of 
prestige by improving their ability to wage war. This competition sets in motion the 
ludicrous cycle of going to war to conserve and increase the means to wage war: that 
is, the manpower, resources, and armaments. France had unscrupulously risked war 
over Morocco in 1911, not for necessities, but their ability to keep the French economy 
viable due to Morocco’s raw materials, jobs, and human labour, who were exploited 
in both world wars. 
What a country calls vital economic interest is not what enables its citizens to live, it is what 
allows it to make war; oil is much more likely to provoke international conflicts than wheat. 
Thus, when war is waged, it is to preserve or to increase the means of making it. The whole of 
international politics revolves around this vicious circle. What is called national prestige 
consists in acting in such a way as always to give the impression to the other countries that 
eventually one is sure of defeating them, in order to demoralise them. What is called national 
security is a chimerical state of affairs in which the possibility of war can be preserved by 
depriving all other countries. All in all, a self-respecting nation is ready for anything, including 
war, rather than forsake the eventual war.479 
National leaders subscribe to the hallucinatory goal of having the means to wage war, 
even though the expensive arms race belittled human life. Weil suggests that carefully 
considering the word nation would uncover ‘the millions of cadavers, the orphans, the 
mutilated [as well as] despair and tears’480 and that the use of the word should be 
 
479 ‘Ce qu’un pays appelle intérêt économique vital, ce n’est pas ce qui permet à ses citoyens de vivre, 
c’est ce qui lui permet de faire la guerre; le pétrole est bien plus propre à susciter les conflits 
internationaux que le blé. Ainsi, quand on fait la guerre, c’est pour conserver ou pour accroître les 
moyens de la faire. Toute la politique internationale roule autour de ce cercle vicieux. Ce qu’on nomme 
prestige national consiste à agir de manière à toujours donner l’impression aux autres pays 
qu’éventuellement on est sûr de les vaincre, afin de les démoraliser. Ce qu’on nomme sécurité nationale, 
c’est un état de choses chimérique où l’on conserverait la possibilité de faire la guerre en privant tous 
les autres pays. Somme toute, une nation qui se respecte est prête à tout, y compris la guerre, plutôt que 
de renoncer à faire éventuellement la guerre’. Simone Weil, ‘Ne recommençons pas la guerre de Troie’, 
in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1989), p. 54. 
480 ‘C’est la notion même de nation qu’il faudrait supprimer. Ou plutôt c’est l’usage de ce mot: car le 
mot national et les expressions dont il fait partie sont vides de toute signification, ils n’ont pour contenu 
que les millions de cadavres, les orphelins, les mutilés, le désespoir, les larmes’. Simone Weil, ‘Ne 
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challenged. She had no illusion that either unilateral disarmament or general 
disarmament is even conceivable, but she did want people to deal honestly with an 
essential contradiction in social relationships, in that they 
rest on a parity of forces, a balance of pressures analogous to that of fluids. Different countries’ 
prestige cannot be equated; prestige has no limits; all pretensions of prestige detract from the 
prestige and dignity of others. Consequently, all prestige is inseparable from power.481 
Absurdly striving to maintain a nation’s prestige could lead to its destruction if candid 
rationality is not brought to bear on the facts of the situation. The Trojan War serves 
as Weil’s framework to reflect contemporary social, political and economic struggles, 
and their relation to questions of war and violence, as well as the use of inflammatory 
political language that pushes citizens toward war. Therefore, to minimise their 
exposure to war, people need to discern between the real conditions of their lives, 
which involves the struggle for dignity, and their elusive dreams of prestigious power 
over others. At this juncture pacifist conciliation still made more obvious sense to Weil 
rather than meeting force with force. In the final section of her essay, she tries to 
establish the relationship of these empty abstractions with real life. Clearly every 
abstraction relates to a social group aiming at power. At the centre of power is the 
illusion of prestige, without which power would become even less stable than it is. 
Priam and Hector could not have returned Helen to the Greeks without giving the 
impression of weakness, which would have invited attack from the Greeks or even 
their own subjects.482 The result is that force ‘seems to be an impasse from which 
 
recommençons pas la guerre de Troie’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, 
Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 54. 
481 ‘La contradiction essentielle à la société humaine, c’est que toute situation sociale repose sur un 
équilibre de forces, un équilibre de pressions analogue à l’équilibre des fluides; mais les prestiges, eux, 
ne s’équilibrent pas, le prestige ne comporte pas de limites, toute satisfaction de prestige est une atteinte 
au prestige ou à la dignité d’autrui. Or le prestige est inséparable du pouvoir’. Simone Weil, ‘Ne 
recommençons pas la guerre de Troie’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, 
Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 65. 
482 ‘Si Priam et Hector avaient rendu Hélène aux Grecs, ils auraient risqué de leur inspirer d’autant plus 
le désir de saccager une ville apparemment si mal préparée à se défendre; ils auraient risqué aussi un 
soulèvement général à Troie; non pas parce que la restitution d’Hélène aurait indigné les Troyens, mais 
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humanity can only escape by some miracle’.483 The real problems of contemporary 
politics are obscured by a swarm of vacuous entities or abstractions and ‘to sweep 
away these entities from every department of political and social life is an urgently 
necessary measure of public hygiene’.484 Above all, it was and still is necessary to 
seek international peace without opposing the legitimate claims of the 
underprivileged: ‘What is required is discrimination between the imaginary and the 
real, so as to diminish the risks of war, without interfering with the struggle between 
forces which, according to Heraclitus, is the condition of life itself’.485 Weil’s 
conclusion is in keeping with the pacifist, internationalist sentiment at the time. 
By the time her essay is published, Weil is in Switzerland en route for Italy, 
and while it did little to improve her health, the journey marks the beginning of the 
metaphysical development in her thinking. Returning to a France grappling with its 
transition to a second-rank power, who had always believed itself both the terror and 
the darling of the world, the Popular Front government fell. Although Blum continued 
to be Vice-President, in Weil’s view the Popular Front, although continuing in name, 
was dead. Weil delivers her post-mortem Méditations sur un cadavre.486 Insisting on 
the paramount role of imagination in politics, stating that ‘imagination is always the 
 
parce qu’elle leur aurait donné à penser que les hommes auxquels ils obéissaient n’étaient pas tellement 
puissants’. Simone Weil, ‘Ne recommençons pas la guerre de Troie’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, 
Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 64. 
483 ‘Il semble qu’il y ait là une impasse dont l’humanité ne puisse sortir que par miracle. Mais la vie 
humaine est faite de miracles’. Simone Weil, ‘Ne recommençons pas la guerre de Troie’, in Écrits 
historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 
1989), p. 65. 
484 ‘La chasse aux entités dans tous les domaines de la vie politique et sociale est une œuvre urgente de 
salubrité publique’. Simone Weil, ‘Ne recommençons pas la guerre de Troie’, in Écrits historiques et 
politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), pp. 65-66. 
485 ‘Il ne s’agit pas d’immobiliser artificiellement des rapports de force essentiellement variables, et que 
ceux qui souffrent chercheront toujours à faire varier; il s’agit de discriminer l’imaginaire et le réel pour 
diminuer les risques de guerre sans renoncer à la lutte, dont Héraclite disait qu’elle est la condition de 
la vie’. Simone Weil, ‘Ne recommençons pas la guerre de Troie’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, 
Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 66. 
486 Reflections on a corpse. 
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fabric of social life and the dynamic of history’,487 she criticises Blum for not building 
on the reforming sentiment unleashed by the Popular Front’s victory a year earlier. 
Intelligent and sincere though she thought he was, he had not managed to appreciate 
that ‘the material of the political art is the double perspective, ever shifting between 
the real conditions of social equilibrium and the movements of collective 
imagination’.488 Machiavelli is a better teacher here than Marx, and writing in a variant 
for Méditations, Weil states that anyone acceding to power should take harsh measures 
immediately since 
the fundamental principle of power and political action is that the appearance of weakness 
should never be presented. Force is not only feared, but at the same time always a little loved, 
even by those who violently bend under it; weakness not only is not feared, but always inspires 
a little contempt and repulsion even to those that it favors. There is no more bitter truth, and 
that is why it is generally unrecognised. […] [i]t is generally believed that men are determined 
according to reasoning either on justice, or on their interest; in reality the empire of force 
shapes sovereignly feelings and thoughts.489 
In Méditations sur un cadavre we read Weil’s apathetic strain towards the political 
system, much like the end of Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression 
sociale that questions syndicalism’s ability to effect change. These considerations are 
equally valid for economics, though. Contrary to popular opinion, economies seldom 
collapse. Yet, unsound economic conditions undermine the prestige of power so 
 
487 ‘L’imagination est toujours le tissu de la vie sociale et le moteur de l’histoire’. Simone Weil, 
‘Méditations sur un cadavre’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 74. 
488 ‘La matière propre de l’art politique, c’est la double perspective, toujours instable, des conditions 
réelles d’équilibre social et des mouvements d’imagination collective’. Simone Weil, ‘Méditations sur 
un cadavre’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 76. 
489 ‘Le principe fondamental du pouvoir et de toute action politique, c’est qu’il ne faut jamais présenter 
l’apparence de la faiblesse. La force se fait non seulement craindre, mais en même temps toujours un 
peu aimer, même par ceux qu’elle fait violemment plier sous elle; la faiblesse non seulement n’est pas 
redoutée, mais inspire toujours un peu de mépris et de répulsion même à ceux qu’elle favorise. Il n’y a 
pas de vérité plus amère, et c’est pourquoi elle est généralement méconnue. Sylla, après son abdication, 
a vécu en parfait sécurité dans cette Rome où il avait fait couler tant de sang; les Gracques ont péri 
lâchement abandonnés par cette multitude à qui ils avaient voué leur vie on croit généralement que les 
hommes se déterminent d’après des raisonnements soit sur la justice, soit sur leur intérêt; en réalité 
l’empire de la force façonne souverainement sentiments et pensées’. Simone Weil, ‘Méditations sur un 
cadavre’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 290. 
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important for securing popular obedience. This bitter truth had been neglected by 
Blum, who succumbed to the common failings of social democracy: excellent 
intentions but lacking the touch of cynicism essential for perspicacity. Weil recounts 
this failing: 
For there is a political art. The dictators know this; nothing more refined than the manner in 
which Mussolini governed, or even Hitler, or even Stalin. Democrats are unaware of this, at 
least in France. […] Our left-wing men, and particularly our Socialists, govern as if the choice 
of the moment, the order of succession in the measures taken, the manner of presenting the 
measures, and so many other similar things did not matter in politics.490 
In March 1938, German troops entered Vienna; the Anschluss with Austria is the 
result. Weil immediately joins other anti-Fascist intellectuals in signing a petition 
published by Feuilles libres de la quinzaine that declares ‘however distasteful it may 
seem, Chamberlain’s policy,  inasmuch as it endeavours to put a stop to the deadly 
armaments race, is actually the only one that by means of effective negotiation makes 
an attempt to bring about the pacification of Europe’.491 Weil’s recourse to the word 
only is an ideological limitation on the subject. There are several variations of choice 
between doing nothing and declaring war. Already stating that Germany is a fascist 
state, in her syndicalist years Weil expresses concern with the oppression faced by the 
German factory workers. The declaration that Weil signs calls upon 
 
 
 
490 ‘Car il y a un art politique. Les dictateurs le savent; rien de plus raffiné que la manière dont gouverne 
Mussolini, ou même Hitler, ou même Staline. Les démocrates l’ignorent, du moins en France, car il se 
peut que par exemple Roosevelt ne l’ignore pas. Nos hommes de gauche, et particulièrement nos 
socialistes, gouvernent comme si le choix du moment, l’ordre de succession dans les mesures prises, la 
manière de présenter les mesures, et tant d’autres choses analogues n’importaient pas en politique’. 
Simone Weil, ‘Méditations sur un cadavre’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, 
Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), pp. 288-289. 
491 ‘Il faut le dire, si déplaisant que cela paraisse: la politique de M. Chamberlain — pour autant qu’elle 
s’efforcera d’aboutir à un arrêt de la mortelle course aux armements — est actuellement la seule qui, 
par une négociation effective, tente enfin une pacification de l’Europe’. Simone Weil, ‘Pour une 
négociation immédiate’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 79. 
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the French government to join in this action resolutely, and that once a first international 
détente is achieved, it guides the negotiation, in accordance with the popular will, towards a 
just settlement of European and colonial conflicts, condition and starting point of a progressive 
and controlled disarmament.492 
She is, however, decrying the French Government of 1936 at the same time, who were 
brief among all those whose good intentions pave the hell [sic]. People of this character, when 
they meddle in action, are often treated as pure theorists; but they sin on the contrary by 
insufficient theory. They have neglected to meditate on the matter and the instruments proper 
to their art.493 
Weil is willing to concede a German hegemony in Europe, if it avoids war. To deter 
the enemy, she suggests in Réflexions sur la conférence de Bouché494 that the political 
and economic decentralisation that is proposed as a defence against air attack could be 
carried further: 
A certain form of resistance, which would be more guerrilla than warlike […] not to form 
fronts, not to lay siege to cities; to harass the enemy, to hinder his communications, to attack 
him always where he does not expect it, to demoralise him, and stimulate resistance by a series 
of tiny but victorious actions.495 
Such a form of national defence, centred on the people and not on the state, could 
revive the true spirit of the nation. Decidedly changing tack from her pacifist position 
in view of warfare, yet not advocating for physical force, Weil underlines the problem 
 
492 ‘Nous réclamons du gouvernement français qu’il se joigne résolument à cette action, et qu’une fois 
réalisée ainsi une première détente internationale, il oriente la négociation, conformément à la volonté 
populaire, vers un juste règlement d’ensemble des conflits européens et coloniaux, condition et point 
de départ d’un désarmement progressif et contrôlé’. Simone Weil, ‘Pour une négociation immédiate’, 
in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1989), p. 79. 
493 ‘On a porté, on portera sur l’équipe gouvernementale de juin 1936 bien des jugements injustes par 
trop d’hostilité ou de faveur; peut-être l’appréciation la plus juste consisterait-elle à les ranger parmi 
ces architectes qui ne savent faire que des dessins fort agréables sur le papier, mais non conformes aux 
lois des matériaux de construction; ou parmi ces poètes qui ne savent écrire que des projets de poèmes 
rédigés en prose; ou parmi ces auteurs dramatiques dont les œuvres font de l’effet sous forme de livres, 
mais ne passent jamais la rampe; bref parmi tous ceux dont les bonnes intentions pavent l’enfer [sic]. 
Les gens de ce caractère, quand ils se mêlent d’agir, sont souvent traités de purs théoriciens; mais ils 
pêchent au contraire par insuffisance de théorie. Ils ont négligé de méditer sur la matière et les 
instruments propres à leur art’. Simone Weil, ‘Méditations sur un cadavre’, in Écrits historiques et 
politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 289. 
494 Reflections on Bouche’s lecture. 
495 ‘Une certaine décentralisation étant supposée, la technique moderne rend, il me semble, possible, 
notamment par la rapidité des communications, une certaine forme de résistance qui tiendrait plus de la 
guérilla que de la guerre. Ne pas constituer de fronts, ne pas assiéger de villes; harceler l’ennemi, 
entraver ses communications, l’attaquer toujours là où il ne s’y attend pas, le démoraliser et stimuler la 
résistance par une série d’actions infimes, mais victorieuses’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions sur la 
conférence de Bouché’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 88. 
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in her thought. Outlining the decentralisation of political and social life along with the 
resistance, she states ‘decentralisation of a possible armed resistance, which one 
should always consider that in the natural course of things it must not have to 
happen’.496 It is often the case that elements of thought and theories are not scrutinised 
in the natural course of things. Few could have conceived the devastation that would 
be wreaked on Europe. For all Weil’s understanding of Greek and Roman mythology 
and war and the Russian and French Revolutions and their consequences, in effect, 
few were willing to countenance that Germany might again attempt to expand its 
territories. When Weil finally abandons her pacifist approach, it is in recognition of a 
force that she had not yet contemplated. 
  
 
496 ‘Décentralisation de la vie politique, économique et sociale en France, dispersion des 
agglomérations, union de la vie urbaine et de la vie rurale; mais aussi décentralisation d’une résistance 
armée éventuelle, dont on devra toujours considérer que dans le cours naturel des choses elle ne doit 
pas avoir à se produire’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions sur la conférence de Bouché’, in Écrits historiques 
et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 88. 
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4.6 The Tipping Point of Pacifism  
 
At this stage, Weil’s pacifism still held a central place in her thinking. I believe that 
she is certain that rationality can thwart the fast-approaching war. She floats her last 
proposal for conciliation, which causes deep remorse later. After annexing Austria to 
Germany, Hitler looked to Czechoslovakia for his next capture. In her 1938 article, 
L’Europe en guerre pour la Tchécoslovaquie?497 Weil argues for ceding 
Czechoslovakia to Germany. Whilst acknowledging that rights figure in every 
international issue, she is willing to accept a German hegemony in Europe. 
Czechoslovakian submission to Hitler is an obvious injustice, but so is the submission 
of the Sudeten Germans to Czechoslovakia: 
That simply proves that the right of peoples to order their own lives meets an obstacle in the 
nature of things, by the fact that the three maps of Europe, the physical, economic, and 
ethnographic, do not coincide.498 
Weil proposes that Hitler should be given rights over Sudetenland. Finally sensing that 
conflagration would be so terrible, Weil concedes that certain injustices could preserve 
many individuals and cultures from excessive harm. I can understand Weil’s 
reasoning, but even without assessing her decision in hindsight, I believe this is the 
most damning indictment of Weil. It is debatable, if not unknowable, whether 
aggressive acts or war or taking a life is necessarily wrong. But she is willing to 
concede the definite loss of some people’s short-term rights for the profit of a possible 
longer-term peace. Prime facie Weil is contradicting herself. Why are the rights of 
some people less important? She wants to believe that her fellow human beings, 
 
497 Europe at war for Czechoslovakia? 
498 ‘Sans doute; mais le statu quo, d’autre part, est une injustice infligée aux Sudètes; cela prouve 
simplement que le droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes rencontre un obstacle dans la nature des 
choses, du fait que les trois cartes physique, économique et ethnographique de l’Europe ne coïncident 
pas’. Simone Weil, ‘L’Europe en guerre pour la Tchécoslovaquie?’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, 
Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 82. 
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envisioning the inevitable dire consequences of violence, would go to extremes to 
avoid war. I argue that she inverts the foundations of her earlier thinking on 
oppression. It is one thing to suggest that oppression can only be mitigated, but she 
accepts that some should suffer oppression worse than others. She railed against 
France’s hypocrisy and inconsistency, and failure to support the Rights of Man 
doctrine, yet propositioned the concession of part of Czechoslovakia and its peoples.  
Reasoning that war and ways to circumvent it need to be honestly calculated, 
she argues that military aggression is not only the least desirable response but also the 
costliest. Weil finally wades into the realm of economics. Instead of counting coin, 
she counts coffins. Her formula for causing the least possible harm also sanctions 
grave injustices. Given that the stakes were extremely high, she held all aspects of the 
dilemma up to the harsh light of logic, asking, should France send her sons to their 
death for an incoherent principle or instead accept a humiliating erosion of her 
prestige? I do not disagree with this sentiment. I do, however, disagree that some 
(Czechoslovakian) people (and their rights) should be sacrificed so this position can 
be held. 
The Czechoslovakian question can be considered from four points of view. 
From the point of view of rights, the Sudeten Germans had a certain right to self-
determination. If it was exercised and they became a part of Germany then, because 
the geographic, economic and ethnographic maps of Europe did not coincide, the 
probable result would be that Czechoslovakia would become a German satellite. But 
it might still be able to preserve its culture, its language, and its national characteristics. 
Remarkably, because the National Socialist ideology ‘is purely racist; it is only 
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universal if it is anti-communist and anti-Semitic’,499 and if a German hegemony in 
Europe simply required France to take measures against its communists and Jews, the 
price would not be considered too costly. The Czechoslovakians, Weil states, 
can ban the Communist Party and exclude Jews from somewhat less important functions 
without losing anything from their national life. In short, injustice for injustice, since there 
must be one in every way, let us choose the one that is least likely to bring a war.500 
She self-deceptively assumes that the safeguard of their culture, language, and ethnic 
characteristics could be assured. Weil, however, is not clear whether it is the 
Czechoslovakian or Jewish culture that could be safeguarded. This hypothetical 
concession, entirely inconsistent with her method of first evaluating objectively all 
possible alternatives and then imagining their consequences, became a source of deep 
dismay for her when Hitler’s full aggressive intentions became evident. 
Secondly, the balance of power would then shift towards Germany. But ‘if one 
country must dominate the centre of Europe, it is in the nature of things that it will be 
Germany’.501 Weil questions, ‘why is the possibility of German hegemony worse than 
French hegemony?’502 Without answering, instead asserting that in the long run 
hegemony always weakens the country that achieve it, she states: 
 
 
 
499 ‘L’idéologie national-socialiste est purement raciste; elle n’a d’universel que l’anticommunisme et 
l’antisémitisme’. Simone Weil, ‘L’Europe en guerre pour la Tchécoslovaquie?’, in Écrits historiques 
et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 82. 
500 ‘Les Tchèques peuvent interdire le parti communiste et exclure les Juifs des fonctions quelque peu 
importantes, sans perdre quoi que ce soit de leur vie nationale. Bref, injustice pour injustice, puisqu’il 
doit y en avoir une de toutes manières, choisissons celle qui risque le moins d’amener une guerre’. 
Simone Weil, ‘L’Europe en guerre pour la Tchécoslovaquie?’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome 
II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), pp. 82-83. 
501 ‘S’il doit y avoir une hégémonie au centre de l’Europe, il est dans la nature des choses que ce soit 
une hégémonie allemande. La force est du côté de l’Allemagne’. Simone Weil, ‘L’Europe en guerre 
pour la Tchécoslovaquie?’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 83. 
502 ‘Au reste, pourquoi une hégémonie allemande est-elle une éventualité pire qu’une hégémonie 
française?’. Simone Weil, ‘L’Europe en guerre pour la Tchécoslovaquie?’, in Écrits historiques et 
politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 83. 
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Germany is ‘totalitarian’, it is true. But political regimes are unstable; in thirty years, France 
and Germany, who can say which will be a dictatorship, which a democracy? Right now, a 
German hegemony would be suffocating. But could it be more, I’m not saying than a war, but 
than the present peace, with the maddening nervous tension, the siege mentality, and the 
material and moral impoverishment to which we are increasingly subjected?503 
This line of thinking bears little resemblance to Weil’s syndicalism. There is no 
consideration for the oppressed proletariat. She states that because ‘both the 
acquisition of hegemony and the weakening that follows from it have always, if I am 
not mistaken, been brought about by wars. If this time the same process could take 
place without war – would not that be real progress?’504 Stipulating that France or 
Europe should conform to a totalitarian regime in the hope that hegemonies 
historically weaken at some point, Weil fails to consider events in Russia and more 
recently in Germany. 
Thirdly, that treaty obligations are not considered as overriding in international 
relations as ‘even a formal promise does not constitute, in international matters, 
sufficient grounds for action’.505 There are shades of WWI in this consideration. It is, 
however, suffice to suggest that honouring commitments on an international stage 
merit serious consideration. Fourthly and most importantly, the essential question is 
whether the chances for peace would be improved if France and Britain guaranteed 
the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia. Weil saw only two choices: 
 
503 ‘L’Allemagne est « totalitaire », il est vrai. Mais les régimes politiques sont instables; dans trente 
ans, de la France et de l’Allemagne, qui peut dire laquelle sera une dictature, laquelle une démocratie? 
En ce moment, une hégémonie allemande serait étouffante. Mais pourrait-elle l’être plus, je ne dis 
même pas qu’une guerre, mais que la paix, avec la tension nerveuse, affolante, l’esprit d’état de siège, 
l’appauvrissement matériel et moral que nous y subissons de plus en plus?’. Simone Weil, ‘L’Europe 
en guerre pour la Tchécoslovaquie?’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, 
Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), pp. 83-84. 
504 ‘Seulement, jusqu’ici, l’acquisition de l’hégémonie, puis l’affaiblissement qui en résulte se sont 
toujours accomplis, sauf erreur, au moyen de guerres. Si le même processus pouvait, cette fois, avoir 
lieu sans guerre, ne serait-ce pas le vrai progrès?’. Simone Weil, ‘L’Europe en guerre pour la 
Tchécoslovaquie?’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 84. 
505 ‘Mais un engagement même formel ne constitue pourtant pas, en matière internationale, une raison 
suffisante d’agir’. Simone Weil, ‘L’Europe en guerre pour la Tchécoslovaquie?’, in Écrits historiques 
et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 84. 
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either France or England declare that they will go to war to maintain Czechoslovakia’s 
integrity, or they openly agree to a transformation of the Czechoslovakian state that would 
satisfy the main German aims. Apart from these two choices, there can only be terrible 
humiliations, or war, or probably both. It is obvious to me that the second choice is infinitely 
preferable.506 
Although she countenances a government oppressing Jews and communists, she does 
not want a French government making France an armed camp on perpetual alert. The 
hope of containing Germany by exerting such a counterforce would be a political and 
psychological disaster, and the end of freedom and democracy. I believe that Weil is 
undertaking a considerable negotiation with her pacifist position so that it might stay 
intact. I argue that it directly contradicts her position as defender of the oppressed. To 
further weaken her stance, she states: 
It is true that the satisfaction of Germany’s demands in Czechoslovakia would bring down all 
Central Europe under its influence. This leads us to another point of view, that of the 
relationship of the forces. It is no longer a question of the law.507 
Although Weil came to bitterly regret her attitude, it certainly seems to follow both 
from her previous views and from the pacifist attitudes of a large part of the non-
Communist Left. From her days at Henri-IV and the École Normale she, in common 
with many of her fellow pupils, abhors flag-waving patriotism. Like most intellectuals 
of her generation, she believes that resistance to Fascism and resistance to war went 
hand in hand and views war in the larger context of the sufferings and oppression that 
it would entail for the mass of the people. How far Weil’s positions shifts captures the 
 
506 ‘Ou la France et l’Angleterre se déclarent décidées à la guerre pour en maintenir l’intégrité, ou elles 
acceptent publiquement une transformation de l’Etat tchécoslovaque propre à satisfaire les principales 
visées allemandes. En dehors de ces deux partis, il ne peut y avoir que des humiliations terribles, ou la 
guerre, ou probablement les deux. Que le second soit infiniment préférable, c’est ce qui est à mes yeux 
évident’. Simone Weil, ‘L’Europe en guerre pour la Tchécoslovaquie?’, in Écrits historiques et 
politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 86. 
507 ‘Il est vrai que la satisfaction des revendications de l’Allemagne en Tchécoslovaquie ferait tomber 
toute l’Europe centrale sous son influence. Ceci nous amène à un autre point de vue, celui du rapport 
des forces. Il n’est plus question de droit’. Simone Weil, ‘L’Europe en guerre pour la 
Tchécoslovaquie?’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 83. 
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tone of Europe pre-WWII. Everyone is grappling to understand how, again. 
Afterwards everyone questions, why? 
The reality of Hitler’s intentions is another matter, however. Even though Weil 
sates that Hitler’s racist ideology required periodic and brutal affirmations of power, 
she accepts his claims of the contested German territory. If Hitler wants to regain the 
Sudetenland, which the Versailles Treaty took from the German nation, Weil accepts 
that he had some basis for that. If nations honestly supported Woodrow Wilson’s 
Fourteen Points, particularly a people’s right to self-determination, the fact that most 
German speakers in Sudetenland never had the opportunity to decide their fate posed 
a problem of consistency. This same indifference to a people’s right to choose 
occurred in 1919, when the fate of the Austrian German-speaking population was 
decided without their consent. If re-altering Germany’s frontiers might satisfy Hitler, 
she reasons, that since the victors at Versailles decided without a referendum to give 
part of Germany to Czechoslovakia, then returning the territory to Germany might 
extend the peace. Weil understood the painful reality that the grand principle of 
European stability is constructed on war. If hegemony in Central Europe fell to 
Germany, the perceived balance of power between nations would be seriously altered. 
France wanted to keep its hegemony in Europe, but could not, in good conscience, 
accept only its own hegemony without considering that of others. There is, however, 
a downside to being the dominating power, for hegemony creates its own strain within 
a nation. It is arguable that maintaining a position of power among countries 
eventually wears out a nation from the inside. Weil argues that Germany’s 
sustainability in a position of domination might not be durable. This experiment, not 
yet purposefully tried, might be far less costly than war. However, I argue that 
L’Europe en guerre pour la Tchécoslovaquie is the tipping point of Weil’s pacifist and 
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conciliatory beliefs. Her concession that the Czechoslovakian government should 
marginalise Jews and communists, so hated by the National Socialist regime, to 
maintain the peace is complex. Doering states that what ‘led her to this point was a 
willingness to weigh all options, not indifference to the well-being of others’.508  
Whilst Weil later condemns the limitations of her wholehearted commitment to peace, 
what she considers at the time is a compensatory sacrifice to avoid the horrors of war. 
This is contradictory because she still accepts this compromise and maintains a pacifist 
position. 
One final time before the outbreak of war, Weil comments on the political 
situation in Réflexions en vue d’un bilan.509 In March, Hitler’s troops occupy Prague; 
in April, Mussolini invades Albania, and Britain introduces conscription; in May, 
Germany and Italy conclude a military alliance. For, while ‘both war and the 
domination of civilian life by the military are evils as great as enslavement by 
foreigners’,510 it is equally true that ‘an enslaved country may be subjected to a military 
regime and compelled to participate in its conqueror’s wars’.511 In an era of unlimited 
or total war, any peace is likely to be as catastrophic as the war which preceded it. 
Since security could only be achieved by universal domination, ‘either some other 
country will acquire ‘universal domination’ — which will be no less of an evil in its 
hands — or, more probably, since there seems to be no country of sufficient calibre 
 
508 E. Jane Doering, Simone Weil and the Specter of Self-Perpetuating Force (Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2010), p. 38. 
509 Reflections in view of an assessment.  
510 ‘Certains sont prêts à subir même la perte de l’existence nationale plutôt que d’avoir recours soit à 
la guerre, soit à la militarisation complète du pays; et leur opinion peut être défendue ou condamnée 
par des arguments également sans réplique, car s’ils montrent facilement que la militarisation de la vie 
civile et la guerre comportent des maux égaux à ceux de l’asservissement à l’étranger, on peut alléguer 
tout aussi facilement qu’un pays asservi peut être soumis à un régime militaire et contraint de participer 
aux guerres de ses maîtres’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions en vue d’un bilan’, in Écrits historiques et 
politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 100. 
511 Ibid. 
190 
 
for the role, the total ruin of Europe, which will thereafter no doubt become, in its turn, 
a colonial territory’.512 Negotiation simply became a phase of the war itself, designed 
above all to preserve prestige, which is the essence of power. For Weil, the key to the 
situation did not lie in speculating about the psychology of Hitler. He was no maniac 
obsessed with delusions of grandeur: 
The appetite for power, even for universal power, is only insane when there is no possibility 
of indulging it; a man who sees the possibility opening before him and does not try to grasp it, 
even at the risk of destroying himself and his country, is either a saint or a mediocrity.513 
Nevertheless, in the long term, totalitarian regimes such as Hitler’s are subject to 
fundamental weaknesses. The examples of imperial Rome and the Soviet Union show 
that the constant purging of the top echelons of society undermine the continuous and 
reliable team-work demanded by action on a grand scale. Also, when the only 
incentives remaining are fear or ambition for power, weaknesses in the technical field 
soon become apparent. Most important is the strain on the human material. 
The real stumbling-block of totalitarian regimes is not the spiritual need of men for freedom 
of thought; it is men’s inability to stand the physical and nervous strain of a permanent state 
of excitement, except during a few years of their youth.514 
Enthusiasm is a machine which wears out and, in the end, produces the combination 
of docility and rancour characteristic of slaves. Any sensible policy, therefore, should 
be to try to match the German system’s phase of expansion. An intuitive tactic of 
 
512 ‘L’anéantissement d’un pareil pays implique, ou qu’un autre pays acquiert la domination universelle 
— qui ne serait pas meilleure entre ses mains — ou plus probablement, car aucun pays ne semble de 
taille à jouer un pareil rôle, la ruine complète de l’Europe, vouée sans doute dès lors à devenir à son 
tour un territoire colonial’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions en vue d’un bilan’, in Écrits historiques et 
politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 102. 
513 ‘L’appétit de domination, même universelle, n’est une folie que si les possibilités de domination sont 
absentes; celui qui voit des chemins vers la domination s’ouvrir devant lui ne s’abstient de s’y avancer, 
même s’il doit y jouer son existence et celle de son pays, que s’il est ou un saint ou un homme de petite 
envergure’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions en vue d’un bilan’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: 
Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 106. 
514 ‘Le véritable écueil du régime ne réside pas dans le besoin spirituel qu’éprouvent les hommes à 
penser d’une manière indépendante, mais dans leur impuissance physique et nerveuse à se maintenir 
dans un état durable d’enthousiasme, sinon pendant quelques années de jeunesse’. Simone Weil, 
‘Réflexions en vue d’un bilan’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 111. 
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standing firm or giving way according to circumstance might yet circumvent the 
choice between enslavement and war. But Weil is now clear that her previous pacifism 
was no longer applicable. 
Only ten years ago France had the power to behave with generosity in Europe; even three years 
ago she could still at least have behaved with moderation; today she is able to do neither 
because she is not strong enough.515 
France’s attitude could not remain purely defensive, since such a stance would have 
been bad for morale and unlikely to succeed. Only appeals for genuine liberty could 
galvanise the people of France and further afield. But for that, a new atmosphere was 
necessary. 
It is not enough that France should be regarded as a country which enjoys the remains of a 
freedom acquired long ago. If she is still to count in the world — and if she does not intend to, 
she may as well perish — she must be seen by her own citizens and by all men as an ever-
flowing source of liberty.516 
Weil’s conclusion does not go so far as to state that her former pacifist stance is 
mistaken, only that it was no longer applicable. I content that Weil’s pacifism is now 
redundant because the position cannot be universally. Once a position can be defeated, 
in this case, pacifism is good but the use of force is sometimes necessary, then the 
position collapses on itself because of the person’s own declarations. A person cannot 
declare to be a pacifist and advocate the use of violence: it is a contradiction of 
definitions. Her sentiment of application parallels the tone of disillusion that followed 
her anarcho-syndicalism activities in the early years of the decade. In Réflexions she 
bids farewell to many of the expectations that inspired her commitment to the workers’ 
 
515 ‘Il y a dix ans encore elle pouvait agir en Europe d’une manière généreuse; il y a trois ans encore, 
elle pouvait au moins se montrer raisonnable elle ne peut plus ni l’un ni l’autre, parce qu’elle n’est plus 
assez forte’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions en vue d’un bilan’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: 
Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 114. 
516 ‘Il ne suffit pas que la France soit considérée comme un pays qui jouit des restes d’une liberté depuis 
longtemps acquise; si elle doit encore compter dans le monde — et si elle ne le doit plus, elle peut périr 
— il faut qu’elle apparaisse à ses propres citoyens et au monde comme une source perpétuellement 
jaillissante de liberté’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions en vue d’un bilan’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, 
Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 116. 
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movement. Now she had to, regretfully, admit that her aims in international relations 
proved equally elusive. Réflexions en vue d’un bilan517 also clarifies her understanding 
of pacifism and why she now rejected it. She believes that had France been able to 
carry out Aristide Briand’s initiatives after the Great War, Hitler could not have come 
to power. 
Virtue in itself is a timeless thing, but it has to be exercised in the course of time; and when, 
having the power to act wisely and justly in a given situation, one abstains from exercising 
virtue, one is often punished by the very ruin of that power.518 
By holding up a mirror to France, Weil wants to shame the country into facing publicly 
its own moral failings and to persuade people that the rationale for this war could lead 
to endless wars. Hindsight allows us a clearer evaluation of the various options than 
were evident in 1938—39, though I do believe that some evidence of National 
Socialism’s authoritative intent was observable. Weil’s determination to look at all 
sides clearly and to confront candidly her own cherished homeland’s abuses of power 
is an exemplar of probing reflection and some of its pitfalls. To her profound dismay, 
Weil discovers that she underestimated Hitler. Although her personal sense of guilt 
for promoting a pacifist position is unassuageable, she never denies her own 
responsibility for having encouraged conciliation. She spurns pacifism as no longer 
having validity for the current circumstances. 
You do not need a tank or an airplane to kill a man. A kitchen knife is enough. If those who 
have had their fill of the Nazi executioners all rise up together, at the same time that the armed 
forces strike the decisive blow, deliverance will be swift.519 
 
517 Can also be translated as Reflections in view of a balance sheet. 
518 ‘La vertu est en soi chose intemporelle, mais elle doit être exercée dans le cours du temps; et quand, 
ayant le pouvoir d’agir à l’égard d’une situation donnée d’une manière sage et juste, on s’abstient de 
l’exercer, on en est puni souvent par la perte même de ce pouvoir’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions en vue 
d’un bilan’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 114. 
519 ‘Il n’y a pas besoin d’un tank ou d’un avion pour tuer un homme. Il suffit d’un couteau de cuisine. 
Quand tous ceux qui en ont assez des bourreaux nazis se lèveront ensemble, en même temps que les 
forces armées frapperont le coup décisif, la délivrance sera rapide’. Simone Weil, ‘Fragment’, in Écrits 
historiques et politiques (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), p. 315. 
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In recognising that force has a central place in the human condition, Weil accepts that 
sometimes men of goodwill must deploy force. Hitler’s aggression causes her to alter 
her direction and to attend to the urgent need of making others aware of the inherent 
place that force, and its consorts, power and prestige, held in human aspirations. 
Nevertheless, war and force require explicit methods for evaluating ends and means. 
Her insistence on this need for evaluation and enlightenment is based on keen 
empirical observations of human behaviour and knowledge of history. A nation’s 
constant need to display its invincibility could lead to endless war. At this point, Weil 
embarks on the quest for a new strategy to understand force’s corrupting power. In her 
concern regarding the use of force, to keep it from spiralling out of control and 
demoralising everyone it touched, she devises her own variation on, not a just-war 
theory, but a just-force theory. While she accepts the use of force in very limited 
circumstances, she never again advocates complete accommodation when faced with 
an unconscionable deployment of force. 
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Conclusion: Accepting Inherent Force 
 
Weil now confronts the conclusion that is as complex as it is difficult to reconcile: that 
force is an inherent and inescapable part of the social fabric. A defining characteristic 
of force between living things is scarcity of resources as they attempt to mitigate and 
resist life’s death and decay. Power is the race to attain prominence in securing a share 
of this scarcity and oppression is the consequence of losing that race. Weil’s crucial 
observation is that oppression will always exist so long as we depend on each other, 
and she does not suggest that we will ever be truly independent. Recognising the 
tautological nature of existence defines Weil’s philosophical opposition as it relates to 
Marxism. In a broad sweep, it insists that if some measures are taken, like 
redistribution or wealth or socialising private property, then a paradisal state can be 
realised. Working towards a society without oppression (or alienation) is a 
contradiction in terms: for a large many people, the working entails oppression. Weil 
finally recognises that oppression cannot be eradicated as its bound to force. 
Instead of insisting that Weil’s position on force is solely because of the 
European war, it is more justifiable to suggest that her position could have been 
reached without the conflict. It is without merit to decipher what came first: the war 
or the development of her understanding of force. Yet, it is undeniable that the conflict 
informed the further development of force. I show in the opening section how force 
develops from an understanding of oppression, even though Weil’s argument 
developed through working conditions, Marxism and then oppression. As Weil 
considers force as perennial only when confronted with the impending conflict, it is 
necessary to outline her understanding of force in L’Iliade ou le poème de la force, 
where it declares at its outset: ‘The true hero, the true subject, the centre of the Iliad is 
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force’.520 Dietz states that ‘[i]mmediately, she draws our attention toward the same 
invisible, pervasive element that governs her analysis of oppression in […] 
[Réflexions]’.521 Instead of shifting perspective from Réflexions, Weil further develops 
her argument in L’Iliade ou le poème de la force. In attempting to define force, Weil 
states that force is 
that x that turns anybody who is subjected to it into a thing. Exercised to the limit, it turns man 
into a thing in the most literal sense: it makes a corpse out of him. Somebody was here, and 
the next minute there was nobody here at all.522 
Winch translates this definition to mean that force as ‘the power of the force which 
rules human life to turn anybody who is subjected to it “into a thing”,523 yet Weil does 
not clarify what X is in the above definition. There appears to be a materiality in the 
thing, though it is increasingly possible to understand this force in relation to its 
reification of human into non-human. Again, we are relying on its effects rather than 
its nature. It is only somewhat clarified when Weil underscores force’s possessive 
aspect as 
[t]he forces that men wield, the force that subdues men, in the face of which human flesh 
shrinks back. The human soul seems ever conditioned by its ties with force, swept away, 
blinded by the force it believes it can control, bowed under the constraint of the force it submits 
to.524 
 
520 ‘Le vrai héros, le vrai sujet, le centre de l’Iliade, c’est la force’. Simone Weil, ‘L’Iliade ou le poème 
de la force’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 227. 
521 Dietz, Between the Human and the Divine, p. 86. 
522 ‘La force, c’est ce qui fait de quiconque lui est soumis une chose. Quand elle s’exerce jusqu’au bout, 
elle fait de l’homme une chose au sens le plus littéral, car elle en fait un cadavre. Il y avait quelqu’un, 
et, un instant plus tard, il n’y a personne’. Simone Weil, ‘L’Iliade ou le poème de la force’, in Écrits 
historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 
1989), p. 227. This is a translation echoed by Rachel Bespaloff in Bespaloff, Rachel, Simone Weil: War 
and the Iliad (New York: New York Book Review, 2005). It can also be translated as ‘Force is that 
which makes a thing of whoever submits to it. Exercised to the extreme, it makes the human being a 
thing quite literally, that is, a dead body. Someone was there and, the next moment, no  
one’. 
523 Winch, The Just Balance, p. 145. 
524 ‘La force qui est maniée par les hommes, la force qui soumet les hommes, la force devant quoi la 
chair des hommes se rétracte. L’âme humaine ne cesse pas d’y apparaître modifiée par ses rapports 
avec la force; entraînée, aveuglée par la force dont elle croit disposer, courbée sous la contrainte de la 
force qu’elle subit’. Simone Weil, ‘L’Iliade ou le poème de la force’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, 
Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 227. 
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The germination of this thought is evident in the Réflexions, when she comments upon 
‘the race for power’525 and writes, ‘it is the reflection of this frenzy that lends an epic 
grandeur to works such as Comédie Humaine, Shakespeare’s Histories, the chansons 
de geste, or The Iliad’.526 In particular, however, she focuses on The Iliad, and notes 
that its primary theme is the ‘sway exercised by war’.527 Thus, she concludes, ‘in this 
ancient and wonderful poem there already appears the essential evil besetting 
humanity, the substitution of means for ends’.528 The substitution of means for ends, 
and the phenomenon of war taking on a life of its own, continues to guide Weil’s 
reflections in L’Iliade ou le poème de la force. She chooses France’s defeat and her 
own exile as the occasion to examine the universality of force more closely and The 
Iliad is the text that brings this political context most vividly to life. Consequently, 
within the body of L’Iliade ou le poème de la force we have a more detailed 
understanding of what Weil means by force, but is its essence that much clearer? Dietz 
states that ‘[w]e might characterise her understanding of this idea much as we did the 
‘collectivity’—force is both some ‘thing’ and nothing, a sinister mesh of 
 
525 ‘Le seul caractère propre à ce régime, c’est que les instruments de la production industrielle y sont 
en même temps les armes principales dans la course au pouvoir; mais toujours les procédés de la course 
au pouvoir, quels qu’ils soient, se soumettent les hommes par le même vertige et s’imposent à eux à 
titre de fins absolues’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, 
in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: 
Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 57. 
526 ‘C’est le reflet de ce vertige qui donne une grandeur épique à des œuvres comme la Comédie 
humaine, ou les Histories de Shakespeare, ou les chansons de geste, ou l’Iliade’. Simone Weil, 
‘Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, 
Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1991), p. 57. 
527 ‘Le véritable sujet de l’Iliade, c’est l’emprise de la guerre sur les guerriers, et, par leur intermédiaire, 
sur tous les humains; nul ne sait pourquoi chacun se sacrifie, et sacrifie tous les siens à une guerre 
meurtrière et sans objet, et c’est pourquoi, tout au long du poème, c’est aux dieux qu’est attribuée 
l’influence mystérieuse qui fait échec aux pourparlers de paix, rallume sans cesse les hostilités, ramène 
les combattants qu’un éclair de raison pousse à abandonner la lutte’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions sur les 
causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience 
ouvrière et l’adieu à la révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), pp. 57-58. 
528 ‘Ainsi dans cet antique et merveilleux poème apparaît déjà le mal essentiel de l’humanité, la 
substitution des moyens aux fins’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de 
l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la 
révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 58. 
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circumstances that overwhelms human agents, and an indiscernible power’.529 This 
understanding of force is concomitant to my previous discussions, that and force is 
something (external) which acts upon a person, persons or things and that we witness 
the effects of force. Dietz confirms this by stating that Weil ‘makes it both concrete 
and abstract, physical and spiritual, natural and social, visible and invisible’.530 
If we directly translate ‘est soumis’531 in isolation, then we discover the 
definition hinges on subjection: a thing subjected to another thing. When investigating 
the subjection of moral phenomena to necessity, Rhees comments on Weil’s use of 
language. He states, ‘I can understand being subjected to such and such a pressure or 
being subjected to radiation of such a such a sort’,532 so how are we to understand the 
subjection of a thing to another thing that falls outside of the continuity of, for 
example, the natural sciences, where, for example, water is subject to turning to steam 
at one-hundred degrees Celsius. Yet, even this example has a myriad of problems like 
water heated in a vacuum distorts the continuity of its subjection. Again we are 
redirected to it effects rather than its essence, which reinforces Dietz’s attempt to 
define: ‘[f]orce, it seems, is best understood by looking to it consequences—its ability 
to turn a human being into a thing— rather than to its origin, or to its cause, or to 
something like its internal nature’.533 If we recall that Weil gave a different definition 
to force in Réflexions, stating, ‘what needs to be understood above all is that it is not 
the manner in which use is made of some particular force, but its very nature, which 
determines whether it is oppressive or not’,534 it appears that the inarticulability is 
 
529 Dietz, Between the Human and the Divine, pp. 86-87. 
530 Dietz, Between the Human and the Divine, p. 87. 
531 Is subjected. 
532 Rhees, Discussion of Simone Weil, p. 35. 
533 Dietz, Between the Human and the Divine, p. 87. 
534 ‘La notion de force est loin d’être simple, et cependant elle est la première à élucider pour poser les 
problèmes sociaux. La force et l’oppression, cela fait deux; mais ce qu’il faut comprendre avant tout, 
c’est que ce n’est pas la manière dont on use d’une force quelconque, mais sa nature même qui 
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continued in L’Iliade ou le poème de la force. It seems we cannot know force. We can 
only experience its effects. Therefore, we must contend that force is only understood 
by its effects. 
Understanding force’s effects is more approachable. Force turns humans into 
non-humans by causing them to cease to live. The second instance is more 
problematic, however. By this Weil means that, while force has ‘the power to kill — 
to turn a living human being into a corpse; [it] also […] has the power to rob a human 
being of what is distinctively human about him or her: ability to consent, or power to 
refuse’.535 Running parallel to an understanding of force, we also have a further 
development, force can characterise a person’s humanness. Weil may also add what it 
is to be a free human. In Réflexions we understand that labour and the workers’ 
inherent ability to think, to engage, is at the centre of what it means to be human. The 
ability to consent and the power to refuse are now added. I contend that Weil 
understands force’s greatest effect to be outside of war, in that it is the weight which 
is placed on a person’s ability to think, thus negating liberty. She states: ‘before long 
he understands that the weapon will not turn aside, and, though breathing still, he is 
no more than matter; still thinking, he can think no more’.536 Moulakis argues that 
‘[s]ince power is a relationship—it is always power over someone weaker—at its 
extreme limit, killing, it abolishes itself by abolishing one of the poles of the 
relationship’.537 For Dietz, ‘Weil presents force as a power that one individual or a 
 
détermine si elle est ou non oppressive’. Simone Weil, ‘Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de 
l’oppression sociale’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: L’expérience ouvrière et l’adieu à la 
révolution, Volume 2: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 53. 
535 Winch, The Just Balance, p. 146. 
536 ‘Mais bientôt il a compris que l’arme ne se détourera pas, et, respirant encore, il n’est plus que 
matière, encore pensant ne peut plus rien penser’. Simone Weil, ‘L’Iliade ou le poème de la force’, in 
Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1989), p. 229. 
537 Moulakis, Simone Weil and the Politics of Self-Denial, p. 155. 
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group holds over another. But it is not just any sort of power; it is one that 
dehumanises’.538 I argue that Dietz’s force as a power is somewhat limited. It is not 
wrong to suggest that force is a power over individuals or groups, I argue that Weil is 
attempting to suggest that force exists irrespective of the ability of people to wield it 
in the form of power. Force is both pervasive, in that it is naturally occurring, and it is 
a tool or weapon or abstract pressure that can be exercised through power. In its most 
summary form, force kills. In a more subdued form, it strips a person of their human 
qualities. For Weil, ‘in whatever aspect, its effect is the same: it changes the human 
being into stone’.539 Instead of concentrating on the transformation of humans into 
things through killing,  she is (more) concerned with this stone-like quality 
transformation, ‘that of making a still living human being into a thing’.540 Moulakis 
states that ‘[t]hose who suffer always live under the more or less disguised threat of 
death, since the power to kill another human being is enough to half-kill him, turn him 
into a thing’.541 This is exemplified when Weil states that ‘[a] man disarmed and 
exposed, toward whom a weapon points, becomes a corpse before being touched’.542 
It can be understood that, aside from the crushing, indifference of nature and the 
physicality of war, the force of inhumane working conditions, like the inability to think 
as Weil understands it, delivers a similar non-fatal blow. But then the corollary for 
 
538 Dietz, Between the Human and the Divine, p. 87. 
539 ‘La force qui tue est une forme sommaire, grossière de la force. Combien plus variée en ses procédés, 
combien plus surprenante en ses effets, est l’autre force, celle qui ne tue pas; c’est-à-dire celle qui ne 
tue pas encore. Elle va tuer sûrement, ou elle va tuer peut-être, ou bien elle est seulement suspendue sur 
l’être qu’à tout instant elle peut tuer; de toutes façons elle change l’homme en pierre’. Simone Weil, 
‘L’Iliade ou le poème de la force’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 
3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 228. 
540 ‘Du pouvoir de transformer un homme en chose en le faisant mourir procède un autre pouvoir, et 
bien autrement prodigieux, celui de faire une chose d’un homme qui reste vivant’. Simone Weil, 
‘L’Iliade ou le poème de la force’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 
3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), pp. 228-229. 
541 Moulakis, Simone Weil and the Politics of Self-Denial, p. 155. 
542 ‘Un homme désarmé et nu sur lequel se dirige une arme devient cadavre avant d’être touché’. Simone 
Weil, ‘L’Iliade ou le poème de la force’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, 
Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 229. 
200 
 
Weil, which Winch outlines, is that ‘[f]orce may damage the human capacities not 
merely of the one who is at the receiving end but also of the one who, for the present, 
wields it’.543 I believe that Winch is arguing that force wielded diminishes human 
capacity, which in turn diminishes our capacity as humans. Here Winch wrenches 
force away from those solely subjected to include those who subjugate. Force has lost 
it possessive dominant quality as its pervasiveness taints even those who wield it, as 
echoed by Weil: 
Force is as pitiless to the man who possesses it, or thinks he does, as it is to his victims; the 
second it crushes, the first it intoxicates. The truth is nobody really possesses it. The human 
race is not divided up, in the Iliad, into conquered persons, slaves, suppliants, on the one hand, 
and conquerors and chiefs on the other.544 
Weil’s overall concern is, what is this thing that weighs upon man, which suffuses the 
world and holds all living creatures in its grip. For Moulakis  
[i]t is worth noting that Weil, and in similar passages Alain as well, trapped in their 
physicalism, were not out to discover a criterion for differentiating between power and force. 
If killing radically turns the victim into an object—that is, a corpse—then every exercise of 
power is analogously a relationship that deals in material objects.545 
However, while thinking in an abstracted form, Weil contemplates force from the 
perspective of the working conditions, of the proletariat, of the common solider. Dietz 
states that Weil ‘introduces the metaphor of slavery in order to underscore the abject 
condition of the defeated’.546 Maybe the term ‘defeated’ is a more understandable 
narrative, but it can be argued that a slave mentality is closer to Weil’s engagement 
 
543 Winch, The Just Balance, p. 146. 
544 ‘Aussi impitoyablement la force écrase, aussi impitoyablement elle enivre quiconque la possède, ou 
croit la posséder. Personne ne la possède véritablement. Les hommes ne sont pas divisés, dans l’Iliade, 
en vaincus, en esclaves, en suppliants d’un côté, et en vainqueurs, en chefs, de l’autre; il ne s’y trouve 
pas un seul homme qui ne soit à quelque moment contraint de plier sous la force. Les soldats, bien que 
libres et armés, n’en subissent pas moins ordres et outrages’. Simone Weil, ‘L’Iliade ou le poème de la 
force’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1989), pp. 233-234. 
545 Moulakis, Simone Weil and the Politics of Self-Denial, p. 155. 
546 Dietz, Between the Human and the Divine, p. 87. 
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with Roman history and an acceptance of a developing spirituality that relates to 
Catholicism, as Weil states: 
To lose more than the slave does is impossible, for he loses his whole inner life. A fragment 
of it he may get back if he sees the possibility of changing his fate, but this is his only hope. 
Such is the empire of force, as extensive as the empire of nature.547 
When Dietz argues that ‘force involves the diminishment of some human beings by 
others, and the suffering of some at the hands of others’548 she, like Weil, must account 
for a force that is also pressing on the people who dominate other people, such that the 
definition of force is so broad and so pervasive. Akin to her understanding of labour, 
I argue that Weil is more concerned with force from the point of the view of the people 
who are suffering at the hands of others and not those who dominate. It can be argued 
that because force acts upon all people in different guises, oppression has the same 
perennial quality. If we are to accept Dietz’s account, that 
Weil’s reflections here—on thinghood, on the loss of ‘inner life’, on the fragmentary and 
wasted nature of the existence of the slave/vanquished in whom ‘memory itself barely lingers 
on’—recall the graphic imagery of factory work she presents in La Condition ouvriére549 
combines with Weil’s account of her factory labour and an advocacy for the labouring 
classes. We then find a subjective, narrow version of force that does not account for 
force in its entirety, as per Weil’s earlier definition of the nature of force. Dietz 
challenges this argument, by stating that 
[w]e would be mistaken, of course, to draw from this the conclusion that Weil is somehow 
erasing all distinction between the extremities of factory work and the horror of war. Yet if we 
read [L’Iliade ou le poème de la force] with her earlier essays in mind, it is difficult not to see 
her preoccupation with the dehumanising aspects of earthly life.550 
 
547 ‘On ne peut perdre plus que ne perd l’esclave; il perd toute vie intérieure. Il n’en retrouve un peu 
que lorsque apparaît la possibilité de changer de destin. Tel est l’empire de la force: cet empire va aussi 
loin que celui de la nature’. Simone Weil, ‘L’Iliade ou le poème de la force’, in Écrits historiques et 
politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), p. 233. 
548 Dietz, Between the Human and the Divine, p. 87. 
549 Ibid. 
550 Ibid. 
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Dietz represents Weil accurately, but is it fair to question, that if force and its effects 
are inescapable, then the dehumanising element of force is also inescapable. Force 
always has the power to dehumanise. Force cannot not exist. It can be mitigated 
through commanding power. So, we could consider that an unpalatable aspect of 
power is that it is better to have power than not. In terms of humanity’s use of physical 
force, which emanates from a wider of understanding force, Weil states that 
[p]eople in The Iliad are not segregated into conquered, slaves, suppliants on the one side and 
conquerors and masters on the other; every human being may at any moment be compelled to 
submit to force. The warriors, though free and armed, submit no less to commands and 
insults.551 
How then do we expect, for example, factory owners to create an environment free 
from force that is pervasive and inescapable and that does not need to kill to 
dehumanise? It is an important shift in the concept of force if we are not divided into 
conquerors and slaves or the victors and the vanquished. Weil’s understanding insists 
that nobody is in possession of force. I contend we have the power to wield force and 
that that power is unstable. Dietz rephrases, stating that ‘[t]he reality of war, then, is 
larger than the dualism of conqueror/ conquered suggests. For in war, all humans are 
transformed into things, although perhaps in different ways’.552 The contradiction 
within this statement is that, if force is pervasive and all humans are subject to its 
dehumanising nature, then there is the possibility that all humanity can be 
dehumanised simply because they and force exist. As noted at the beginning of this 
chapter, Weil states that ‘[f]orce is as pitiless to the man who possesses it, or thinks he 
 
551 ‘Personne ne la possède véritablement. Les hommes ne sont pas divisés, dans l’Iliade, en vaincus, 
en esclaves, en suppliants d’un côté, et en vainqueurs, en chefs, de l’autre; il ne s’y trouve pas un seul 
homme qui ne soit à quelque moment contraint de plier sous la force. Les soldats, bien que libres et 
armés, n’en subissent pas moins ordres et outrages’. Simone Weil, ‘L’Iliade ou le poème de la force’, 
in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1989), pp. 233-234. 
552 Dietz, Between the Human and the Divine, p. 88. 
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does, as to its victims; the second it crushes, the first it intoxicates’,553 meaning force 
is non-discerning as to who it weighs upon. As, however, L’Iliade ou le poème de la 
force is written in the shadow of an occupied Paris, Weil is more concerned with force 
in relation to war, as she states: 
The point is that in this condition, there is no fixity, no stable identity; the intoxicated and the 
crushed are one and the same. And this is not only because, as in the Iliad, the progress of war 
is a ‘continual game of seesaw’ where the victor one day is vanquished the next. More 
importantly, war reduces everyone to a common denominator, to thinghood. It petrifies human 
sensitivity, compassion, generosity, and respect.554 
If we are to accept, as Weil has done, that, if force is pervasive and affects and weighs 
upon everyone, an acceptance of another form of force (war) is just another state of 
force. This leads to an escapable argument ad infinitum. 
Thus, war effaces every concept of a goal, even the goals of war. It effaces the idea of an end 
of war. The possibility of a situation so violent is unthinkable outside that situation; an end to 
it is unthinkable within it.555 
If war is another form of force and force is pervasive within nature and society, then 
pacifism when confronted with force is invalid, irrespective of the context of the force. 
If we are always acted upon by force then resisting force is the only corresponding 
action, save of being crushed or dehumanised. I argue that it is this line of thinking 
which dissolves Weil’s pacifist ideal. It can be argued that, as war is force and force 
is pervasive even outside of war, then engaging in war is just another form of the 
struggle against force. There could have been another account of this dissolution of 
pacifism according to Blum and Seidler, who state: 
 
553 ‘Aussi impitoyablement la force écrase, aussi impitoyablement elle enivre quiconque la possède, ou 
croit la posséder. Personne ne la possède véritablement’. Simone Weil, ‘L’Iliade ou le poème de la 
force’, in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1989), pp. 233-234. 
554 Dietz, Between the Human and the Divine, p. 88. 
555 ‘Ainsi la guerre efface toute idée de but, même l’idée des buts de la guerre. Elle efface la pensée 
même de mettre fin à la guerre. La possibilité d’une situation si violente est inconcevable tant qu’on 
n’y est pas; la fin en est inconcevable quand on y est’. Simone Weil, ‘L’Iliade ou le poème de la force’, 
in Écrits historiques et politiques, Tome II: Vers la guerre, Volume 3: Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1989), p. 242. 
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A deepened concern with spiritual values was an integral part of her rejecting her long-held 
pacifist position. She became convinced of the unimaginable destruction of human values that 
would result with Hitler’s victory.556 
Despite acknowledging force, Weil is also reluctantly advocating the use of force in 
war as it negates humanity’s ability to withstand force. In spite of the analysis 
suggesting a pervasive force, reluctantly this leads to the understanding that Blum and 
Seidler state, that ‘[a]fter a painful inner struggle she changed her view that the cost 
of war was greater, […] she accepted an overriding obligation to work for Hitler’s 
destruction’.557 Consequently, Weil sought to fully inform people of the repercussions 
of the impending conflict, imploring that if force is to be utilised in response to force 
that it should be done so in the full knowledge of its consequences for societal values. 
With the conflicts of the Great War and the Spanish Civil War still fresh in the minds 
of the readers of L’Iliade ou le poem de la force, the oscillating force detailed in 
Homer’s The Iliad is not minutely reawakened in advocacy of force but so the 
significance of that choice can be understood. Force clings to all exponents and 
unmitigatedly weighs upon the executioner as well as the victim. In L’Iliade ou le 
poem de la force Weil dissects the boundless capacity of force that can destroy men’s 
humanity. Accepting that force is significant throughout history and that no one can 
escape its pressure, Weil acknowledges that man must bear some responsibility for 
perpetuating its effects as Weil argues that we exasperate its effects. If force is 
inescapable, then anything that mitigates and lessens its heavy burden is preferable. 
Criticising the shortcomings of a Marxism that fails to recognise the full extent and 
consequences oppression or force, eventually, when Weil abandons her pacifist 
position it is because of a rigorously philosophical dissection of the political and social 
context devoid of ideological blinkers. 
 
556 Blum and Seidler, A Truer Liberty, p. 211. 
557 Blum and Seidler, A Truer Liberty, pp. 211-212. 
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Conclusion 
 
Simone Weil’s political and social writing not only analyses the tempestuous period 
of the twentieth century, it reflects a maturing philosophical consciousness that 
develops in parallel with its traumatic political events. Whilst not relevant to this 
thesis, I believe that Weil’s later work is an extension of this consciousness. Her life’s 
work suggests she embodies one of Alain’s lessons, that thought must be wedded to 
experience. The conjunction of theoria and praxis Weil maintains can hardly be 
overstated because it has immediate relevance to one of the difficulties of the French 
and European Left, in that it so often failed to bridge the substantial gap between 
bourgeois socialist utopianism and the real concerns and conditions of the 
impoverished working class. Irrespective of whether one agrees with Weil’s methods 
or analysis, it cannot be contested that Weil does not actively engage with her subjects. 
Painstakingly detailing the stages through which Weil’s philosophy evolves 
from pacifism to a justification of force, I present an argument in consideration of its 
evolution. I conclude that her thought could have evolved quicker had she not been so 
wedded to pacifism, syndicalism and Marxism. Whilst her rejection of syndiclaism 
and Marxism are informed by these movements’ inability to either deal with or 
understand the complexity of the problem respectively, it is fair to suggest that she 
may not have rejected pacifism except that WWII exposes its limitations, though the 
contrary is equally possible. I contend that only when she rejects these beliefs, through 
a combination of maturing analysis and reflective experience, that it beomes evident 
that oppression, power, and particualrly force, are undeniable and ineradicable. In 
order to prove this conclusion, my argument is chartered methodically through four 
chapters, spanning a chronological timeframe of 1925 to 1940. In one sense, it may 
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have been easier to begin with force, working instead from a thematic methodology, 
which might be punctured with a contextual timeframe. But if Weil’s philosophical 
development is to be understood, I contend that it must be explicated in parallel to the 
belief systems and political events of the time. 
The first chapter of this thesis identifies the thematic components of Weil’s 
philosophical education in Lycée Henri-IV and École Normale Supérieure, where 
labour and science are drawn from her earliest essays. It shows how Weil argues that 
labour should be the centre of life and that science has become almost inconceivable 
by a single person. The way Weil expands on these themes is the basis for her 
syndicalist activism. There is a problem methodically at this point, however. We 
cannot discount Weil’s age, that she is young and the authority of her ideas are 
compromised, or that her age presents limited grounds on which to criticise what is a 
developing philosophy. I argue, however, that these themes are ingrained politically 
as well as philosophically. I think it is uncontentious to suggest that from an early age 
Weil intellectually aligns herself with the socialist Left. I argue that this alignment 
hinders her development as a philosopher. The most important aspect of Weil 
philosophy at this stage though, is the redefinition of Descartes’s cogito from “I think” 
to “I (can) act”. This activity defines and later underpins Weil’s understanding of 
work, humanity and liberty and consequently, oppression and force. 
The second chapter details Weil’s engagement and subsequent progression 
through the French syndicalist movement. Developing political praxis alongside a 
teaching career, Weil’s appreciation and conflict with the French syndicalist 
movement develops a more militant hue. But her critique of orthodox Marxism also 
elicits a profound intellectual disagreement, which acts as a counterpoint that Weil is 
definitively Marxist. Where Marx believes that oppression can be eliminated, Weil 
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disagrees, stating that it can only be mitigated. This is a seminal period in Weil’s 
philosophical life. I argue that her profound dismay with syndicalism, in conjunction 
with a visit to Germany in the 1930s, elicit the first hints that force is a necessary 
countermeasure in social and syndicalist relations. But it is also fair to suggest that 
Weil does not reject syndicalism. In its current form, namely bureaucratic and elite, 
syndicalism is unable to deliver the type of revolution that she believes would be 
transformative and lasting. It is probably also fair to suggest that Weil’s type of 
revolution; slow and one not requiring a central elite, is highly unlikely. The revolution 
that she really desires is one where the individual is revolutionised, where liberty 
flourishes when one can choose (or reject) their actions, which stems mainly from 
“correct” working conditions, and that this revolution completely reforms the societal 
and political systems. I argue that this revolution is much more violent than, say, a 
militant, violent uprising against the government where buildings are looted and burnt. 
Weil instead wants to “burn down” a traditional way of thinking, wants to dramatically 
reduce the power of powerful people, wants to completely re-alter how the economy 
functions. Her version of a revolution requires the complete restructure of French and 
European life. 
The third chapter concentrates on her seminal work, Réflexions sur les causes 
de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale. In this section I provide textual evidence that 
Weil concludes her engagement with syndicalism because it cannot herald the reforms 
her philosophy requires. Preferring instead to concentrate on more theoretical work, 
she focuses on themes of labour, science and oppression, which I explicate from her 
earliest writings. Engaging more critically with Marxism and its defects, Weil’s argues 
that because power (and privilege) is a manifestation of oppression, then power is an 
undeniable and eradicable phenomenon. Consequently, oppression cannot be 
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eliminated and may only be mitigated.  Whereas Marx believes the bourgeoisie act 
primarily to obtain a disproportionate amount of goods and that re-altering the 
hierarchical system and ownership of production methods would erase oppression, 
Weil believes they act accordingly to retain power. This sharp distinction on the nature 
of oppression is the diverging issue between Weil and Marx. There are many 
contributing factors to oppression and Weil argues that Marxism reproduces rather 
than erases them. At this stage, power is central to Weil’s thought but the foundational 
factor of force emerges to have a greater bearing on her thought. Consequently, 
working conditions and liberty, science and privilege, and power and oppression, 
which are all underpinned by force, must be completely re-imagined. 
The final chapter provides evidence of Weil’s philosophical attempt to 
understand and subsequently accept force in L’Iliade ou le poème de la force. Whilst 
Weil might accept that force as a natural and social phenomenon exists, she struggles 
with its justified use in the impending Second World War and remains almost 
intractably pacifist. Building my argument throughout outline steps research, I argue 
that Weil’s experiences expose the limitation of syndicalism, Marxism and pacifism 
only when she disregards them as beliefs. Whilst Weil finds that syndicalism is unable 
to provide a method for reform and Marxism is limited because of its defects, namely 
is misunderstanding of oppression, Weil does not reject pacifism but recognises its 
limitations once again. Weil still holds pacifism as a moral position and yet struggles 
with her relation to its contradictions as her understanding of force becomes more 
conceptualised. Some of Weil’s remarks relating to Czechoslovakia are isolated 
during this timeframe and the inferences appear damning. Some of her arguments do 
not align with her previous work on oppression and her emerging but unarticulated 
ideas on human rights. It is arguable that Weil is philosophically at her most vulnerable 
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and most ruthless. In calculating the cost of war, a smaller number must pay the price. 
Whilst the experience and active engagement within these movements might lead Weil 
into a greater understanding, I believe she commits the cardinal sin: philosophers 
cannot join clubs. They cannot advocate from within political parties; they cannot be 
members of unions; they cannot be proponents of movements. Once this happens, it is 
very difficult to not be influenced by membership and association. Advocates of Weil 
will say that she never joined a political party or even a religion. She was, however, a 
strong proponent of syndicalism, Marxism and pacifism, and while she recognised 
their limitations, she should not have needed to rid these movements from her belief 
system. They should not have been held. 
Weil’s formal education concludes with Science et perception dans Descartes. 
It is important to show that she reworks Descartes’s cogito into a form of power 
through thinking, asserting, ‘I (can) act, therefore, I am’. However, this act only 
characterises thought itself – as an activity. In expressing that the power she has over 
her own beliefs is not an illusion and through this power she knows that she thinks, 
Weil reveals a discourse on the nature of doubt, thought, power, existence and 
knowledge. More significantly, previous essays and her dissertation incorporate the 
early iterations of themes on labour and science, showing that Weil’s earliest writings 
fecundate her later political writing, which predates the war. Directly relating these 
dissertation themes within France’s syndicalist tradition provides fertile criticism of 
Marxist socialist syndicalist ideology, where Weil analyses workers’ oppression in 
relation to her theory of labour. Therefore, in 1931, Weil champions unions as the 
vehicle imperative to actualising an ideal society rather than the machinations of 
political parties. She believes in the power of the collective (unions) to wage a peaceful 
class war. Considering revolution as a worthy pursuit, her focus is guided by a belief 
210 
 
in the unity of labour union politics during this period. Advocating pacifism and 
empathy for the underprivileged, the industrialised town of Le Puy becomes the battle 
ground for her activities in the syndicalist movement. When she takes her teaching 
post, this movement is torn between the reformist Confédération Générale du Travail 
(C.G.T.) and the Communist leaning Confédération Générale du Travail Unifiée 
(C.G.T.U.). During this period, Weil’s thought and action refer to the ethics and 
conceptions of anarchic-spirited revolutionary syndicalism and Marxism. Her 
solidarity with the working class dictates her participation in events arising from the 
economic crisis that wreaked early 1930s France. Accompanying a delegation of the 
unemployed to the mayor of Le Puy, Weil attempts to intervene on their behalf to the 
municipal council of this city. Advocating on behalf of the employed leads to a written 
declaration that force may be a necessary counterforce in the class war. 
Irrupted by the tension provoked by Hitler’s Nationalist Socialist’s policies, 
Weil laments the absence of coherent thought in the contemporary workers’ 
movement. The divisions within syndicalism, the party-political system and the 
fragmentation of movements like Communism, socialism and anarchism mean that 
lucid positions are inarticulable. Echoing Marx, Weil is also optimistic about the 
capacity of the German workers to provide the next revolution. Yet, after her trip to 
Germany, Weil is firmly convinced that Communist influences are harmful to the 
future of the labour movement, who, along with the socialists, social-democrats and 
the unions, fail to engage seriously with the rise of fascism.  Weil regards the situation 
from the workers’ revolutionary perspective, meaning that her belief in syndicalism 
diverts her attention from the more serious problem and I suggest that Weil mistakenly 
sought to articulate the plight of the underprivileged. The textual evidence shows that 
by examining oppression in relation to the conditions of proletariat workers, instead 
211 
 
of the totality of those who are oppressed, her analysis is far from encompassing but 
still more developed than Marxism. However, a visit to Germany marks the beginning 
of Weil’s political and syndicalist despondency. Thereafter, she shows no real 
engagement in trade union activities as she recognises that their prospects of change 
are illusory. The rejection of revolutionary syndicalism led her to withdraw from her 
political and syndicalist activities to focus on theoretical work. 
Responding to a differentiation between idealism and actuality, I argue that 
methodologically Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale can 
be understood in two sections. The first section focusses on analysis and critique. In 
the second section Weil envisages an ideal and compares the viability of contemporary 
social life to absorb such an ideal. I argue that we can essentially divide the article into 
two parts; critical analysis and idealistic abstraction. The division between these two 
sections is an important development in Weil’s thought. How we understand the 
confrontation between the conceptual ideal and the diagnosed reality is paramount. It 
is not that the ideal fell short, it is that Weil recognises the limitations of Marx’s ideal. 
Where Weil stretched an unlikely aspiration, she believes that Marx did not fully grasp 
the problem. This underpins Weil’s rejection of revolutionary syndicalism, Marxism 
and ultimately pacifism. My articulation of the difference between Weil’s idealism 
and actuality is underpinned by Weil’s argument that the modern worker is not offered 
the opportunity to conceptualise and act on his liberty. In order to demonstrate why 
this step is important, it is necessary to contrast Weil and Marx. Weil still believes 
after her disengagement with syndicalism that a real revolution required that workers 
re-appropriate knowledge and gain dominionship over the science that informs the 
production methods. It is important to understand Weil’s theory of labour to 
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distinguish earlier Weilian thinking in relation to Marxism with the later Weilian 
thinking and Marxist ideology. 
One of the main differences between Marx and Weil is her insistence that the 
individual worker, as opposed to the collective, should be considered as the supreme 
value. In believing that the labouring worker should be the supreme value, she opposes 
specialisation that reduces his ability to think as it blunts his ability to conceive liberty. 
The obvious rebuttal is that Marx is also concerned for the worker. But Weil extends 
far beyond Marx, in that she wants to give the worker the dignity of understanding the 
entire production process, which is not just controlling the means of production. Marx 
wants to redistribute power to the worker, while Weil wants to empower the worker. 
As revolutionary as Marx’s idea are, Weil’s ideas are much more seismic, even 
violent, requiring a complete reshape and redirection for (French, European, world) 
society. An implementation of her ideas would change society beyond recognition and 
may even cause economies to collapse. Weil does not provide an explanation of how 
this might be actualised, though her later work, The Need for Roots, is a closer 
manifestation of these ideas. Even the idea of de-specialising the economy, which 
amounts to specialising all workers in all things related to their field, is (somewhat) 
beyond comprehension. It may not be her area of expertise or something that she does 
not need to concern herself with, but, while this ambition is laudable, it shows that she 
does not engage with the economics of such an argument. I suggest that the radical 
change which Weil sought could lead to even more desperation and oppression as 
economies collapse. We also must recognise that Weil does not discriminate between 
capitalists, classes of capitalists, or even capital. This oversight is important because 
this inarticulation inadvertently moves her closer to a Marxist position. Its inference 
is that those who are oppressed are not capitalists or that (some) capitalists do not 
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suffer oppression. It is type of bluntness that Weil criticised, because analysis without 
perspicuity differentiates her from Marx. As her work is devoid of such a perspective, 
I argue that Weil does not appreciate that there is industrial (factory) capitalists and 
financial (speculative) capitalists but also shop keepers and sole traders and employers 
of two and three people. This type of dogmatic composition is an example of blunt 
Marxism, which asserts that temporary oppression is an acceptable means to 
disintegrate the classification of classes. Weil (correctly) diagnoses part of the problem 
with capitalism, but then attempts to solve it be eradicating capitalism, creating a 
fallacy of composition. If there is a problem with some part of capitalism, then trying 
to solve it by eradicating capitalism is likely to solve the problem, but only at the 
expense of those who did not cause the problem. If the problem with capitalism is 
speculative financial capitalists and not a shopkeeper hoping to expand, then the 
shopkeeper is considered similarly to the speculative financial capitalist. Hence, where 
the analysis is blunt, the solution is crude. In contrast, Weil believes that Marx sins by 
optimism, asserting that oppression is destined to disappear because it is bound 
exclusively to the mode of capitalist property. In a more developed contrast, Weil 
believes oppression is linked to the production of great industry and the unlimited 
development of the productive forces. She criticises the very notion of revolution, 
particularly the Soviet kind, which represents a degenerate bureaucratic deformation 
of the dictatorship of the proletariat state. In regarding the USSR bureaucracy as a new 
social class form as exploitative as capitalism, Weil’s belief that a revolution against 
the apparatus of State shows she still held a position that war is not justified because 
war-time production is a heightened form of oppression. 
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Weil circumvents man’s seemingly endless servitude by arguing that an ability 
to think allows an idea of liberty to be retained. One could be forgiven for thinking 
that Weil aims at forming a society free from oppression. Utilising the free ability to 
conceive, she images a society that mitigates oppression. Weil, however, cautions that 
oppression must distinguish between the suppression of individual (harmful) desires 
and the need for social order and harmony. The constraint that society imposes on 
individuals should not be confused with oppression unless it results in a division of 
those who exercise it and those who are subject to it, in effect, giving those in 
command the power to crush those who obey. Having made this distinction though, 
Weil argues against the assumption a priori that the abolition of oppression would be 
possible and concludes that it is impracticable to expect that the utopian use of 
technology would alleviate the burdens imposed by nature, and man and society. If it 
were possible, unlimited production might eradicate nature’s burden through food and 
shelter, but societal issues, albeit maybe new ones, would still occur. Power and the 
race for power would still exist as some new form of oppression is created. It is through 
this evidentiary caution that it can be contested with certainty that Weil rejected 
Marxism. 
As tension engulfed Europe in 1937, Weil implores the Europeans not to repeat 
the Trojan War in her pacifist article, Ne recommençons pas la guerre de Troie. Based 
on Homer’s The Iliad and the account of the Trojan War, Weil’s article analyses the 
mechanism of murderous force. Detailing this development in her writing shows its 
evolution as it transitions from an almost unconditional pacifist viewpoint to the 
acceptance of a justified force in an inevitable war. It is my contention that the 
inevitability of war as a force illuminates the point that, even if one does not wish to 
engage in force, force may be employed anyway. For Weil, the Spanish Civil clarifies 
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this unpalatable aspect of force. Occurring because of political unrest, mirrored 
somewhat in France and Germany, the volatile theatre, which rejected political 
methods for violence means, is a decisive stage in Weil’s rejection of pacifism. The 
themes of science and labour were still applicable, but they had to be re-envisaged. 
The fight in Spain was a political, unionised issue, concentrating on the distilled issue 
of who decides: the nationalists or the monarchy; the unions or the factory owners; the 
(religious) status quo, the socialists, the anarchists or the myriad of splinter groups. 
This chaotic milieu forces Weil to delve behind labour and science to reformulate the 
themes as oppression, power and force in Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de 
l’oppression sociale. Weil struggles to fully articulate a definition of force, and 
reformulating the definition in L’Iliade ou le poème de la force, I conclude that the 
ambiguity in Réflexions is replicated in L’Iliade ou le poème de la force. 
Prior to 1936, Weil’s position is clear. In Réflexions sur la guerre she is almost 
unconditionally pacifist and condemns all foreign war and even so-called 
revolutionary war like that of 1792 as it fails to take account of oppression. The enemy 
of the people is the State and its apparatus. Only a social revolution without the means 
of war is legitimate, as all war leads to despotism and continues or increases 
oppression. Weil’s Non-intervention généralisée558 approves of France’s non-
intervention policy in Spain and questions whether that consistency should be 
enforced as it related to the pacts that France had signed with other countries. This 
argument is decisive because Weil countenances whether it is necessary to remain 
passive while Germany invades Czechoslovakia, even though France had signed a pact 
of assistance that had not been ratified. We can understand that Weil is attempting to 
avoid war at all costs, but to what extent is she accepting an ever-increasing bill of 
 
558 Generalised non-intervention. 
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sale? Despite still holding a position of pacifism, it is also difficult to understand the 
extension of its limit. We can understand her reasoning, however. Ne recommençons 
pas la guerre de Troie, subtitled, Pouvoir des mots, demonstrates how men might fight 
for abstract words and phrases, like fascism, communism, nation, order, authority and 
property. Justifiably, she argues that these concepts are rarely pure in their essence, in 
that they are infrequently always true all the time. The article dismantles all the 
pretexts, all the mechanisms by which countries justify war. However, I argue that 
Weil also utilises the same Orwellian abstraction of words to advocate against war. In 
a sense though, we exist in the same argument. All language is abstract, and so open 
to interpretation. Language can be hollow, meaningless phrases, until such time as it 
manifests concretely, if ever at all. The Spanish Civil War continues and Weil realises 
that the war is no longer an uprising of peasants oppressed by the Nationalists and the 
Church. Without the western powers deciding to intervene amidst the fear of a 
European conflict, Republican Spain dies gently as Russia, Germany and Italy turn the 
peninsula into the matinée for a greater conflict. 
When Germany annexes Austria, the focus turns to Czechoslovakia and the 
agitation of the Sudeten minorities. It is within this atmosphere that Weil publishes 
L’Europe en guerre pour la Tchécoslovaquie. I contend that Weil struggles to 
maintain a coherent argument, based on a hangover of her political beliefs from her 
upbringing, school and university. She tries to argue for the avoidance of war within 
a Leftist framework. It is difficult not to lament that she casts aside the very people 
she once principally stood for, though undoubtedly, she is arguing pragmatically. If 
Weil believes in the value of life and the rights of citizens, then not only accepting but 
advocating that a group should be subjugated by another is a contradiction in terms of 
her own convictions. I am not trying to assert the universality of either of her positions. 
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The framework that I use is Weil’s argument. She cannot advocate both for the 
mitigation of oppression and that some people should be oppressed. 
Far from completely castigating Weil’s patience in concluding that force is 
perennial as Europe catapulted itself in another conflict, it is of greater insight to detail 
the development of her understanding of force in L’Iliade ou le poème de la force after 
she recognise pacifism’s limitations. Attempting to articulate force in accordance with 
its nature in Réflexions, Weil is more assured of the concept by the time she writes 
L’Iliade ou le poème de la force. However, while we observe a determined 
concentration on force, the more that Weil attempts to define force, the more it 
becomes opaque. By her own assertion, we cannot know force, we can only experience 
its effects. I suggest that force exists in nature, irrespective of man, and then it 
continues to exist in the same and different guises when man exists. The manifestation 
of man’s interrelationship (strife and success) as he attempts to mitigate force is power. 
In finally accepting, as Weil did, that, if force is pervasive and weighs upon everyone, 
she still employs a measure of doubt by imploring that if force is to be utilised in 
response to force, then it done so in the full knowledge of its consequences. It is fair 
to suggest that Weil does not reject the aspirational merits of pacifism but that she 
recognises pacificism’s limits in counteracting an opposing, physical force deployed 
by humans. I contend though, that in failing to employ a rigorous measure of doubt 
whilst advocating for syndicalism, Marxism and pacifism, it appears Weil’s own 
beliefs stifle her development. We can understand that Weil’s desire to advocate and 
be a voice for the underprivileged against the oppressors means that philosophy’s 
semantics cannot alleviate hunger or mitigate the crushing weight of force. Is the 
lesson then to be taken from Nevin’s ‘Inconclusions’, that ‘[Weil] does not solve 
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problems, but she can more than occasionally help us in trying to face them’?559 This 
I certainly believe to be true. With that in mind, we must return to Rush Rhees’s 
patience in the introduction, who, in doubting his own sensibilities, helps us to 
recognise that Weil bypassed that which did not provide an answer to the completeness 
and complexity of the world. As such, one must be compassionate for such a profound 
figure writing in an era of illimitable turmoil. Weil only sought to understand and 
delivers herself from this world on pain of conviction. 
  
 
559 Nevin, Simone Weil: Portrait of a Self-Exiled Jew, p. 384. 
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